STABILIZATION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Client: Global Affairs, Canada
LITERATURE REVIEW
STABILIZATION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Client:
Global Affairs, Canada

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# ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>3D</td>
<td>Diplomacy, Development, Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Australian Civilian Corps</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil–Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter-Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSF</td>
<td>Conflict Stability and Security Fund (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIIS</td>
<td>Danish Institute for International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid operations (EU)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>GAC</td>
<td>Global Affairs, Canada</td>
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<td>GPSF</td>
<td>Global Peace and Security Fund (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (EU)</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IDPS</td>
<td>International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State Building</td>
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<td>INCAF</td>
<td>International Network on Conflict and Fragility</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Task Force</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>Norad</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>OECD/DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>PRA</td>
<td>International Assistance Evaluation Division (Canada)</td>
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<td>PRISM</td>
<td>Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation (EU)</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>PSF</td>
<td>Peace and Stabilisation Fund (Denmark)</td>
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<td>PSOPs</td>
<td>Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (Canada)</td>
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<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>SDN</td>
<td>Stabilization–Development Nexus</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Canada)</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reforms</td>
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<td>SU</td>
<td>Stabilization Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report</td>
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<td>WHS</td>
<td>World Humanitarian Summit</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Due to an increase over the last decade in violent conflicts—in the numbers of affected populations, costs and new conflict patterns—efforts to bring more people out of poverty have been hampered. This has consequently led to a growing interest in what has been termed “fragility” and “conflict-affected states” and consequently in how to engage in these situations with humanitarian, development and security or stabilization interventions. Interest in the nexus between these efforts has also grown. This is reflected in Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals, defined as promotion of “peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.”

Based on this review of literature concerning the stabilization–development nexus, we in summary present the following findings:

1. The concept of stabilization remains contested and lacks an agreed and unambiguous definition. Both in political and scholarly debates, the term is often used in ways that overlap with other, often equally contested, concepts such as conflict management, peacebuilding, state building or counter-insurgency. Often, however, stabilization is associated with joined-up or integrated civilian/military efforts undertaken by external actors in conflict situations where there is no peace to keep. This is also the working definition we have used for this review. Depending on the context and the institutional actor in question, the level of ambition for such efforts may range from a focus on halting the fighting, providing the basis for building legitimate and inclusive state structures, including justice and security structures, and creating employment and livelihood possibilities.

2. Debates over stabilization draw upon and continue long-standing debates over the security and development nexus. This includes reigniting concerns over the securitization of development, including the risk of overly militarized engagement in complex political situations and fundamental questions related to who benefits from security. As is the case with many other concepts that prescribe international engagement in fragile situations, many critiques have pointed to its underlying Western, liberal model and its emphasis on promoting democracy and market economies. Other critiques, however, argue that stabilization reflects a lowering of liberal ambitions and a turn toward a more pragmatic, contextualized, and arguably more realistic, approach to ordering fragmented societies.

3. Increasingly, there appears to be a recognition of the importance of the wider humanitarian–development–security nexus. In the literature, however, the nexus discussions have focused either on the humanitarian–development nexus or the development–security nexus. The concept of stabilization has the potential to bridge the two yet remains underdeveloped.

4. Evaluations of attempts to practically implement stabilization together with development are relatively few and in those that exist there are few identified good practices, The following, however, are important points raised in the evaluations studied:
a) There is a need to more clearly define objectives and results of efforts at the stabilization-development nexus (SDN) and ensure that it is understood that stabilization is political.
b) A thorough understanding and analysis of the context is necessary and should be a shared undertaking by relevant actors at local, national and international levels.
c) Planning of the efforts should be done through an integrated, whole-of-government approach and separate planning by security, humanitarian and development actors should be discontinued.
d) Necessary flexibility should be built into the planning to adapt efforts to the evolving situation in an often very unstable environment.
e) Nexus efforts need local ownership and considerations should be given to inclusive processes. Care should be taken to the influence that interventions will have on conflict, especially where local governments are part of the conflict and lack legitimacy.
f) In order to enable and improve monitoring and evaluations a clear theory of change (ToC) should be developed but that has the necessary flexibility to adapt to a changing scenario.

These points are in line with the recently published “DAC Recommendations on the Humanitarian-Peace Nexus” which have the potential for becoming the new metrics for stabilization related evaluations.

5. Stabilization programs of the seven countries in question have different understandings of stabilization and modes of working but have similarities in that they use a whole-of-government approach, provide flexible funding—which can be released quickly and adapted to the situation in question—and provide both civilian and military assistance. A move toward more realistic stabilization programs, both in terms of scope and aim, seems to be a common feature and resonates with the developments in academic discussions.
1. INTRODUCTION

The International Assistance Evaluation Division (PRA) of Global Affairs Canada (GAC) plans in the near future to launch evaluations of Canada’s international assistance in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, and assistance delivered through the Peace and Stabilization Operations (PSOPs) Program.

As all these evaluations will include the stabilization–development nexus, PRA has commissioned this literature review of findings and lessons learned concerning the stabilization–development nexus (SDN) based on donor evaluations and academic sources to support the development of the evaluation strategies for these evaluations.

Consequently, the objective of this assignment is a “literature review of findings and lessons learned based on donor evaluations and academic sources.”

The approach to this literature review has been theory-based, as the initial effort has been to understand the theory or theories of the change expected by applying stabilization and development efforts simultaneously in fragile and often violent conflict situations. Discussions of this are presented in Section 2 below and in Annex 1.

We have attempted to compare different approaches to practical stabilization efforts of seven different countries/organizations and the findings, conclusions and lessons learned of evaluations of SDN implementations especially related to Afghanistan, DRC, Mali and PSOPs. This is presented in Sections 3 and 4 below.

The final section (Section 5) presents the findings, lessons learned and conclusions.

The main method for this review has been desk-studies of secondary sources, mainly documents accessed through open sources. It has included:

1. A review of academic literature:
   Although there have been discussions of methods for aid delivery in fragile situations for decades, the breakthrough for the discussions on the humanitarian–stabilization–development nexus came during the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in May 2016. We suggested to focus our review of academic literature from 2016 onwards, but as this literature was limited, we have also have included literature, mainly from January 2014 and onwards, that prepared the way for more recent discussions. The review has included both pure academic literature, as well as grey and more normative literature.

2. Review of evaluations:
   The review of evaluations has included relevant donor evaluations since January 2014 by Australia, Canada, Denmark, the European Union (EU), the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). Focus has been on evaluations of stabilization-development efforts related to Afghanistan, DRC, Mali, and peace support operations in general. Due to the limited number of such evaluations, we have included evaluation of nexus operations in Somalia and South Sudan.

3. **Brief analysis of seven stabilization programs.**
   Australia, Canada, Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US all have stabilization programs. Some initial research by GAC has formed the basis for our brief analysis, which has been updated with more information found through an online search of documentation. The analysis has attempted to identify similarities and differences between the stabilization programs of the seven entities and a schematic overview of this can be found in Annex 2.

This study represents a time-bound review of the literature. It does not claim to be exhaustive in scope and almost exclusively addresses literature, which can be accessed online.
2. STABILIZATION: CLARIFYING THE DEBATE

The notion that security and development are inextricably linked has long shaped debates on international responses to civil wars and complex political emergencies in the Global South and prompted a rise in various forms of multidimensional, civil–military, engagements aimed at helping societies marred by systemic violence, endemic poverty and organized crime move toward a stable peace.

Dating back to the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace, emphasis has been on overcoming political, bureaucratic and conceptual silos between security and development and enabling a coherent contribution to securing peace. To advance this goal, donor governments and international organizations have developed an abundance of policy concepts, including notions of peacebuilding, state fragility, post-conflict reconstruction, whole-of-government approaches and most recently, so-called pathways to peace. It is within this broad agenda that the notion of stabilization is gaining ground and used as a common moniker for a range of efforts undertaken primarily by Western actors in places such as Afghanistan, Mali, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine.

From the outset, the field has been beset by definitional uncertainties and conceptual confusion, contestation and competition. The fluidity has been reinforced by the tendency of decision-makers and policy practitioners to use the various terms inconsistently over time and between different contexts. This also goes for the emerging debate on stabilization, which both in the scholarly literature and in policy documents lacks an understanding of what it is, what it is not, and how it differs from and relates to other forms of multidimensional, international interventions in conflict-affected settings. As a result, the debate over what works in stabilization remains equally confused and inconclusive. It does not, however, start from scratch but rather draws on and continues the basic arguments that have shaped debates on the security–development nexus since the end of the Cold War. This includes critical debates on the wider politics

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2 We have in annex 1 included a note on the background for the discussions to the S-DN discussions and the development of efforts to support fragile and conflict affected states.
3 For more detail on these notions see annex 1.
7 http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/ourwork/Stabilization.html
11 While the focus in this report is on the nexus between stabilization and development, it is important to keep in mind that in most, if not all, situations, where stabilization is applied, the international engagement also involves considerable humanitarian assistance. Much work has been done on the humanitarian–development nexus and important policy advances were made at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. Ideally, the full humanitarian–stabilization–development nexus should thus be taken into account when contemplating how or whether to advance linkages between development and stabilization. Time and space, however, has only allowed this report to do so to a very limited extent.
of intervention and the basic question of whose security is at stake when the donor community’s concern for development and security are merged. It also includes problem-solving debates over how to best address the intrinsic contradictions that follow from using external intervention to foster domestic peace. The operational dilemmas of intervention have been identified in successive evaluations and lessons learned studies and point among others to the difficulty of:

- ensuring that what works in the short run does not run counter to what is necessary in the long term.
- managing civil–military relations in the field and between headquarters.
- legitimizing external involvement in the eyes of both taxpayers at home and local actors on the ground.
- translating universal values into particular contexts.

While these questions are not new, it is clear that the stabilization discourse is emerging in a global political climate that differs significantly from the one that gave birth to the comprehensive post-cold war Agenda for Peace. The era of liberal interventionism is rapidly waning—in part as a result of Western intervention fatigue following failed missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, in part as a result of wider changes in the global distribution of power and the growing role played by rising powers from the Global South in questions related to international peace and security. When held up against the ambitions of the liberal peace agenda of fundamentally transforming state–society relations and building a positive, self-sustaining peace based on democracy, human rights and equal opportunities for all, stabilization (in its various forms) thus comes through as a decidedly more pragmatic agenda. Arguably in an attempt to come to terms with the limited ability of international interventions to fix failed states, the stability discourse reflects both a lowering of liberal ambitions and an urge to “go local” in the search for stable solutions.

To further clarify what this means, it is helpful to distinguish between two distinct schools of thought. In one sense, these schools reflect an evolutionary understanding of the challenges at stake—from the simplistic to the more nuanced. In another sense, however, they mark clearly distinct approaches that each gives priority to perspectives of different actors. The first and oldest school emphasizes the “hot” aspects of stabilization: military-led actions undertaken in the midst of a violent conflict to bring the fighting to a halt. The second—increasingly popular—school stresses the political aspects of stabilization, including the importance of forging inclusive political deals.
2.1 HOT STABILIZATION

The “hot” approach to stabilization has been formulated and advanced primarily by US scholars and actors. It emphasizes the military aspects of conflict resolution and enlists civilian actors and aims as a means to further the goal of stabilizing the situation and laying the ground for a sustainable order that can be maintained by local actors.\textsuperscript{16} A clear example of this is the notion of minimalist stabilization developed by RAND as a cost-effective alternative to prolonged state-building interventions.\textsuperscript{17} RAND defines minimalist stabilization as small-scale operations designed to tip the balance in favour of local US allies. Such operations revolve primarily around training and equipping local security forces to enable them to do the fighting and subsequently maintain stability and control once the enemy has been defeated. This does not preclude the intervening party from also having combat troops on the ground and contributing to defeating the enemy, yet the brunt of the work is to be done by local forces who will stay on the ground and ensure that the advances are sustained and that order and stability can be maintained after the conclusion of international military intervention.

Importantly, hot stabilization assumes that simply defeating the enemy through kinetic operations will not in and of itself provide stability: Incentives must also be made for the population to turn against the insurgency and reinforce the basis for a social contract between the government and the population in the contested areas.\textsuperscript{18}

This underlines the close affinity between minimalist or hot stabilization and counter-insurgency—an affinity so strong that the two terms are often used interchangeably in the literature. It further suggests that the distinction between stabilization and (narrowly conceived) notions of state building is in fact quite blurred. The focus in both is on (re-) establishing the state’s monopoly on violence and strengthening the legitimate authority of the state through institution building and the delivery of key public services. The main difference seems to be the extent to which the actual fighting is left to local forces.

