



FINAL REPORT

**REVIEW OF FINDINGS FROM EUROPEAN EVALUATIONS OF COUNTER
TERRORISM CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMS**

Client: Global Affairs Canada

ACRONYMS

AML	Anti-Money Laundering
C-IEDs	Countering Improvised Explosive Devices
CAR	Central African Republic
CFT	Countering Financing of Terrorism
CSS	Collège Sahélien de Sécurité
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTCBP	Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program
CTG	Counter Terrorism Group
CTPF	Counter Terrorism Program Fund
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GCTF	Global Counter Terrorism Forum
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
ICCT	International Centre on Counter Terrorism
IcSP	(EU) Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MTR	Mid-Term Review
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
P/CVE	Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism
PRA	International Assistance Evaluation Division
RT	Review Team
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
SoW	Statement of Work
ToT	Training of Trainers
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

CONTENTS

Executive Summary	iii
1 Introduction	1
2 Snapshot of Terrorism Trends	2
3 Methodology and Approach	3
3.1 Conceptual understanding	3
3.2 Overall approach	3
3.3 Limitations	4
4 Overview of European countries' Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Efforts	6
4.1 European Union	6
4.2 United Kingdom	7
4.3 Germany	8
4.4 France	8
4.5 Netherlands	8
4.6 Denmark	9
4.7 Sweden	10
5 Review findings	10
5.1 Responses to needs and opportunities for Counter-Terrorism capacity building	10
5.2 Extent of achievement of intended results	12
5.3 Application of a gender analysis lens to program design.....	14
5.4 Lessons learned and good practices for improving effectiveness.....	15
5.5 Unanticipated impacts from this kind of programming	17
5.6 Sustainability issues	18
5.7 Good practice from other sources	20
6 Conclusions	21
7 Annexes	24
7.1 Annex A – Key points from Evaluations of U.S. CT capacity building programs.....	24
7.2 Annex B – Sources consulted.....	26
7.3 Annex C – List of databases consulted	32

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides a literature review of the findings and lessons learned from counter terrorism capacity building programs implemented by European countries and has been commissioned by the International Assistance Evaluation Division (PRA) of Global Affairs Canada (GAC). The review draws from evaluations, reviews and other documentation that is available from open sources and it is intended to feed into an upcoming evaluation of GAC's Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP).

The review was asked to identify lessons and good practice within the six thematic areas priorities by the CTCBP. These are: (1) Border and Transportation Security; (2) Legislative Assistance; (3) Law Enforcement, Security, Military and Intelligence; (4) Combatting Financing of Terrorism; (5) Critical Infrastructure Protection; and (6) Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. The review was also asked to have a geographical focus on capacity building programs in the Sahel, the Maghreb and the Middle East and programs undertaken by the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. Given the paucity of relevant information available on these efforts from open sources, the geographical focus was expanded to include other areas (such as South East Asia) where relevant and additionally has been supplemented with input from multilateral organizations (notably the European Union and the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, UNODC). The Review Team's findings are summarized in the sections below and in more detail in the main report.

Key Messages:

- There are few evaluations of bilateral counter terrorism capacity building programs available on open sources. From a learning perspective, the products available in knowledge-banks, such as the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), compensate for this weakness as do evaluations of counter terrorism initiatives financed by multilateral agencies, mainly the European Union.
- There is significant variation amongst the thematic areas assessed where documentation is available on open sources. There was most documentation on law enforcement, criminal justice, and Anti-Money Laundering / Counter Terrorist Financing and less on border security and counter terrorism legislation, while some (such as Countering Improvised Explosive Devices) were not represented at all.
- The counter terrorism capacity building initiatives assessed by the evaluations are found to be relevant and a range of results are highlighted, particularly at output level. Examples include improved technical capacity to implement counter terrorism legislation, provide local training, and strengthened inter-agency cooperation.
- The evaluations find that effectiveness is promoted through training needs analysis, the use of trainers with the required technical and contextual understanding, correct targeting of participants, and follow up.
- Few of the evaluations assessed the approach taken to gender and human rights. We conclude that there is a need to include examination of unintended results as a standard practice in counter terrorism program design and evaluation.
- The quality of results-based monitoring of counter terrorism capacity building is often regarded by the evaluations as weak and not fit for purpose. Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning processes should therefore be strengthened.