A key theoretical question that remains understudied is what happens when this hot notion of stabilization is applied in situations where the international intervention supports the insurgency and intervenes to help overthrow the existing regime. In the case of Syria, military training and equipment have been provided to opposition forces along with civilian governance assistance to local councils in opposition-held areas. While this can be seen as part of “a broader move toward bottom-up stabilization initiatives,” the incompatibility of combining counter-insurgency with


\textsuperscript{17} Watts, Stephen, Caroline Baxter, Molly Dunigan, and Christopher Rizz 2012: The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions, Washington: RAND

regime-change became apparent when the Assad-regime turned out to have far more staying power than initially expected.19

A key part of the critique that has been levelled against hot stabilization—whether framed as counter-insurgency or regime-change—is the underlying assumption that the legitimacy, and hence stability, of a governance arrangement is reflected in the provision of public services.20 No one, however, takes up arms because the closest health clinic is too far away.21 Basic political and economic interests, including fights for recognition, resources and self-determination are at stake in all violent conflicts. If international interventions are conducted in a depoliticizing and technical manner, they miss the mark. In recognition of this, the policy debate is increasingly paying attention to the need to get the politics right when seeking to reduce levels of violence. The theoretical backing for this is found in academic literature on political settlements.

2.2 STABILIZING THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

The political approach to stabilization revolves around forging a new and more inclusive political settlement that can ensure stability in heterogeneous societies. According to this view, the aim of stabilization is to foster a renegotiation of power-sharing arrangements to enable non-violent forms of politics to emerge and deal with the basic disagreements over interests, ideas and the distribution and use of power that are inherent to political life in all societies.22 This renegotiation is distinct from the notion of a social contract between state and people that underpins the liberal peace model and to some extent also the counter-insurgency, hot stabilization model. It is widely understood in the political settlement literature that this game plays out primarily between distinct groups and individuals that make up the elites while to some extent including relations between the elites and the ordinary people they each claim to represent. It is further understood that political settlement revolves around—and yet extends beyond—the formal institutional governance arrangements of the state and encompasses the entire political economy of a society, including all forms of informal, economic and concealed interests and actors.

To some scholars, this implies focusing on elite bargains—defined as discrete agreements or a series of agreements that explicitly renegotiate the distribution of power and allocation of resources between groups and individuals with significant power to make decisions and implement policies that affect wider populations.23 Others, however, advance a more people-centred approach that reaches deeper into the grassroots and everyday levels of society to build peace-

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20 Ibid.
22 Kelsall, Tim (2016) Thinking and working with political settlements, ODI
ful and inclusive societies.\textsuperscript{24} The latter approach takes a decidedly longer-term perspective to stabilization, whereas the former is more concerned with finding a power-sharing arrangement that works here and now. What they have in common is a claim that once the political settlement is inclusive enough, stability will follow.

This provides for a decidedly different use of development. It involves using aid in a manner that is politically smart, that uses aid to support the forging of an inclusive political process and by buying time and space for local actors to renegotiate their relationships rather than as a vehicle for delivering tangible development outcomes.\textsuperscript{25} In this way, the political approach to stabilization overlaps with recent calls for doing development differently, by “working with the grain” in a flexible, adaptive and iterative manner that allows for indigenous solutions to emerge.

This suggests that while the political approach to stabilization comes through as more palatable to civilian actors than the overly militarized hot approach, it is in fact quite demanding for development agencies. The emphasis placed on supporting contextualized, flexible, open-ended processes rather than specific programs prohibits not only the reliance on generic guidelines and best practices but also the identification of indicators and metrics and is thus inherently alien to the bureaucratic requirements of most agencies. The suggestion that international stabilizers should be used in a manner that remains open-ended and agnostic as to the type of local structures they support is equally difficult to comprehend for political and military agencies. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on forging stable political settlements may end up reproducing unfair, unjust and unequal systems of rule in a manner that may actually run counter to the strategic aim of stability.

This takes us into a new round of reflections on what comes after stabilization and whether stabilization should be seen as an entry point that enables a wider and more long-term transformative, international engagement. Or, should stabilization be understood as an exit strategy aimed at enabling domestic systems to maintain order within the territorial borders of the state? As such, we are back to the basic paradoxes and contradictions of using external intervention to promote domestic order, including in particular the dilemma of making sure that what works in the short term does not run counter to what is necessary in the long term.


\textsuperscript{25} Menocal, Alina Rocha (2014) Getting real about politics from thinking politically to working differently, ODI
3. COMPARING WAYS OF APPROACHING STABILIZATION EFFORTS

In this section, we will in brief describe the key differences and similarities between donors with respect to their stabilization programs and how they approach stabilization programming. This is mainly done through schematic presentations. Annex 2 contain a more detailed and longer presentation of this and includes summaries of evaluations and reviews of Canadian, US, UK, Danish, and EU stabilization programs.

The following is a schematic comparison of the seven different approaches to stabilization:

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<tr>
<th>CANADA</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>DENMARK</th>
<th>NETHERLANDS</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>AUSTRALIA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STABILIZATION DEFINITION</td>
<td>Maintain, restore and establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved.</td>
<td>Umbrella term for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, development, human rights promotion and capacity building of state institutions, with more possibility for long term engagement and development.</td>
<td>The initial response to violence or the immediate threat of violence. Approach used in situations of violent conflict designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability.</td>
<td>No definition but key objective to promote the collaboration of all relevant Danish instruments in achieving commonly defined stabilization goals.</td>
<td>Geared toward the normalization of the security situation and thus creating conditions for lasting development and peace.</td>
<td>No definition.</td>
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### 3. COMPARING WAYS OF APPROACHING STABILIZATION EFFORTS

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<tr>
<th>RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS</th>
<th>CANADA</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>DENMARK</th>
<th>NETHERLANDS</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>AUSTRALIA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Reports to Director General who reports to the Assistant Deputy Minister for the International Security and Political Affairs Branch in Global Affairs Canada.</td>
<td>State Department, reporting to the Under Secretary of Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights.</td>
<td>Joint efforts of Foreign Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defense and Department for International Development. The SU is a cross-government unit that reports through the National Security Adviser to the National Security Council.</td>
<td>Anchored in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department for Stabilization and Security. Decisions taken by the Steering Committee with officials from PM office, MFA, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice.</td>
<td>Guided by Stabilization Division within the Department of Stabilization and Humanitarian Assistance of the Netherlands MFA. The Division operates under the Director of the Department, who reports to the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.</td>
<td>PRISM operates under European External Action Service. IcSP. EU foreign policy instrument. The Division reports directly to Deputy Secretary General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response.</td>
<td>The ACC may work alone, with host governments or jointly with other partners or multilateral agencies. ACC office: Representatives from Department of Defense and the Australian Federal Police.</td>
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<tr>
<th>MECHANISMS</th>
<th>PSOPs</th>
<th>CSO</th>
<th>CSSF, SU</th>
<th>PSF</th>
<th>Stability Assessment Framework</th>
<th>PRISM, IcSP</th>
<th>ACC</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANNUAL INVESTMENTS IN STABILIZATION</td>
<td>PSOP: $450 million CAD over three years (2016)</td>
<td>15.7 million USD (2018 request)</td>
<td>CSSF: £13896000 (average 2017-2020)</td>
<td>Holds 450 million DKK annually with a combination of development and non-developments funds (2018)</td>
<td>Stability Fund: €100 million</td>
<td>PRISM: No budget of its own. Internally, there is a budget of €450,000 for mediation and dialogue-incl. stabilization activities.</td>
<td>$7.5 million AUD (2016-2017)</td>
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### 3. COMPARING WAYS OF APPROACHING STABILIZATION EFFORTS

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<th>AUSTRALIA</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NOTED POSITIVE ASPECTS ON APPROACH</strong></td>
<td>Focus on maintaining conditions for progress and development.</td>
<td>Refined focus.</td>
<td>Prioritize being proactive in their response to prevent conflict.</td>
<td>Strong and prominent conflict analysis.</td>
<td>Aligning PSF to Danish priorities.</td>
<td>Corresponds with priorities of Treaty of the EU, supports the Global Strategy.</td>
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<td>Provide targeted assistance and engaging in partnerships with international partners to foster more long-term responses to issues.</td>
<td>Flexibility and quick response.</td>
<td>Supporting engagements that address drivers of conflict, instability and insecurity.</td>
<td>Cooperative with EU external action priorities.</td>
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<td>This allowed PSOPs to better respond quickly to evolving situations.</td>
<td>Coordination between departments and strong alignment of priorities of partner country governments as well as a strong approach to conflict sensitivity</td>
<td>Promoting the effective and efficient use of resources.</td>
<td>Flexibility and speed.</td>
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<td>Development of management structures.</td>
<td>Politically responsive, with a strong focus on conflict prevention, democracy and good governance.</td>
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<td>Understanding of local context.</td>
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### CRITIQUES OF APPROACH

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<td>Some of OECD’s 10 principles for engaging in fragile states, were not explicitly integrated in PSOPs.</td>
<td>Lack of clarity on programmatic approaches and Theory of Change.</td>
<td>Weak theories of change and results frameworks.</td>
<td>Need to strengthen results and M&amp;E frameworks.</td>
<td>Improvement to “do-no-harm” practices.</td>
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<td>Not all PSOPs projects demonstrated the intention to ’act fast, but stay long enough to give success a chance’</td>
<td>Absence of baseline data to compare changes against.</td>
<td>Weak “do no harm” practices.</td>
<td>Need more focus on key stabilisation issues.</td>
<td>Lacking in clear definition of stabilization.</td>
<td>Lacking clear definition of what is meant by stabilization activities, as well as what intended outcomes and overall approach is.</td>
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<td>Information gaps about context resulting in poor situational awareness.</td>
<td>Stronger portfolio management needed.</td>
<td>Weak Theories of Change. Fund’s comparative advantage not adequately reflected in programming.</td>
<td>Need to build baseline for better performance measurement, improve overall strategic framework, improve conflict sensitivity and finally engage in more dialogue on challenges with other peace and stability funds.</td>
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<td>Not adequate flexibility in funding.</td>
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<td>Needs stronger management of the Fund.</td>
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The following figure shows the main elements included in each of the seven approaches: peace-building, state building, conflict prevention, security, and addressing conflict drivers.

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### 3.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Several of the seven stabilization frameworks did not define stabilization (e.g., Australia and Denmark) and hence had the flexibility to fund and program a wide spectrum of activities including conflict prevention, state- and peacebuilding, security, justice, and addressing drivers of conflict.

The few that tried to conceptualize stabilization have, over time, changed their understanding from being almost all-inclusive of what the academic literature called the liberal peace paradigm, including state and market building, to more realistic scope and aims. This appears to run parallel to the development in academic literature.

It is not always clear whose security is at the focus of the stabilization activities when reviewing the stabilization programs, but there appears to be a certain element of self-protection in the approach of many of the countries, notwithstanding that human security in recipient countries is also a focus.

By comparison—and despite a rather critical recent review of spending through the Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)—the UK’s stabilization program stands out in relation to its conscious conceptual evolution of stabilization, its support to academic research and its development of policies and guides for stabilization efforts. It seems that there is a lot to learned by many of the other countries from the UK’s stabilization resources and thinking.
The following are the main findings:

1. While there is no agreed definition or understanding of the concept of stabilization, there appears to be a move over time to limit stabilization to more pragmatic and realistic activities and objectives rather than building liberal states and promoting democracy. But most concepts include prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peacebuilding in their understanding of relevant activities.

2. There is a growing understanding that stabilization is a political process by political actors and not just a way of working through integrated, joined-up or whole-of-government activities to conduct neutral, technical, capacity building activities.

3. In all the evaluations and reviews of peace operations surveyed, there is noted a need to better assess “do no harm,” which points toward a need for a more thorough context and risk analysis.

4. There is a general criticism of weak performance measurements and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) pointing to a need to improve Theory of Change (ToC) formulations for stabilization programming.

5. There is a general agreement of the need for flexibility in the complex and difficult situations in which stabilization interventions are happening and as well the need for flexible funding for stabilization programs.

6. The Principles for International Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and Societies, even after nine years, is still not adhered to by all.

7. There is a need for thinking long-term at the start of any intervention to ensure links to normal development interventions even though there are important reasons to act quickly with short-term actions to save lives.

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4. LESSONS LEARNED FROM STABILIZATION EFFORTS

The Statement of Work for this review raises the question if there are any good practices or considerations for conducting stabilization–development programming in Afghanistan, the DRC, or Mali.

We have not been able to identify any specific evaluation of the SDN and there are a limited number of publicly available evaluations relevant to stabilization and development and especially to humanitarian–stabilization–development programming in those countries. For this reason, we have included evaluations and reviews relevant to the SDN in Somalia and South Sudan as well as reviews and other relevant studies that may not live up to the evaluation standards of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) but may otherwise provide insight to answer the question. We have mainly surveyed evaluations and reviews commissioned by Canada, Denmark, the US, the UK, and the EU. We did not identify relevant evaluations commissioned by Australia and the Netherlands.

The evaluation briefs of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) summarizing the evaluations of development assistance over the last decade to Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan have also been studied as have the United Nations Evaluation Group's (UNEG) mapping of evaluations of the humanitarian–development nexus.

4.1 THE HUMANITARIAN–DEVELOPMENT NEXUS – WHAT DO EVALUATIONS HAVE TO SAY?

While not directly dealing with the SDN, the synthesis of evaluations of the humanitarian–development nexus by UNEG may provide some lessons relevant to this review. UNEG’s 2018 mapping of evaluations on the humanitarian–development nexus provides lessons learned from 123 evaluations published between 2010 and 2017, of which 97 focused on specific countries and 26 were global. The aim was to assess the extent to which the need to deliver on collective outcomes that go beyond the humanitarian–development divide had been addressed in evaluation work.

UNEG notes at the outset a “lack of shared definitions of the nexus and its broad and evolving conceptual boundaries.”

The mapping found that the nexus is addressed more prominently in humanitarian evaluations that focus on multiple rather than single interventions, in strategic and thematic evaluations, as well as in development evaluations that considered a wider range of issues, such as policy and institutional capacity, peacebuilding and stabilization. This finding directly links to the lack of a shared definition mentioned above, as it reveals that evaluations with a wider understanding of development and humanitarian activities are those most likely to address these in an integrated...
way. The nexus has been covered in sectors including food security, agriculture, the public sector and infrastructure. UNEG’s key finding was the importance for evaluations to avoid approaching these different sectors individually and look for inter-sectoral linkages to cover broader nexus implications.

Some of the evaluations assessed mentioned the difficulties identifying and achieving development objectives and goals in contexts of chronic instability. To address this, donors should try to better adapt the time frame and scope of interventions to address programming challenges related to the nexus.

The mapping found that the link between the humanitarian–development nexus and conflict and peace was considered most often in evaluations of conflict-affected contexts or those focusing on peacebuilding. “Overall, among all the evaluations with focus on conflict, the majority included an analysis of the impact of conflict on both humanitarian and development programs but rarely an analysis of the impact of programs on conflict dynamics.”

UNEG’s mapping concludes that, if humanitarian and development actors are finding a new way of working toward common outcomes, it will be important to consider applying a nexus lens more broadly on both sides.

4.2 AFGHANISTAN
Norad’s evaluation brief on Afghanistan has surveyed 50 published reviews and evaluations along with several unpublished from the last decade, with 29 selected for closer review. Relevant findings in relation to the SDN are presented below:

1. Western political and military interests largely defined the nature and magnitude of aid flows and in this sense the implications were that criteria that would normally be used to determine development assistance were often ignored.

2. The immense relief and development needs in this context have reinforced the rationale for large assistance programs but the problem is that the often-limited absorptive capacity is ignored resulting in unintended consequences that become difficult to reverse.

3. A major concern is the lack of documented effects on poverty reduction, gender equality and sustainability of interventions, demonstrating a strong need for improving M&E.

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28 Ibid. p. 4
4. Community-based rural development programs demonstrated that bottom-up development on a local and small scale was possible. Although it remained vulnerable to elite capture, it has fostered a positive attitude toward women’s roles in society.

5. Partnering arrangements were central in building local civil society capacity. In cases where funding was channelled through Afghan NGOs, there was found to be considerable added value.

6. The advantages of multi-donor trust funds were identified—these types of funds can be essential in state building as it pools funding, reduces risk, facilitates coordination and lessens the burden on individual donors.

7. Lack of synergy between development and security was identified. It is argued that, “The logic of development and the logic of security did not always harmonize but appeared as constellations of opposite interests and actors.”30 This shows that when projects are driven by military interest, sustainability is lacking which, from a development perspective, could be considered dysfunctional. Therefore, there needs to be more coordination and synergy between the two, demonstrating the need for more actors to consider the stabilization–development nexus. This brief also notes that there is “a lack of evaluations of assistance delivered by or through the military which has a primary security objective, which makes it difficult to differentiate between the outcomes of these as compared with projects that have a clear development objective.”31

Overall, although support was found to be relevant in most cases and led to positive outcomes, programming was often lacked conflict analysis and an ability to measure impact and sustainability. A number of evaluations concluded that most development activities could be considered unsustainable due to the recipient government’s heavy financial dependence on donors. Finally, the brief notes that evaluations rarely dealt with broader social impacts but instead focused on immediate outputs and outcomes.

There are a number of lessons learned presented in the Norad briefing, which can help to identify good practices for future engagement:

- A need for greater conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity, and adaptability to context.
- A need to prioritize interventions with a focus on creating change, as opposed to those that aim to reframe debates, build general capacity or change behaviour. If change is to be created in respect to public goods and participatory processes, then a long-term commitment that carefully considers local context is necessary.
- Improvement in innovative M&E for impact measurement.
- A need to prioritize community-based projects that bring together government, donors and NGOs, because these are superior for producing ownership and control.
- Sustainability assessments at initial project proposal.

30 Ibid p.32
31 Ibid p.31
In addition to these more general findings based on evaluations of a range of development assistance, we believe that the findings on lessons learned from integrated approaches in Afghanistan are of special interest as an integrated approach (also referred to as 3D — diplomacy, development, defence) or a whole-of-government approach is the preferred tool for implementing stabilization interventions.32

The main lesson learned from donors’ comprehensive and integrated approaches to their engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 is to avoid a silo mentality. The review found that the pursuit of coherence must first be established at the highest possible level, both internally and especially between the relevant organizations involved. Secondly, it must create frameworks for joint planning and decision-making, as well as joint learning and analysis. Finally, it must be based on the different competencies of respective actors. The interventions in Afghanistan yielded mixed results and showed that when stabilization, development and humanitarian programs are happening simultaneously in an extremely complex context, it is crucial to plan long-term and to coordinate these three streams as much as possible.

Key recommendations for future integrated approaches based on the case of Afghanistan are quoted here in full (with emphasis in quotation):

• “Much stronger international emphasis and focus on creating political solutions. Lasting peace is created through political processes, not by using various combinations of development aid and military means.

• “Prioritising, focusing and determining a meaningful sequence for the different efforts rather than attempting to address all issues simultaneously.

• “Understanding how resources from external actors — civil as well as military — affect the host country’s political and financial systems. Sudden and massive injections of resources in countries with weak or collapsed institutions can increase corruption and create a conflict economy in which powerful actors are neither interested in, nor have incentives to change the status quo.

• “Knowing the context and taking all of its complexity into consideration in order to avoid simplistic and overambitious ideas about what can be achieved by international intervention.

• “Lowering the level of ambition and exercising strategic patience. If the efforts are to make a positive difference, a significantly longer time horizon is needed than the two to three years that are typically considered to be ‘long term’ in the context of.

• “Instead of having to prioritize and choose between different goals – and resources and methods – the coherence agenda promises that – if only all actors involved coordinate their efforts – it is possible to pursue many goals at the same time.

• “The study points out that an integrated approach is not and cannot be a goal per se. It is a method that may be used to achieve a given goal.

• “Based on the experience of Afghanistan this study suggests that future stabilisation interventions should take their starting point in the local context and from there seek to outline a possible political process that can lead the country away from fragility and toward stability.

• “The security-development nexus does not only imply that lasting peace cannot be achieved without development; it also indicates that sustainable development cannot be pursued in the midst of ongoing war”.

The paper notes that it is challenging to coordinate civilian and military interventions in a high-risk country like Afghanistan. For example, the fact that civilian staff were subject to strict and costly security protocols that restricted their freedom of movement in the field caused tensions between the military and civilian actors. From the military’s perspective, it seemed as though they were not receiving the necessary support from the civilian actors, and therefore opted to work on governance and development issues themselves, even though they lacked the necessary skills. On the other hand, the experience in Afghanistan demonstrated the limited civilian capacity for engaging in stabilization missions. “Identifying enough civilian consultants with the right combination of professional and personal competencies and the ability to leave their regular jobs and be stationed in Afghanistan remained a problem throughout.”

Furthermore, the report points to the imbalanced relationship between civilian and military staff in the field, which further hindered effective integrated activities, stemming from “a misunderstood notion of development. The idea that the civilian development organizations could somehow be flown in to build and hold areas that the military had cleared was fundamentally flawed and disregarded the fact that aid organizations work in a process-related manner with local ownership and capacity building.” This is a crucial lesson from the Afghan experience that should be integrated into SDN programming in any conflict-affected context. It also shows the importance of all actors involved having a holistic understanding of development and stabilization to avoid an over-simplified division of tasks between development-related and stabilization-related activities.

33 Ibid, p. 9-10
34 Ibid, p. 66
35 Ibid.
4.3 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

It has been difficult to identify relevant evaluations concerning stabilization and development assistance to DRC.

An evaluation of the Coherence Fund for Stabilisation operated by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC is forthcoming.36 In terms of coherence with the humanitarian–development–peacebuilding nexus, the fund seeks to strengthen the dynamics of stabilization interventions and has a key role in ensuring that donors provide support to meet the needs and opportunities for development actions in the context of stabilization.

We understand that the findings of the evaluation include a determination that the nexus dynamics are not yet fully exploited. According to some implementing partners, the projects have at times been too small in scope to facilitate links with development dynamics. The evaluation recommends, among others, that the internal coherence of the fund be strengthened by more integrated planning, and that it support coordination and advocacy between different actors at the policy level, including donors, to help address the issues raised by the fund’s interventions.

The main relevant evaluation identified in relation to the DRC is from 2011 and focuses on the eastern DRC from 2002 to 2010. Although the situation in DRC has developed since then, the multi-donor project, “Joint Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in DRC,” was a large undertaking and may continue to provide insights that are relevant today.37

The major findings were that, given the weakness of the state, the project approach focused on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This made it difficult to define progress toward conflict resolution and peacebuilding achieved by the interventions, as the contextual analysis was defective.

The main recommendations were:

- A Donors should position programming based on an assessment of conflict drivers.
- B Donors should increase joint interventions and programs depending on the value-added of the different sectors toward a broad and comprehensive peacebuilding and conflict-prevention strategy adopted by all intervening actors.
- C Donors should adopt a partnership with the government and create partnerships at the local level.

An evaluation of the EU’s European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) in DRC includes some useful findings, because ECHO’s programming in the DRC stands at the

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37 Channel Research 2011: “Joint evaluation of conflict prevention and peace building in DRC.”
The evaluation found that the operation contributed substantially to protection in humanitarian action through its consistent support to the main agencies undertaking protection—the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The result came because ECHO's encouraged them to develop projects in areas difficult to access. Thus, ECHO's programming contained a component of protection by presence, which was important in the context of DRC as it allowed aid to reach populations in need. In addition, the simple presence and activities of project staff could decrease tensions between the populations and armed groups. As roads and transport options were often very limited in these isolated areas, ECHO's projects, which aimed to rehabilitate or construct landing sites and roads, were positive not only from a humanitarian and stabilization point of view but from the vantage of longer-term development. This approach allowed humanitarian partners to access vulnerable populations and allowed those populations to access basic social services and connected them to other communities in the region.

The evaluation suggested that the transitional situation in DRC, especially in the eastern region, requires significant attention to the issue of mediation of land conflicts and reconciliation. Some of ECHO's partners have developed expertise on this subject. ECHO's investment was valuable not only in terms of emergency response but also long-term stabilization, as this was key for the success of the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugee repatriation.

Recommendations for ECHO's further work in DRC suggest it should increase its involvement in prevention activities (early warning, training, community-based projects etc.), as well as more frequent engagement in exchanging views on protection with other donors. Furthermore, the evaluation suggests ECHO's projects related to reintegration and livelihoods for victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) should adopt a wider perspective to include indirect victims, such as men, children and witnesses, as well as a longer-term perspective. Integrating outreach services and reproductive health services would enable ECHO to provide more sustainable assistance to persons at risk beyond immediate humanitarian response.

However, the evaluation concluded that development aid in DRC was not having an effect on humanitarian needs, and that the government's effectiveness in terms of economic growth, governance, and basic service provision remained uncertain. Therefore, addressing protection needs in DRC necessitates an integrated approach between development efforts and humanitarian assistance. In other words, transitional situations like the one in DRC require programming to be designed at the humanitarian–stabilization–development nexus, as in some areas there is still a major focus on emergency protection situations while others are dealing with reconstruction and development.

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38 DARA 2010: “Evaluation of DG ECHO’s Actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, October 2010
4.4 MALI

Norad’s evaluation brief on Mali including 25 evaluations and reviews over the last 10 years, none of which directly deal with SDN.

Norad’s assessment of the evaluations of development aid to Mali published since 2010 identifies that budget support and governance provide some useful considerations for development–stabilization programming, as they are key to the country’s ability to provide sustainable services and peace to its citizens.

Donor budget support to Mali yielded positive outcomes in the period from 2003–2009, where Mali enjoyed relative stability. The positive outcomes triggered by budget support spilled over into other areas, such as poverty reduction, growth, health and education. However, evaluations of budget support in this period also revealed the need for increased accountability and efficiency in financial management, as well as issues linked to corruption.