The review sought to answer six key questions:

Question 1: To what extent has similar programming by other countries responded to evolving needs and opportunities for counter-terrorism capacity building, especially in the Sahel?

All of the literature examined by the Review Team has found the CT interventions concerned to have a high degree of relevance, with an essential pre-condition for this being a robust context analysis and participatory design process. The evaluations recommend that this be a “whole of system” approach so that the capacities, interests and needs of different actors and the connectivity between them are highlighted and taken into account in program design and implementation. Adopting a political economy lens and theory of change approach during design would be useful in these respects, irrespective of the thematic area concerned. Other factors aiding relevance include flexibility and adaptability so that longer term initiatives have the opportunity to flex and meet emerging needs. In relation to the Sahel, evaluations highlighted the need for flexibility to respond to the evolving context (increasingly unstable). They also noted the increasing donor interest in the past five years or so that requires harmonisation of counter terrorism programming to promote overall coherence and avoid duplication and/or gaps.

Question 2: To what extent has similar programming by other countries delivered desired results? This is essentially an issue of effectiveness – have the programs been effective in achieving their goals?

The documentation presents a picture of mixed levels of effectiveness. It is generally vague in terms of impacts and outcomes and somewhat less so in relation to outputs, thereby echoing the widespread observation that identifying the results of counter terrorism (as with preventing/countering violent extremism) is difficult. The documentation also points to weaknesses in the approach to monitoring, evaluation and learning as being partly to blame for this; projects did not necessarily have measurable baselines and indicators against which to measure and monitor change. This points to the need to strengthen Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning frameworks, especially at outcome level.

Question 3: Does similar programming by other countries apply a gender analysis lens to program design and the achievement of desired results?

Few counter terrorism evaluations include gender considerations and, in those that do (mainly European Union evaluations), gender is not assessed in detail. Lessons from wider development practice emphasize that meaningful approaches to gender involve more than simply increasing the number of women participants in training courses. They also concern empowerment and integration of gender perspectives into actual practice.

Question 4: What are the lessons learned and good practices for improving the effectiveness and the achievement of longer-term outcomes for this kind of programming?

The review points to a large number of good practices and lessons from counter terrorism which, at a generic level, mirror findings from similar studies of preventing / countering violent extremism as well as development practice. These include robust context analysis (including conflict sensitivity), tailoring of designs imported from elsewhere to fit the context, the importance of generating ownership amongst beneficiaries through participatory processes, sufficient and informed project management, a focus on coherence and coordination to reduce silo thinking through inter-disciplinary processes, practical and applicable approaches and techniques etc.

Question 5: What have been some of the unanticipated impacts from this kind of programming?

Very little of the documentation reviewed took a systematic approach to addressing unanticipated impacts, although some were identified (such as the growth in inter-agency cooperation as a consequence of the European Union's Sahel engagements). This diverges from Rand Europe's 2018 study of counter terrorism evaluations (2018), which found that half of the evaluations had sought to capture potential unintended effects of initiatives. Of these, it was found that evaluations of counter terrorism initiatives placed greater emphasis on investigating unintended effects than those looking at preventing / countering violent extremism specific initiatives. Our findings reinforce the European Union Global Evaluation's recommendation that counter terrorism (and preventing / countering violent extremism) evaluations should examine unintended consequences as a matter of course and the application of Do No Harm in particular.

Question 6: Does similar programming by other countries include sustainability considerations? Where possible, what factors have contributed to the sustainability of results especially after funding ended?