This points to the governance sector, to which development assistance contributed both before and after 2012. While Mali was portrayed as a prime example of donor-supported democratic governance before 2012, the events of 2012 highlighted the need for governance programming to focus on re-establishing democratic order and addressing root causes of conflict in the northern region. Thus, development assistance after 2012 was redirected to, among other areas, supporting multiparty dialogue and interactions between civil society and politicians. However, evaluations show that what the Malian context really needed was structural reform and efforts to address issues such as marginalization in order to deal with the underlying causes of conflict. Therefore, from a stabilization perspective, the multiparty platform might not be the most effective tool to use in a conflict context. “It has been argued that ‘governance shortcomings continue to undermine security in the country,’ and efforts to generate ‘short-term peace’ may work against ‘long-term stabilisation goals.’”

The issue of corruption in terms of holding government officials accountable for financial mismanagement has received more focus since 2012, but no donors have engaged in large-scale anti-corruption programming. However, a successful initiative by the German development cooperation agency in regard to governance is worth mentioning, as it is relevant for conflict-affected contexts. By taking informal aspects of governance into account into its decentralization and local governance programming, German development support has facilitated multi-stakeholder engagement.

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40 In this context it should be noted that there appears to be an unwillingness by the Government of Mali to recognize that Mali is a fragile country. Mali has not joined the G7+ group, which may in turn be a reason for the absence of evaluations of stabilization efforts.
41 Norad’s brief 2018 p. 21
dialogue, “including traditional institutions, in new approaches to local governance, service provision and economic development.”

Norad’s evaluation brief suggested that when looking ahead, it is critical that donor programming focus on governance, and especially work toward re-establishing trust between society and government in Mali. Moreover, “the coming period of development assistance will need to consider both new and recurrent drivers of instability in Mali and find sustainable ways to address them to ensure long-term development goals. In particular, deep reflection on root causes that may not have been addressed in the earlier period should lead to adjustments to governance interventions.”

Some of the most significant gaps identified in governance engagement are issues of corruption and justice system reform, which both require more holistic and innovative approaches than development assistance to date.

4.5 SOUTH SUDAN

Norad’s evaluation brief, which builds on close to 30 evaluations and reviews since 2010, notes that, “Development and humanitarian programs in South Sudan had four main weaknesses:

- “The donor community did not develop an overall strategic plan for recovery and development for itself or in collaboration with the government.
- “Diplomats, politicians and development practitioners did not collaborate closely enough to develop joint approaches.
- “The donor community mostly failed to adapt their development interventions to the volatile and fragile South Sudanese context. Their vision for South Sudan was often different from what national or local political actors pursued.
- The aid architecture was inconsistent, and lessons learned did not alter approaches.”

The evaluation brief went on to say that, “These lessons are a useful reminder when considering the long list of challenges the international community is facing in South Sudan, as they apply to modes of operation, to the relationship between aid and politics, and to both humanitarian and development assistance.”

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42 ibid. p. 25
43 Ibid. p. 30
44 ibid. p.30
45 Norad Evaluation Department 2018: “Mali” Country Evaluation Brief 6/2018
46 Ibid p.3
Although the large, multi-donor evaluation, Aiding the Peace, is from 2010, we consider this an important evaluation with important lessons learned:47

A Transition from war to peace is not a technical exercise but a highly political process.
B A sophisticated and nuanced analysis of power relations, causes of vulnerability, and drivers of conflict and resilience was largely missing and not updated.
C Neither the government nor donors provided an overall framework for development support, which was much needed.
D Good practice can be over-used, especially when respect for ownership and harmonization comes at the expense of field knowledge and engagement.

A key recommendation is that, “The main consideration should always remain: are the interventions dealing adequately with the factors that lead to conflict? All activities and sector priorities should flow from the answer.”

Other recommendations include:

1. Ensuring that new and revised programs are always preceded by a conflict analysis that links wider dynamics to those that are specific to the area of operation.
2. Framing interventions in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding is to be encouraged.
3. The need for conflict analysis to be referred to continually over the programming cycle.
4. The need to invest in monitoring the changing dynamics in the different states of South Sudan at regular intervals and ensure that chosen funding mechanisms are sufficiently flexible to respond to these changes.
5. Ensuring that pooled funds for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as well as more conventional output and impact indicators are monitored.
6. Focusing capacity building and support to decentralized levels of government and increasing associated performance monitoring.
7. Ensuring that the urgent training of the judiciary at state and sub-state levels is always in tandem with dialogue with chiefs and those responsible for customary law.
8. Enabling traditional authority (chiefs) to address root causes of conflict (including disputes over land or bride wealth) at their customary courts by providing capacity building programs for these courts.
9. Ensuring that local peacebuilding initiatives are linked to development inputs to consolidate solutions reached. This implies the use of “do no harm” tests, especially in conflict areas. Efforts should be made to encourage greater female involvement in peace committees.

The more recent evaluation of ECHO’s humanitarian response in Sudan and South Sudan also incorporates relevant findings.\(^{48}\) Overall, it concludes that the program was effective because the assessment of humanitarian needs was of high quality, and because it was able to respond quickly and effectively to situational changes. Given the unstable context and difficulties in collaborating with the Sudanese and South Sudanese governments, ECHO only managed to a limited extent to link relief, rehabilitation and development in its program activities. Furthermore, ECHO’s annual funding cycle is not conducive to the implementation of medium or longer-term activities as is typically required for effective engagements with communities and (local) authorities.

Canadian support to South Sudan was evaluated in 2016.\(^{49}\) The main findings were that:

- Canadian programming was generally aligned with many good practices for engaging in fragile states. However, more could have been done.
- Programming in South Sudan and other fragile states could have benefited from a long-term vision and commitment that integrated GAC programming streams.
- There were limited resources and time available for the effective integration of some program requirements, particularly crosscutting themes, drivers of conflict, and the principles for engagement in fragile states.

Among the main recommendations:

1. “GAC should ensure that future South Sudan programming is based on an integrated, whole-of-department approach. Specifically, the continuum of programming should be based on:
   - A long-term, common, and documented vision for the country;
   - A recognition of the need for responsive, flexible and nimble programming to adapt to rapidly changing contexts;
   - The effective integration of crosscutting themes; and,
   - An enhanced strategic analysis that addresses the drivers of conflict and is based in the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. An approved and integrated country program strategy, an integrated logic model and a policy dialogue strategy could implement these elements.

2. “GAC should ensure that any additional or refocusing of requirements for the integration, analysis and synthesis of crosscutting issues and conflict drivers within fragile states be adequately supported by specialists.”\(^{50}\)


50 Ibid.
4.6 SOMALIA

The Norad evaluation brief from 2017 identifies 37 reviews and evaluations of development assistance to Somalia since 2010.\(^{51}\) It concludes that successful interventions were characterized by a participatory and inclusive approach from project planning to implementation—one that involved working with the government, local authorities and communities to jointly identify priorities and provide them with ownership over achievements.

Security is the major focus of international support to Somalia. However, Norad finds that security has often been integrated into humanitarian and development programs instead of being addressed as a stand-alone theme, probably resulting in incoherent and fragmented activities in the security sector. Those activities also seldom exhibited a common understanding of principles of stabilization and governance.

Norad’s main findings focus on eight areas: \(^{52}\)

1. The constraints imposed by continued insecurity. A consistent theme is that insecurity continues to undermine and constrain the impact of all aid efforts. The evaluation reports include recommendations for security to be given a higher priority and for a more comprehensive approach to be adopted.
2. The value of consultation and local participation.
3. The need to continually adapt approaches to the evolving context.
4. The case for greater investment in monitoring and evaluation.
5. The challenge of insufficient progress on tackling corruption.
6. The case for additional—and better prioritized—funding. As reports note, after decades of little development in Somalia, the needs are clear. Yet Somalia receives less development aid per person than many other post-conflict countries.
7. The urgency of tackling standard aid effectiveness challenges. The overarching reviews note the need for more effective integration of humanitarian, development and government efforts with half the population still dependent on humanitarian support.
8. The success of some mechanisms developed for post-conflict situations. The Compact, and in particular the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility, have proved useful. But there is scope to fully exploit the potential of these approaches.

An evaluation of the Somalia Stability Programme from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) recommended that DFID focus on Somalia’s south-central region, which is the


\(^{52}\) Ibid, p. 29
most conflict-affected in the country, and the region with the most political significance. This would allow the collection of improved information on the program’s outcomes and impact and address the needs of the areas most subject to instability.

The evaluation points to the fact that it is important to invest in longer-term activities such as community-driven development, which plays an important role in gaining entry to unstable areas. Furthermore, DFID can use community-driven development achievements as a base for building local government capacity, developing civil society, and working with the private sector. That is to say, there is good reason to integrate long-term development activities into programming while still in a stabilization phase, as the two are interconnected.

The key lesson learned from the evaluation is the necessity of an in-depth understanding of the context, and the development of an acute cultural sensitivity to the social, political and ethnic systems in Somali society. This involves respecting clan sensibilities, which often comes at the cost of reinforcing divisions in Somali society. Furthermore, donors should take into account the important unifying role of Islam for Somalis, which transcends clan and regional affiliation. Care should also be taken not to undermine traditional Somali structures critical to stability. External-driven forms of stabilization therefore need to take sufficient account of local belief and value systems. To successfully manage stabilization-development-humanitarian programming, care must be taken to support hybrid systems in order to create structures and patterns of behaviour that lead to a more state-oriented vision of society as opposed to one that is exclusively driven by clan interests.

Given the importance of the Somali Compact, the UK Overseas Development Institute (ODI) conducted a review of the Somali Compact, which was established in 2013 and based on the New Deal for engagement in fragile states. The objective of the Compact is to create “a new beginning for a sovereign, secure, democratic, united and federal Somalia at peace with itself and the world, and for the benefit of its people.”

The review starts by noting that the security issues on the ground in Somalia presented a particularly challenging context and limited the presence of development partners.

The review also states that the Compact was successful in developing a comprehensive approach and building trust, thanks to its inclusiveness and ability to respond to emerging federal member states. “It has provided a valuable, clear transparent framework for mutual accountability” between the federal government and development partners. Furthermore, many of these partners stated that the Compact was a critical factor in their choice to commit increased levels of long-term development funding.

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56 Ibid, p. 7
On the other hand, the review notes that the dialogue around the Compact was perceived to be extremely complicated. Furthermore, humanitarian and development efforts were not sufficiently coherent, and the Compact did not manage to deal quickly enough with core financial issues such as public financial management, corruption, and the need for increasing domestic revenues. Finally, the private sector and civil society have not been sufficiently involved.

The review’s key findings are similar to those of other compacts in post-conflict countries: “Context matters: progress is hard in the absence of basic security and a stable political settlement. Compacts generally improve coordination but with high transaction costs and slow movement toward coherence of policies involving development, humanitarian, security and political actors. Success in one of these areas is unlikely to be sustained without success in the others.”

4.7 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM RELEVANT COUNTRY EVALUATIONS

As mentioned previously, we have not been able to identify evaluations specifically dealing with SDN except perhaps the evaluation of the DFID stabilization program in Somalia. We have also studied a report synthesizing lessons learned from integrated approaches in Afghanistan, which can be considered as stabilization efforts. Other relevant evaluations and reviews have dealt with the issue of providing development assistance to countries in conflict and included the humanitarian–development nexus, as well as support to peace- and state building. These interventions are often labelled as stabilization, pointing to the lack of an agreed definition or understanding of stabilization between various agencies and donors.

Not unexpectedly, there is an overlap between the findings of these evaluations and the evaluations of the stabilization programs of the different donors as presented in Annex 2, Sections 1.8 and 1.9. This underlines the importance of these issues. The most important can be summarized as follows:

4.7.1 LACK OF JOINT VISION OR FRAMEWORK

One of the most important findings and lessons learned is the issue of the absence of a joint vision or framework for providing assistance, whether humanitarian, stabilization or development in many of the conflict-affected countries studied. There appears to be a general agreement that, in order to build a foundation for sustainable development, there needs to be some sort of common vision or plan and shared understanding of the term “development” from which to align support. Development programming in non-conflict situations often aligns to a national development plan or one of its variants by the recipient government. The findings from evaluations grapple with this question, as when there is a lack of a plan or framework, donors end up developing their own projects in an uncoordinated way (noting, for example, the DRC experience). But in conflict-affected states, where either the government is too weak to develop and implement such a plan (e.g. DRC and Afghanistan) or the government is seen as part of the problem (e.g. South Sudan and Mali), then this may not be possible. Multi-Donor Trust Funds in these situations have proven to be effective in providing some coherence in aid efforts, despite

Ibid, p.8
criticism for being overly bureaucratic. The Somali Compact—building on the G7+ Peace- and State-Building Principles—provides a promising solution to this, although the verdict is still out. As the review of the Somali Compact concludes, similar to those of other compacts in conflict-affected countries: “Context matters: progress is hard in the absence of basic security and a stable political settlement. Compacts generally improve coordination but with high transaction costs and slow movement toward coherence of policies involving development, humanitarian, security and political actors. Success in one of these areas is unlikely to be sustained without success in the others.”

The recommendation of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and The New Way of Working to define specific collective outcomes shared and agreed between the various actors—humanitarian, development, diplomatic and security—is another recent attempt to find ways of defining an agreed framework to which all should adhere. Implementing this recommendation will also contribute to programming across the nexus.

4.7.2 ADDITIONAL GOOD PRACTICES

Based on our survey of relevant evaluations and reviews, the following points are good practices that should be considered when planning and implementing stabilization interventions:

1. Stabilization is a political process by political actors, as are conflict resolution and peace-building activities.

2. Stabilization interventions should take their starting point in the local context and from there seek to outline possible political solutions that can lead the country away from fragility and toward stability.

3. The aim of stabilization efforts should be realistic and limited to creating stability in terms of reducing violence and fear for the population in the society in question.

4. Have realistic time horizons—stabilization takes time and requires long-term programming (longer than 3 years).

5. As sustainable development cannot be pursued in an ongoing war, ensure that short-term support has a long-term perspective—stressing the importance of the humanitarian-development nexus.

6. Position programming based on an assessment of conflict drivers and support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding while constantly updating conflict assessments.

7. Ensure coherence, both in planning and implementation, among the involved actors, both military and civilian.

8. Have the necessary flexibility to adapt interventions according to developments on the ground.

9. Avoid doing harm for, by example, providing too much assistance that can overburden local structures.

10. Develop relevant ToCs and results frameworks that make it possible to document results.

5. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

In this section, we will attempt to briefly present the major findings, conclusions and lessons learned from our review.

Providing answers to the four review questions presented in the Statement of Work will do this.

5.1 Q1: IN BRIEF, WHAT ARE THE KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DONORS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR STABILIZATION PROGRAMS AND IN HOW THEY APPROACH STABILIZATION PROGRAMMING?

The answers to this question are mainly presented in Section 3 above with a more detailed analysis in Annex 2. The following is a brief summary of the main findings.

There is no agreed definition or understanding of stabilization either in the academic literature or in the policies of the seven donors examined here (Australia, Canada, Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, the UK and the US).

Some donors such as Australia and Denmark consciously avoid defining stabilization in order to maintain the flexibility to support a broad range of interventions—from prevention to post-conflict assistance. Some donors such as Canada and Denmark mainly understand it as a way of working—whole-of-government, 3D, integrated or joined-up approaches including both military and civilian actors. Among those that define it, definitions range from mainly military interventions as was formerly the case with the US, to definitions that include building “liberal states” and promoting Western-based rule of law and democracy (e.g. the Netherlands and until 2018 the UK).

While various donors have all accepted that human development is at the foundation of their development assistance and where most also ascribe to a focus on human security, there are elements of self-protection in the policies of donors—the fight against terror, fear of an influx of migrants, for example. In practice, this may lead to the securitization of aid (e.g. examples from Afghanistan).

The donors (except for Australia and the EU) have all organized their coordination of stabilization programs in work units, most often led by a steering committee consisting of representatives of the various relevant government structures (e.g. defence, justice, police, development, foreign affairs). The coordination units are placed either separately as in the UK and US or in the foreign affairs ministry as is the case in Canada, the Netherlands, and Denmark. The activities of these work units typically include: administering a pool of experts to be deployed in conflict-affected situations, providing funding through a mix of official development assistance (ODA) and non-ODA funds, and planning, coordinating and monitoring activities of various governmental and non-state actors.
Comparing the seven donors in focus here, the UK’s stabilization program stands out, both in relation to its conscious evolution of the concept of stabilization, in relation to its support to academic research and not least in relation to its development of policies and guides for stabilization efforts. It seems that many of the other counties have a lot to learn from the UK’s stabilization resources and thinking. Denmark also exhibits some good practices in terms of adopting a dynamic approach to conflict sensitivity and continuously updating its contextual understanding. Importantly, in both the academic literature as well as among donors, there is a move over recent years toward understanding stabilization with a more limited scope and having more realistic and pragmatic aims, which will have to be continuously adapted to the change in context. Stability might be brought about by, for example, power sharing of existing elites, which may be seen as good enough. Success might be measured, not by the amount of capacity building, but by its contribution to minimizing violence and fear in the societies in question. Finally, it should be noted that although there is not full agreement on definitions, tools, or ways of organizing, the use of the term “stabilization” among major donors allows for important exchanges of information and experiences in various forums such as the UN and the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), which have shown to be beneficial to mainstreaming good practices and lessons learned. Understanding “stabilization” as a multifaceted and dynamic concept prevents silo mentalities and allows for better cooperation between relevant actors at different stages of the stabilization process.

5.2
Q2: WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT DIFFERENT COUNTRIES HAVE TAKEN DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO STABILIZATION, HOW EFFECTIVE HAVE DONORS BEEN IN BUILDING EFFECTIVE LINKS FROM THEIR STABILIZATION PROGRAMMING TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING?

The fact that there are different approaches to stabilization is obviously linked to the fact that there are different understandings of the concept. Instead of focusing on differences in approach and definition, we have attempted to focus on what is in common and how effective links can be made between stabilization and development programming based on what has been identified as the most common approaches.

Firstly, development programs are one instrument in the toolbox of stabilization, together with such mechanisms as diplomacy, military and police deployments, and humanitarian assistance. Therefore, development should not be separated from stabilization, as it is inherent when donors intervene in conflicts.
Nevertheless, there are some important lessons learned and good practices that can be summarized as follows:

- Lasting peace cannot be achieved without development and sustainable development cannot be pursued in the midst of ongoing conflict, as shown by the experience in Afghanistan. This does not mean that more short-term—often humanitarian—assistance should not be part of the mix contributing to stabilization—on the contrary. Indeed, the planning of short-term interventions should have a longer-term perspective, stressing the importance of the humanitarian–stabilization—development nexus.

- While sustainable development cannot be pursued in open conflict, there seems to be general agreement that in order to build an effective foundation for sustainable development there needs to be a common vision or plan with which to align support. Development programming often aligns with a national development or similar plan developed and endorsed by the recipient government. Findings from the evaluations and reviews grapple with this question. If there is a lack of such a plan or framework, donors end up developing their own projects in an uncoordinated way, as shown by example from the experience in the DRC. In conflict-affected states where either the government is too weak to develop and implement such a plan, as in the DRC and Afghanistan, where the government is part of the problem, as in South Sudan and Mali, such a government-endorsed plan may not be possible. Multi-donor trust funds have in these situations proven to be effective in providing some coherence in aid efforts despite frequent criticism that they are overly bureaucratic. The Somali Compact, building on the G7+ Peace- and State-Building Principles, may provide a promising solution to this although the verdict is still out. As the review of the Somali Compact concludes: “Context matters: progress is hard in the absence of basic security and a stable political settlement. Compacts generally improve coordination but with high transaction costs and slow movement toward coherence of policies involving development, humanitarian, security and political actors. Success in one of these areas is unlikely to be sustained without success in the others.”

- The recent agreements on a New Way of Working (see Annex 1) recommends that stakeholders from the various partners involved in interventions related to the nexus should define collective outcomes, which they should agree to pursue with humanitarian, development, diplomatic, military and other means. This is another way of agreeing on a joint framework for intervening in conflict-affected situations.

Eight years after the Principles for International Interventions in Fragile and Conflict-affected States and Situations were endorsed by OECD/DAC and INCAF, several of the principles appear to be in need of reinforcement. While these principles are obviously more general for providing assistance in fragile and conflict-affected states than the SDN, they are nevertheless also relevant to the SDN.

We have in Section 2 attempted to analyze the academic contributions to answering this question and in Sections 3 and 4 have looked at the evaluations and reviews of the different approaches the seven donors have to stabilization and programs relevant for the SDN.

In brief, the lessons learned and good practices identified in all three sections of this study are:

1. Stabilization is a political process by political actors and not just a way of working together through integrated, joined-up or whole-of-government approaches on neutral, technical activities.
2. Stabilization interventions should take their starting point from a thorough understanding of the local context, of the drivers of conflict, and a solid risk analysis. From there, they should seek to outline a possible political process based on collective outcomes that can lead the recipient country away from fragility and toward stability. They should work within existing systems and structures and seek to make them more efficient, accountable and transparent.
3. The aim of stabilization efforts should be realistic and limited to creating stability and reducing violence and fear in the society in question.
4. Stabilization takes time, so interventions should have realistic time horizons.
5. As sustainable development cannot be pursued during ongoing conflict, interventions should ensure that short-term support has a long-term perspective and is based on an understanding of the importance of the humanitarian–development nexus.
6. Programming should be based on an assessment of conflict drivers and support conflict prevention and peacebuilding while constantly updating conflict assessments.
7. Interventions should ensure coherence, both in planning and implementation, among the involved actors, both military and civilian, as well as local ownership and inclusion of the views of the affected population.
8. Programming must have the necessary flexibility to adapt according to developments on the ground, as there is general agreement on the need for flexibility in complex and difficult situations in which stabilization interventions occur.
9. Donors should create appropriate and flexible financial management tools.
10. Donors should improve their analysis of local governance structure to avoid doing harm for, by example, providing too much assistance that can overburden local structures.

11. Donors should develop relevant ToCs and results frameworks, which make it possible to document results, but ensure that they adapt to changing situations.

12. Interventions should be based from the outset on long-term planning even though there are important immediate needs requiring prompt short-term actions to save lives (the humanitarian-development nexus).

13. To successfully manage humanitarian–stabilization–development programming, care must be taken to support hybrid systems in order to create structures and patterns of behaviour that lead to a more state-oriented vision of society as opposed to one that is exclusively driven by specific interests.

5.4

Q4: ARE THERE ANY GOOD PRACTICES OR CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONDUCTING STABILIZATION–DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING IN AFGHANISTAN, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, OR MALI?

While the more general lessons learned and good practices summarized above apply to programming in Afghanistan, the DRC and Mali, there are a few more country-specific issues to consider:

In Afghanistan, evaluations indicate that Western political and military interests have, to a large extent, defined the nature and magnitude of aid flows. Hence, criteria normally used to define development was often ignored, leading to what is called securitization and a lack of synergy between development and security.

Evaluations and reviews expressed concern about sustainability because of the over-reliance of the recipient governments on donor support and a lack of ability or willingness to prioritize. In the present political situation with donors wanting to leave Afghanistan, an analysis of sustainability and plans to phase out of support in a responsible way should be prioritized.

Community-based rural development programs demonstrated that bottom-up development on a local and small scale was possible. Therefore, such projects that promote collaborate between recipient governments, donors and civil society should be prioritized as these are superior in producing ownership and control.

In addition, multi-donor trust funds have been relatively successful and could be continued and possibly expanded, placing less of a burden on government structures.
Relatively few relevant evaluations and reviews were found on the DRC but the forthcoming evaluation of MONUSCO’s fund for stabilization might provide some interesting insights.

The main issue in DRC appears to be a lack of a comprehensive vision or framework for assistance that integrates humanitarian, stabilization and development programming. In the absence of a government able to provide leadership on this, it appears that donors use a project approach and that short-term humanitarian assistance is still the dominant modality. There is therefore a need for more long-term planning for development assistance to become more effective and have a lasting effect on humanitarian needs. While the current political process is a challenge, the question is who will be able to provide leadership in developing such a plan or defining collective outcomes. Is the UN and MONUSCO a possibility? Can this be done through a multi-donor trust fund or are there possibilities for initiating a compact process, possibly involving civil society actors such as churches?

In Mali, the evaluations and reviews indicate that there are governance issues, not least a lack of accountability, a lack of a functioning legal system and weak efficiency in public financial management, indicating possible problems of corruption that hinders progress in term of stability and development. Evaluations therefore recommend that future programming should focus on governance, especially related to corruption and the justice system.

German attempts to include traditional institutions in governance at a local level appear to have had some success and this approach could be further tested and supported.

5.5 CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONDUCTING EVALUATIONS OF STABILIZATION PROGRAMS

Our study has helped identify they following issues concerning future evaluations of stabilization programs. Almost all evaluations reviewed noted that there have been weak or missing results measurements, especially at outcome levels. Hence a better results management system is recommended.

There appears to be a contradiction between the recommendations of flexible, iterative and adaptable programming and the demand for better ToCs and results frameworks and hence the evaluability of stabilization programs.

The criticism from evaluators about a lack of clear ToCs and results, benchmarked from the start of an intervention, is not compatible with the recommended flexible approach and evaluators must therefore identify other methods of measuring results. This could include such methods as outcome harvesting and “most significant changes.”

For many of the evaluations reviewed, OECD/DAC’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations and the more recent Good Development Support in Fragile, At-Risk
and Crisis-Affected Contexts (see more details in Annex 1) have been frameworks on which evaluation have been based.

While this study has shown that these frameworks are still largely relevant, there is a need to update them with the more recent experiences and developments in approaches.

On February 22, 2019, during the final days before submitting this final report, OECD/DAC published DAC Recommendations on the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus. The report builds on previous work by INCAF as well as global frameworks such as Agenda 2030, the Sustaining Peace resolutions and the Agenda for Humanity. It contains 11 recommendations for partners to “implement more collaborative and complementary humanitarian, development and peace actions, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected situations.” The recommendations include:

2. Providing appropriate resourcing to empower leadership for coordination across the humanitarian, development and peace architecture.
3. Utilizing political engagement and other tools to prevent crisis, resolve conflict and build peace.
4. Prioritizing prevention, mediation and peacebuilding and investing in development whenever possible.
5. Putting people at the centre, tackling exclusion and promoting gender equality.
6. Ensuring that activities do no harm and are conflict sensitive.
7. Aligning joined-up programming with the risk environment.
8. Strengthening national and local capacities.
10. Developing evidence-based humanitarian, development and peace financing strategies.
11. Using predictable, flexible, multi-year financing.

Comparing these recommendations with the good practices presented in our review confirms a large degree of complementarity. The new DAC recommendations could well become the new metrics for evaluation of stabilization efforts.

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61 Ibid. p. 2.
ANNEX 1:
BACKGROUND TO THE STABILIZATION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS DISCUSSIONS

Over the last decade there has been an increase in violent conflicts in the world, especially non-state violence. This number is presently the highest since recording started in 1975. At the same time in the international affairs community, there has been an increased interest in the stabilization development nexus (S-DN), including the humanitarian efforts.

There are (at least) three interrelated causes for this interest:

1. The number of people affected is large and continues to grow. The World Bank estimates that two billion people live in countries where development outcomes are affected by fragility, conflict, and violence and the size of forced displacement is at an all time high with 95% of refugees and internally-displaced living in developing countries, originating from the same 10 conflicts since 1991. These individuals are consistently hosted by about 15 countries – overwhelmingly in the developing world and hence further stressing the development challenge.

2. The cost for the international society, especially of humanitarian assistance, is larger than ever before and the effect of the assistance has not had substantial impact on the length of conflicts or conflict resolutions. This has resulted in a number of initiatives for more effective assistance to conflict affected situations, such as the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2016 and initiatives to work more collaboratively and effective on issues concerning the humanitarian-development nexus.

3. The change in security threats and their increased complexity and multi-dimensionality; including state collapse, criminal networks, migration, human trafficking, and climate change threats, while there has been a decrease in inter-state conflicts.

In order to present a background to reviewing in more detail the present approaches and debates about the S-DN, we present a brief description of the evolution of the concepts and debates in order to understand the present day context in which the S-DN is discussed.

During the cold war, analyses and debates about conflict focused on states and the conflicts between them. After the end of the cold war the focus gradually shifted towards conflict in states and the focus on security of states was supplemented with a focus on ‘human security’.

Some of the theoretical and academic peace-research of the late 1960's and 70's had already introduced elements other than state-conducted violence and conflict. An important example of this was the ground breaking work of one of the founders and leaders of peace-research, the Norwegian Johan Galtung. Galtung defined ‘positive peace’ as a situation where “individuals do

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62 See: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) - http://ucdp.uu.se
64 UCDP
65 The other side of ‘negative peace’ understood as the absence of open violence.
not experience violence, the fear of violence or structural violence\textsuperscript{66}; structural violence understood as violence inflicted indirectly through social, economic and political structures. For Galtung's positive peace to exist structural changes are needed - and hence development comes into the picture. This view of peace and hence of security presented a more holistic view than just the security of the state, which was the dominant theory at the time.

This holistic view of security is close to the holistic definitions of development accepted by most development organisations and this, in time, informed the UN's 'Agenda for Peace'\textsuperscript{67} from 1992 and subsequently influenced the UNDP to develop its core concept of 'human security'\textsuperscript{68}.

The major questions, which the various theories concerning security and development try to answer, are: Who is security for? What is being secured? How can this best facilitate development? - And - how might development contribute to improving security?\textsuperscript{69} These questions are at the centre of the literature reviewed here.

Building on the ‘Agenda for Peace’ another major acknowledgement of the importance of the interconnectedness between security and development came with UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan's statements in 2005 “In Larger Freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all”\textsuperscript{70}; a comprehensive report of the five year progress monitoring of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The often quoted phrase: "There will be no development without security and no security without development" is central to this and can be seen as the first formal international endorsement of the interrelated nature of security and development and hence of the importance of S-DN.

Already during the 1990's but especially after 9/11 in 2001, attention focused on that 'failed' states had become breeding grounds for international terrorists and hence long-term peace needed to be installed to ensure world peace\textsuperscript{71}. Building on previous engagements, this increased


\textsuperscript{67} http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm


\textsuperscript{70} https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/2005. The full quote reads: "In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development without security and no security without development. And both development and security also depends on respect for human rights and the rule of law"

\textsuperscript{71} See e.g. the then UNDP administrator, Mark Malloch Brown 2003: "Democratic Governance: Toward a Framework for Sustainable Peace". In Global Governance Vol. 9, No. 2, Governance After War: Rethinking Democratization and Peacebuilding (Apr.–June 2003), pp. 141-146
discussions and work on engagements in so-called ‘fragile states’ and led several international organisations and bilateral donors to develop policies for working in conflict affected and fragile states.

In 2007 several of these under OECD/DAC initiated INCAF – the International Network on Conflict and Fragility - that included the 29 DAC members\(^{72}\) and several multilateral agencies, including the World Bank (WB) and relevant UN organisations. INCAF was a response to the challenges of development actors who worked in conflict and fragility affected states by creating “… a forum to exchange knowledge on engagements in such contexts, improve policy and programming responses and track results”\(^{73}\). This work shaped - and was shaped - by the ideas and experiences of the individual members of INCAF, and some of the normative work of INCAF was published as “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations” and “Conflict and Fragility. Armed Violence Reduction. Enabling Development”\(^{74}\). This work also mainstreamed the use of the concept of ‘fragile states’ understood as states facing violence and conflict, political instability, and severe poverty, and assumed that political tensions, lack of security and the inability of the state to provide basic services, including security, hampered development and hence posed a threat to not only its citizens but also to regional and global security\(^{75}\).

The next important breakthrough concerning approaches to the discussion on security and development came in 2011 with two important events:

2. Participants in the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan endorsed the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”\(^{77}\).

The WDR 2011 stressed in its preamble that “…insecurity not only remains, it has become a primary development challenge of our time”. The report challenges the ‘silo’ systems of humanitarian, security and development actors, with its main message being that it is important to “accept the links between security and development outcomes”\(^{78}\). It presented an analysis of the basic

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\(^{72}\) All of the seven countries included in this review’s analysis of stabilization programs are members.


\(^{77}\) http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf

\(^{78}\) WDR 20011. P. 276
trends underlying conflict at the time as well as policy recommendations to face the challenge of repeated cycles of violence. It proposed that conflicts were no longer one-off events, that new forms of conflict and violence were emerging, and that different forms of violence could become linked to each other in ways that promote negative cycles that are difficult to break, particularly in fragile contexts. To meet these challenges, the WDR 2011 suggested that it was necessary that ‘inclusive-enough coalitions’ be built up in conflict-affected settings, that these push forward ‘pragmatic, best-fit’ measures that would produce early results in order to increase levels of confidence within society, and that they focus on long-term efforts in supporting security, justice, and employment.79

Concerning the New Deal, donors and a group of fragile and conflict affected states, came together as the G7 in 200880 and launched the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS). This reflected the large amounts of especially humanitarian aid going to these countries and that they would nevertheless not get near meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by 2015. To do this, they argued, they would need to build security, capacity and legitimacy of their states to improve development outcomes. The New Deal was endorsed in 2011 in Busan by members of the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and was based on five peace- and state-building goals:

- “Legitimate Politics - Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
- Security - Establish and strengthen people’s security
- Justice - Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice
- Economic Foundations - Generate employment and improve livelihoods
- Revenues & Services - Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery” 81.

Both the WDR 2011 and the New Deal emphasised support to broad governance and development issues over the more traditional support just to security institutions. These two initiatives represented attempts to bring security and development together with broader processes of peace-building and state building. An internationally agreed framework was emerging, which in short can be described as based on a paradigm of liberal peace-building, where different actors work together – a ‘whole-of-government’ approach – and build peace by supporting inclusive peace resolution of the conflicting parties, building legitimate and inclusive governance structures - including justice and security – and create sustainable livelihood and employment opportunities.

80 The G7+ now includes the countries include in this review: Afghanistan, DRC, Somalia and South Sudan, nut notably not Mali
81 https://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/07/69/07692de0-3557-494e-918e-18df00e9ef73/the_new_deal.pdf IDPS (undated but 2011): “A New Deal for engagement in fragile states”.
In addition it challenged the linear understanding of providing humanitarian support in conflicts while conflict resolution took place waiting for development support when there was peace. Instead it promoted that in conflict there is a need for both short and long-term humanitarian and development support together with diplomatic, security and other kinds of support in a ‘whole-of-government’ effort.

While the MDGs included very little on fragility and conflict, the growing agreement of the importance of addressing conflict not only through short-term humanitarian assistance but also with more long-term development and peace- and state building support was internationally recognized and mainstreamed in 2015 with the agreement at a special UN summit of Heads of States to endorse the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) including SDG 16: “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.” Beginning in 2016 this was one of the 17 internationally agreed goals for international development and as such mainstreamed the importance of the link between promoting peace and sustainable development.

Another important event in early 2016 was the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS). As elaborated in the UN General Secretary’s report: “One humanity: shared responsibility”, the WHS came at a time of skyrocketing humanitarian needs alongside a historic shortfall in the funding required to meet them. “Armed conflicts and other violent situations, disasters caused by natural hazards and the impacts of climate change, health threats, soaring inequality and increased fragility marked by extreme poverty and weak institutions are among the factors contributing to the unprecedented spike in humanitarian needs”.

The outcomes of the WHS were centred around five core responsibilities: 1. Political leadership to prevent and end conflicts; 2 uphold the norms that safeguard humanity; 3. leave no one behind; 4. change people’s lives: from delivering aid to ending need; and 5. invest in humanity.

Two of the main agreements were the “The Grand Bargain” concerning humanitarian financing, but more importantly for this context was “The New Way of Working” where the main donors and multilateral agencies committed to “… meet people’s immediate humanitarian needs while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability over multiple years through the achievement of collective outcomes”. This notion of collective outcomes is central to the New Way of Working,

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82 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16
85 https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/3861
summarized in the “Commitment to Action”. The New Way of Working frames the work of development and humanitarian actors, along with national and local counterparts, in support of collective outcomes that reduce risk and vulnerability and serve as pathways toward achieving the SDGs.

Substantial work and thought have subsequently gone into studies of the humanitarian-development nexus not least through increased cooperation between WB and UN, but given the fact that the core commitment 1 (see above) of the WHS was “Political Leadership to prevent and end conflict” it is noteworthy that little work has been done concerning the S-DN after the WHS. One exception is the INCAF work on “Good Development Support in Fragile, At-risk and Crisis Affected Contexts”. This identified 12 lessons grouped into three thematic areas: building institutional fitness, aspiring to deliver change, and leaving no one behind. These lessons are illustrated with a number of good practice examples from DAC members.

OECD/DAC have continued work on fragility and introduced a multidimensional fragility concept. The “State of Fragility Report 2018” by OECD/DAC and work of the WB in cooperation with UN indicates that the international attention may now – justifiably - be moving towards studies on preventing conflict.

The WB/UN study “Pathways for Peace” looks at how development processes can better interact with security, diplomacy, mediation, and other tools to prevent conflict from becoming violent. In an effort to understand ‘what works,’ it reviews the experience of different countries and institutions to highlight elements that have contributed to peace. Central to these efforts is the need to address grievances around exclusion from access to power, opportunity and security and while states hold the primary responsibility for prevention, other actors must be included, such as civil society, as well as regional and international organizations.

The main importance of this is that it is now stressed that intervening in conflicts and in prevention is a political process. This is now generally agreed upon, although terms may change. In UN
discussions about peacekeeping it is termed the ‘primacy of politics’ and in academic circles ‘political settlements’.

On February 22, 2019, during the final days before submitting this final report, OECD/DAC published DAC Recommendations on the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus. The report builds on previous work by INCAF as well as global frameworks such as Agenda 2030, the Sustaining Peace resolutions and the Agenda for Humanity. It contains 11 recommendations for partners to “implement more collaborative and complementary humanitarian, development and peace actions, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected situations.” The recommendations include:

2. Providing appropriate resourcing to empower leadership for coordination across the humanitarian, development and peace architecture.
3. Utilizing political engagement and other tools to prevent crisis, resolve conflict and build peace.
4. Prioritizing prevention, mediation and peacebuilding and investing in development whenever possible.
5. Putting people at the centre, tackling exclusion and promoting gender equality.
6. Ensuring that activities do no harm and are conflict sensitive.
7. Aligning joined-up programming with the risk environment.
8. Strengthening national and local capacities.
10. Developing evidence-based humanitarian, development and peace financing strategies.
11. Using predictable, flexible, multi-year financing.

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94 Ibid. p. 2.
Based on the above background description we present the following ToC for work in conflict affected and fragile states:

If:
  a) International, national and local actors (humanitarian, development, security, political and diplomatic – governmental and non-governmental) come together to develop and share a joint context, conflict and risk analysis and ...
  
b) Based on the joint analysis the actors define a political strategy/process for delivering shared outcomes for:
     i. inclusive conflict resolution,
     ii. building the state - including of security and justice structures, based on an inclusive peace process, including civil society, private sector and relevant regional and international organisations
     iii. livelihood and employment opportunities and
     iv. basic social, service delivery
  
c) Local inclusive ownership of the plans is ensured through inclusive political structures e.g. national and local governments and civil society and customary institutions and...
  
d) Joint flexible, coordination, monitoring and funding mechanisms are established

Then:
Chances for sustainable peace and development are increased, and the foundation for meeting the SDGs is established.

Stabilization being an activity which attempts to establish security in which the political process can be implemented, is obviously - without being mentioned directly – key to this ToC and includes humanitarian, development, diplomacy and security instruments.

While this appears by and large to be a generally agreed ToC among practitioners, it should be mentioned that there are a number of academics95, which have presented critical analyses of such a concept of fragile states and the theories around this. They may be summarised in the conclusion drawn by the French professor Nay: “The concepts of ‘fragile’ and ‘failed states’ ... are shallow, confusing and imprecise policy-oriented labels. They are based on a state-centric, ahistorical and decontextualized perspective. At the same time, they lend themselves to various meanings and interpretations. They are prescriptive, as Western actors have developed them to promote their own security and development strategies. Finally, they are useless in the realm of policy, given their inability to formulate effective policy responses to society-wide challenges”96.

95 E.g. Duffield, Chandler, Richmond and Nay
ANNEX 2:
COMPARING SEVEN DONORS’ WAYS OF APPROACHING STABILIZATION EFFORTS

In this annex we will attempt to describe the key differences – and similarities - between donors with respect to their stabilization programs and how they approach stabilization programming.

Initially it should be noted that this presents a challenge in that it is rare that interventions are specifically labelled as stabilization or, it is often the case that stabilization is an ill defined or umbrella term encompassing a number of others activities such as security, peace building, conflict resolution, development and humanitarian actions. Overall, the key differences that can be noted when outlining the different approaches of the below actors pertain to how they define stabilization (or not), when and for how long in the conflict cycle they intervene, what are the short and long term objectives, who are the actors involved in the operation, as well as the organisational structure of the stabilization units, which will be presented below.

1 CANADA

There are three main mechanisms through which Canada has engaged in stabilization operations. This includes the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP), which replaced the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), and the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) in 2016. “Stability Operations” are defined by Canada as “tactical operations conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore and establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved”.97 This Canadian ‘whole of government’ approach to stabilization is therefore taking place through joint military-civilian operations. These operations establish and restore peace and order but what stands out is the inclusion of creating and also maintaining conditions for progress and development to be achieved.

PSOP is global in scope and are short to medium term interventions with the core responsibilities being described as providing policy leadership on peace and stabilization operations as well as delivering conflict prevention, stabilization and peace building initiatives98. Serving as a complement to humanitarian assistance, PSOP works both on preventative measures that try and address factors that lead to the outbreak of violence but also lay the framework for more long-term engagement through development assistance. There are a number of key themes that touch on conflict, peace, human rights, pluralism, security, and leadership as well as a strong focus on gender issues. These operations collaborate with both domestic partners (Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Department of Defense etc.) as well as a number of multilateral organisations (UN, EU and AU etc.)

PSOPs is made up of four divisions:

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97 Canada, Department of National Defence, and Depository Services Program (Canada), CFJP 101, “Canadian Military Doctrine” n.d.


- Peace Operations, Stabilization & Conflict Policy Division
- Natural Disaster Response & Civilian Security Policy Division
- Planning & Deployments Division
- Programs Division

The directors of these divisions are responsible for reporting to the Director General whom reports to the Assistant Deputy Minister for the International Security and Political Affairs Branch in Global Affairs Canada. Partnerships with other domestic departments of the Canadian government are important to ensure coordination of efforts between PSOP, humanitarian, and development work to avoid duplication and enhance effectiveness.

Based on a 2018 progress review of PSOPs\(^9\), they are described as having a unique and necessary role in GAC’s international assistance. The review identified 18 types of project activities most common: with the top type of activity being ‘developing and providing training or capacity building’ and in terms of the most recent activities (2016-2018) majority of engagements have been with multilateral organisations. Funding was found to be appropriately targeted at some of the most fragile and conflict affected states but not all of the OECD/DAC ‘Principles for Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Societies’ were integrated. It is suggested that PSOP therefore should focus more on integrating ‘do no harm’ considerations, more conflict analysis and more exploration of opportunities to connect these projects with long-term development programing (more detail of the review in section 1.8 below).

2 **US**

While initially the United States’ stability efforts were solely military, over time objectives have evolved and now include restoring security, basic government services, infrastructure and emergency humanitarian relief. The term stabilization has therefore become a broad umbrella term for conflict prevention, peace building, development, human rights promotion and capacity building of state institutions, with more possibility for long-term engagement and development.\(^{100}\)

The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) was established in 2011 under State Department leadership, reporting to the Under Secretary of Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights. The CSO contains seven offices organized under (1) Policy and Programs, (2) Overseas Operations, (3) Civilian Response Corps and Deployment Support, and (4) Partnerships and Learning and Training and prioritize being proactive in their response to prevent conflict, providing targeted assistance and engaging in partnerships with international partners to foster more long term responses to issues. The CSO is described as “an evolution in the development of U.S. civilian capabilities to prevent and manage conflict, to stabilize transitions from conflict, and to

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create the bases for lasting peace in post-conflict situations". Most recently, a 2018 framework published by the US department of Defense/State Department, who work in close coordination with CSO, define stabilization as a political endeavour which involved a collaborate and integrated civilian-military process with the aim of fostering locally legitimate authorities and institutions that are able to manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.

In 2014 Mazarr observed, based on US policies and experiences from mid-1990 to about 2010, that US goals of peace, democracy and development in fragile and conflict affected states had ‘precious little to show’ and concludes that such goals could not be met by cause-and effect external policy interventions. He argues that the US has moved away from large state-building interventions and now moving into a new paradigm, focussing on defensive self protection, including emphasising and supporting local or regional self-sufficiency.

3 AUSTRALIA
Australia engages in operations, which are a joint effort between civilian and military but has not adopted a single government wide strategy for approaching stabilization in fragile states. In one review, government officials expressed they are not interested in one single government wide strategic framework to approach fragile states as it would be limiting and possibly hinder effectiveness, as each case requires a unique approach therefore Australia does not, like a number of other actors, integrate diplomatic, development and security into strategies. Instead it has a number of specific but separate groups to fill particular needs, this is inclusive of the Australian Civilian Corps (ACC), and the Australian civilian-military centre. The ACC engages in the rapid and temporary deployment of trained civilians with skills that can be utilised for recovery, reconstruction, stabilization and development, but the meaning of ‘stabilization’ in this context is not specified further.

The ACC functions as a register of up to 500 civilian specialists which are selected based on their skillset, and is inclusive of experts in security and reconciliation, economics, stabilization, essential services (health and education), civil society, electoral processes, and communications while training is provided for further competencies required for deployment. The ACC may work alone, with host governments or jointly with other partners or multilateral agencies. The actual ACC office is inclusive of a number of representatives from different government departments including Department of Defense and the Australian Federal Police.

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102 US State Department (2018), A framework for maximizing the effectiveness of US government efforts to stabilize conflict affected areas
4 UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom has one of the most clear and comprehensive conceptualisations and approaches to stabilization\textsuperscript{105}, as a civilian led, ‘whole of government’ integrated approach. The main mechanism through which the UK engages in stabilization include the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) which funds the Stabilisation Unit (SU) an integrated civil-military operational unit (SU) which consists of the joint efforts of the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Department for International Development (DFID). The SU is designed to be agile and responsive and support different departments stabilization activities as required. Stabilization is defined as being only the initial response to violence or the immediate threat of violence.\textsuperscript{106} “While stabilization should be seen as closely related to peacebuilding, there are differences. Unlike stabilization, peacebuilding situates itself as a transformative activity designed to address the underlying drivers of conflict, whether it be to prevent conflict, resolve conflict or to consolidate post-conflict peace. In some contexts, stabilization activities may support and create the foundations for achieving peacebuilding outcomes.”\textsuperscript{107}

It is worth noting that the 2018 definition is different from the 2014 definition, which defined stabilization as: “Stabilization is one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability.”\textsuperscript{108} Structural stability understood as “political systems which are representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully, and societies in which human rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established and opportunities for social and economic development are open to all”.\textsuperscript{109}

One of the unique features of the United Kingdom’s understanding of stabilization is that it is defined as an inherently political act by a political actor within a political context, and conflict analysis remains a central component throughout stabilization operations. Stabilization being defined as a process is one of the stand out features rather than just being an operation. Using a combination of integrated civilian as well as military actions aiming to support an end to violence, and the protection of population and infrastructure with more focus on integrating long-term objectives such as socio-economic development and peaceful politics. What makes these actors unique is that they are not just intervening during or after conflict but also prior to, in a preventative manner – seeing stabilization as a process rather than an end in itself.

\textsuperscript{105} UK has also supported academic research concerning stabilization https://www.stabilityjournal.org/collections/special/the-future-of-stabilization This research documents have been included in this review. The web-site of the Stabilisation Unit is rich on resources and relevant material https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilization-unit


\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{108} Stabilisation Unit. FCO, MOD, DFID 2014: The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation http://www.sclr.stabilizationunit.gov.uk/attachments/article/520/TheUKApproachtoStabilisationMay2014.pdf which is again updated from its 2008 definition.

\textsuperscript{109} Stability Unit UK. 2014: “Building Stability Overseas Strategy”.
The UK’s SU also engages in constantly updating concepts and guidelines and has a number of well-written resources concerning stabilization\textsuperscript{110} and as part of developing these has supported academic work.\textsuperscript{111}

5 DENMARK
The Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) exists at the nexus of security and development with the “key objective to promote the collaboration of all relevant Danish instruments in achieving commonly defined stabilization goals”.\textsuperscript{112} Denmark engages in a ‘whole of government’ approach to ensure a coherent, integrated stabilization policy and action across the relevant Danish government actors. There is not one clear definition of stabilization and this has enabled the PSF to support a wide range of engagements, which are inclusive of security, justice, and rule of law, peace building, conflict prevention and addressing drivers of fragility. There is reference to both short and long term engagements in Denmark’s stabilization programs, in terms of both directly stabilizing, meaning responding quickly to needs for safety and security, access to basic services and reconstruction in conflict-affected areas but also engaging in longer term capacity and state building. The Danish PSF was established under the Danish Defense agreement and is anchored in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Department for Stabilization and Security. Main decisions come form the Steering Committee, which is made up of officials from the Prime Minister’s Office, the MFA, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice. Priorities include: direct stabilization efforts (safety, security basic services), addressing violent extremism, conflict prevention and resolution, security, strengthening maritime security and countering organize crime and illegitimate financial flows.

6 NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands’ approach to stabilization operations is “geared towards the normalization of the security situation and thus creating conditions for lasting development and peace”\textsuperscript{113}. Stabilization operations are guided by the Stabilization Division within the Department of Stabilization and Humanitarian Aid of the Netherlands MFA with the goal of establishing a rule of law and creating sustainable conditions for development in the future, engaging in fragile state both before, during and after conflict. The Division gears its resources towards activities that fall within the themes of “conflict resolution, security, rule of law” while the overall stabilization portfolio of the Netherlands ranges, from participation in peace operations in the broadest sense to the provision of basic services and private sector development with the main objective being to enhance stability which mainly happens through security and governance. Overall, taking an integrated approach combining security, development and diplomatic efforts. In addition, the Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) helps to incorporate information management and analysis, policy

\textsuperscript{110} See: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilization-unit
\textsuperscript{111} See: https://www.stabilityjournal.org/collections/special/the-future-of-stabilization
\textsuperscript{112} Coffey (2014), Evaluation of the Danish peace and Stabilisation fund.
\textsuperscript{113} Netherlands Defence Doctrine. Ministerie van Defensie, n.d.
identification, and prioritisation into the development of an overall stabilization promotion strategy for a particular country or region.\(^{114}\)

7 EUROPEAN UNION

There are two main stability instruments used by the EU. The first being a broad crisis management structure known as PRISM (Prevention of conflicts, Rule of law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation) contained under the European External Action Service crisis management structure. The stabilization pillar is described as a crisis response platform, serving to push forward the EU’s vision for a more integrated approach. In addition, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is another of the EU foreign policy instruments for crisis response established in 2014, which engages in preparedness and conflict prevention, supporting activities covering a wide range of sectors: dialogue and reconciliation, mediation, confidence building; support to democratic institutions; rule of law; transitional justice; SSR and DDR processes; infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction; employment generation; demining, migration; and stabilization.\(^{115}\) The integrated approach of the IcSP to conflict and crisis engages in preserving peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security and assisting populations affected by conflict or disasters, with largest share of the IcSP budget allocated to short-term rapid and flexible support measures in countries and regions experiencing situations of crisis.\(^{116}\) The overall objective and expected impact of the IcSP is to contribute to international peace and security.

Neither of these instruments have a concise definition of the meaning of stabilization.

8 REVIEWS AND EVALUATIONS OF DONOR’S STABILIZATION INSTRUMENTS AND PROGRAMING

In order to further explore the key differences we have reviewed various relevant evaluations and reviews. Included in this subsection are brief summaries of what evaluations and reviews have to say about stabilization instruments from the EU, Denmark, the UK, and Canada.


In an external evaluation of the EU’s IcSP performed in 2017, the IcPS was found to be a relevant instrument in that it responds well to priorities set by the Treaty of the EU, supports the Global Strategy, takes an integrated approach, is cooperative, and serves as an implementing vehicle for EU external action priorities. A number of comparative advantages are identified which include its flexibility, speed, and ability to adapt to evolving contexts. The IcSP is identified as being

\(^{114}\) Stabilisation Unit (2014), Analysis for Conflict and Stabilisation Interventions: what works series

\(^{115}\) Ibid.

politically responsive and is described as being of critical relevance for the EU. However, improvement could be made to ‘do-no-harm’ practices and consideration for how interventions could have negative impacts.

In terms of effectiveness, funding was found to be politically responsive, with a strong focus on conflict prevention, democracy and good governance. The impact on gender and human rights is noted as being in need of improvement. Data on budgets and spending indicate that it is performing efficiently. Coordination is limited between IcSP and other external peace and security instruments with regard to systemic challenges, but program specific coordination with external actors is robust.

IcSP’s added value was experienced at multiple levels. Firstly it was found to add value in the sense that it’s flexibility, risk willingness and priorities complementary to member states and other donors. It is highly valued for its rapid response, flexibility adaptability and political influence. In addition the evaluation found that the instrument has in a number of important ways, contributed to the larger EU policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments in a number of countries and through this, leveraged support for outcomes from other instruments.

Recommendations for improvement of the IcSP included that it was important to build a baseline for better performance measurement, improve overall strategic framework, develop comprehensive approach to ‘do no harm’ and conflict sensitivity and finally engage in more dialogue on challenges with other peace and stability funds. The evaluation concluded that this instrument has made important contributions to peace and security

8.2 AID SPENDING REVIEW OF THE UK CONFLICT, STABILITY AND SECURITY FUND (CSSF)

In 2018 UK’s Independent Commission for Aid Impact reviewed relevance, effectiveness and learning of CSSF’s aid spending.

Relevance was found to be satisfactory in most areas. Priorities were found to align closely with those of the national Security Council as well as with the UK aid strategy. CSSF engages in strong analysis of conflict making it well informed about dynamics and developments. Its flexibility and quick response were also praised but weakness was found in its ability to have more coherent goals that ensure its aid programing is contributing to something that is greater than the sum of its parts. In addition, weak theories of change and results frameworks leave room for improvement.

Effectiveness was found to be unsatisfactory in most areas but with a few positive elements. The review found inadequate results management processes, with program designs unclear and lacking in distinguishing between outputs, outcomes and activities. In addition, weak theories of change and monitoring and evaluation practices make it so that CSSF would not be able to identify which interventions are effective, thus making results unverifiable. This also makes it difficult to know if they are causing harm and therefore a strengthening of ‘do no harm’ practices
is needed. Stronger portfolio management is also needed. The positive elements that exist are good coordination between departments and strong alignment of priorities of partner country governments as well as a strong approach to conflict sensitivity.

Learning was also found to be unsatisfactory in most areas with some positive elements. The CSSF was found to be inadequate at using and disseminating knowledge beyond individual projects in order to learn best practices. CSSF is strong in the academic literature of conflict analysis but this is not used to guide policy. Therefore there is a need to strengthen internal learning processes and share annual reviews.

Recommendations included; a better ToC and outlining how programs will achieve objectives by detailing what the outcomes and assumptions are. It was also recommended that progress be explicitly reported so it can be confirmed and monitored, with a clearer outline of how to identify, manage and mitigate risks of doing harm. Gaps in results management also need to be addressed as well as an improvement in practices of synthesizing and sharing evidence on what works, hopefully resulting in better lessons learned.

8.3 EVALUATION OF THE DANISH PEACE AND STABILISATION FUND (PSF)
As mentioned above the PSF was established under the 2010-2014 Danish Defence Agreement as a cross-government funding pool to support stabilization and conflict prevention initiatives in the nexus of security and development.

Overall, the 2014 evaluation concluded that the PSF had been successful particularly in six areas:

1. “Developing cross-government working on stabilization
2. Aligning the PSF to Danish strategic priorities
3. Supporting engagements that address drivers of conflict, instability and insecurity and produce benefits for people and countries receiving PSF support
4. Promoting the effective and efficient use of resources
5. Developing management structures
6. Learning lessons”.

The evaluation then provides seven areas on which Denmark should focus in order to improve the PSF’s performance:

1. “Deepening the Danish integrated approach to stabilization
2. Matching political ambition with human and financial resources
3. Sharping the PSF’s focus on key stabilization issues
4. Strengthening the PSF’s capacity for assessing context and developing theories of change as a basis for PSF programing and monitoring and evaluation

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117 Coffey (August 2014), Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, p.9
5. Ensuring that the Fund’s comparative advantage is adequately reflected in programing
6. Ensuring adequate flexibility in the use of PSF funding
7. Strengthening the management of the Fund to further enhance the effective and efficient use of PSF resources”.  

Furthermore, the PSF’s M&E mechanism was found to be weak, focusing on outputs rather than outcomes. Therefore, an M&E system should be developed and implemented by each PSF program, which will allow program managers to assess thematic objectives and adjust interventions when necessary.

Using the example of the PSF’s interventions in the Horn of Africa, the evaluation pointed out that the PSF should make efforts to identify and manage good partners or implementing mechanisms. This can be done by mapping relevant partners’ strengths and weaknesses, reviewing the effectiveness of the partner or mechanism by drawing on other donors’ experiences, acknowledging the level of oversight that might be required with certain partners, and monitoring the partners’ performance.

A recommendation that often comes up in development and stabilization program evaluation is to develop a deep understanding of the local context and take a point of departure in this context and local populations’ needs. This is one of the PSF’s main strengths, as the evaluation finds that the PSF’s stabilization advisors “have played an important role in generating and understanding the context and identifying programing opportunities to respond to emerging needs or changing conditions” in both the Horn of Africa and the Afghanistan-Pakistan regions.

8.4 CANADA’S PEACE AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS PROGRAM (PSOP)
PROGRESS REVIEW
The review was published in October 2018 and found that PSOP were targeted at the world’s most fragile and conflict-affected countries. Based on a tiered selection system, “the application of key international principles, including (...) the Feminist International Assistance Policy and the Women, Peace and Security agenda; and a robust project review”, Global Affairs Canada was confident that its selection of interventions were valuable investments for the chosen countries.

The success of PSOPs were partly due to the fact that they continually refined their focus and moved away from certain activities that weren’t optimal (e.g. disaster response) and engaged more in others (e.g. peacekeeping operations and women, peace and security). Furthermore, they increasingly funded NGOs to improve their on-the-ground understanding of the context. This also allowed PSOPs to better respond quickly to evolving situations.

By applying key international principles in PSOPs and thoroughly reviewing and selecting pro-

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118 Ibid, p. 10
119 Ibid, p. 12
120 Global Affairs Canada (October 2018), Peace and Stabilisation Operations Programs (PSOP) Progress Review.
121 Ibid, p. 16
jects, Global Affairs Canada ensured that the chosen interventions were valuable investment decisions for the targeted countries. However, on this point, the review found that some of the OECD’s 10 principles for engaging in fragile states, were not explicitly integrated in PSOPs e.g. in Mali. For example, most of the projects’ documentation failed to reflect on how the project could negatively influence conflict situations. Additionally, just over half of PSOP projects demonstrated the intention to ‘act fast, but stay long enough to give success a chance’. This shows the importance of looking for opportunities to better connect international assistance projects with long-term development programing. In conflict-affected countries, it is especially important to not only think short-term in terms of humanitarian and stabilization programing, but to include a longer-term development perspective from the start.

The review showed that the initial programing results were contributing to peace and security by focusing on building the capacity of the state and civil society organisations to, on the one hand, address threats to social cohesion and political stability, and on the other, protect civilians from violence. In order to increase the sustainability of these initiatives, GAC should ensure that its monitoring mechanisms identify factors contributing to the achievement and sustainability of the expected partners. Better collection of long-term data through consistent reporting on performance indicators and better documentation of project monitoring missions could contribute to increased learning and improved programing.

9 FINDINGS
Several of the seven countries’ stabilization frameworks did not define stabilization (e.g. Australia, EU and Denmark) and hence had the flexibility to fund and program a wide spectre of activities including conflict prevention, state- and peacebuilding, security, justice, and addressing drivers of conflict.

The few which tried to conceptualise stabilization has over-time changed their understanding from being almost all inclusive of what in the academic literature was called the ‘liberal peace’ paradigm including state and market building but have reduced the understanding to more realistic scope and aims. A move parallel to the development in academic literature.

In the review it is not always clear whose security is at the focus of the stabilization activities, but there appears to be a certain element of ‘self-protection’ in the approach of many of the countries notwithstanding that human security in recipient countries is also in focus.

In comparison - and despite a rather critical recent review of the CSSP spending – the UK’s stabilization program stands out, both in relation to its conscious evolution conceptually of stabilization, in relation to its support to academic research and not least in relation to its development of policies and guides for stabilization efforts. It seems that there is a lot to learn by many of the other countries from the UK’s stabilization resources and thinking.
In point form the following the main findings are:

1. While there is no agreed definition or understanding of the concept of stabilization there appears to be a move over time to limit stabilization to more pragmatic and realistic activities and objectives than building liberal states and promote democracy, but most include both prevention, conflict resolution, and post conflict peace building in their understanding of relevant activities.

2. There is a growing understanding of that stabilization is a political process by political actors and not just a way of working together (integrated, joined up or 'whole-of-government') conducting neutral, technical, capacity building activities.

3. In all the evaluations and reviews of peace operations surveyed there is noted a need to better assess ‘do-no-harm’, which points towards a need for a more thorough context and risk analysis.

4. There is a general criticism of weak performance measurements and M&E pointing to a need to improve ToCs for stabilization programing.

5. There is a general agreement of the need for flexibility in the complex and difficult situations in which stabilization interventions is happening but also that flexible funding is being provided by the Stabilization programs.

6. The ‘Principles for International Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected States and Societies’\(^{122}\), while being nine years old is still not adhered to by all.

7. There is a need for thinking long-term at the start of the intervention – to ensure links to ‘normal’ development interventions, although there are important reasons to act fast, with short-term actions, in order to save lives.

ANNEX 3:
LIST OF LITERATURE

It should be noted that we have included literature, which we have studied, but which may not be directly quoted or referenced in the report.

‘Pure’ academic literature:

Andersen, L. R. 2012.


Barnett et al. 2007.

Boutellis, A. 2015.


Rising Powers and Peacebuilding Breaking the Mold?.: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chandler, D. 2015.


'Grey' and 'normative' literature:


Meehan, P 2018. What are the key factors that affect the securing and sustaining of an initial deal to reduce levels of armed conflict? Stabilisation Unit (UK)


Literature concerning Stability Operations in General and of the seven countries:

**Canada**


**United States**


**Netherlands**


**Australia**


**EU**


**Denmark**


**UK**


Stabilisation Unit (2014)

Stabilisation Unit (2014)
UK Principles for Stabilisation Organisations and Programmes: Stabilisation Issues Note.


DFID.

Stabilisation Unit. 2018.

General:

Designing Future Stabilization Efforts. The Hauge Centre for Strategic Studies.


Evaluations and reviews of stabilization related efforts in specific countries:

**General**


**Afghanistan**


**DRC**


**Mali**


**Somalia**


**South Sudan**


LITERATURE REVIEW
STABILIZATION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

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