The evaluations studied tended not to assess the degree to which results have been sustained after project exit. Nonetheless, the literature did come with a number of useful observations for how sustainability can be optimised. Many of the sources emphasized the importance of embedding knowledge and skills within beneficiary institutions; for example, through Training of Trainers approaches, which can ameliorate the common problem of trained personnel being rotated away from the jobs for which they have been trained. Sustainability can also be enhanced through investing in local ownership; for example, by involving beneficiaries in project design, strengthening coordination units, and through improving cross-agency cooperation. Predictable funding and the longevity and cohesion of support (not one-off activities) also appear relevant

1 INTRODUCTION

This report provides a literature review of the findings and lessons learned from counter terrorism capacity building programs implemented by European countries and has been commissioned by the International Assistance Evaluation Division (PRA) of Global Affairs Canada (GAC). The review draws from evaluations, reviews and other documentation that is available from open sources and it is intended to feed into an upcoming evaluation of GAC's Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP). The CTCBP has global scope and was initiated in 2005. A separate Sahel envelope was added in late 2010. The program has a focus on a number of specific capacity building areas, these being:

- (1) Border and Transportation Security
- (2) Legislative Assistance
- (3) Law Enforcement, Security, Military and Intelligence
- (4) Combatting Financing of Terrorism
- (5) Critical Infrastructure Protection; and
- (6) Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IEDs).

These six CTCBP areas concern measures to strengthen partner countries' capacities to Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Respond to terrorism. The Statement of Work (SoW) for the review asked that it cover the above areas with a particular focus on capacity building programs in the Sahel, the Maghreb and the Middle East. It also envisaged that the study would concern programs undertaken by the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, although these could be augmented with input from other Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members and multilateral organizations where relevant.

Within the six thematic areas and areas of geographic interest, the review was asked to consider six questions, these being:

1. To what extent has similar programming by other countries responded to evolving needs and opportunities for counter-terrorism (CT) capacity building especially in the Sahel?
2. To what extent has similar programming by other countries delivered desired results (i.e. immediate outcomes, intermediate outcomes and other impacts)?
3. Does similar programming by other countries apply a gender analysis lens to program design and the achievement of desired results?
4. What are the lessons learned and good practices for improving the effectiveness and the achievement of longer-term outcomes for this kind of programming?
5. What have been some of the unanticipated impacts from this kind of programming?
6. Does similar programming by other countries include sustainability considerations? Where possible, what factors have contributed to the sustainability of results especially after funding ended?

The report is structured around six chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a short snapshot of current terrorism trends, with a focus on the contexts in which counter terrorism capacity building takes place. This is included in order to provide the reader with a contextual overview for the review. Chapter 3 provides a description of our methodology and approach. Here, we also discuss a number of limitations or constraints to

the study and how these have been addressed through adapting the methodology. Chapter 4 provides a brief overview of the information we have been able to identify concerning the six European countries and their support to third countries' capacity building. Chapter 5 provides our answers to the six questions. In each case, we highlight the thematic focus of the evaluation or review concerned. Finally, chapter 6 is a summary of our conclusions and key findings.

The Review Team (RT) comprised Julian Brett, Finn Skadkær Pedersen and Kelsey Welham from Tana Copenhagen in Denmark. The review was undertaken between November 2019 and January 2020 and was desk based. This report is the responsibility of the authors and should not be taken as necessarily reflecting the views of Global Affairs Canada.

2 SNAPSHOT OF TERRORISM TRENDS

The most recent report of the UN Secretary General on the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy highlights the continuing threat to international peace, security and development posed by terrorism. It notes the increasingly transnational character of extremist ideology and terrorist groups fuelled by it, as exemplified by Islamic State/Daesh, al-Qaida, Boko Haram and other jihadist groups. The report also notes the cross-border nature of financing, recruitment and planning of acts of terror.¹ Academic sources monitoring terrorism, such as the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), show that the number of deaths arising from it has been declining since 2014 and assess that a significant factor in this has been the military successes against the Daesh in Iraq/Syria and al-Shabaab in Somalia. This reduction, however, needs to be seen against a major spike in terrorist attacks in the period 2013-2016.²

Afghanistan has now replaced Iraq as the country most affected by terrorism and, together with Nigeria, has seen an increase in the number of deaths (56% and 33% increase respectively in 2018), although in Nigeria's case the number of deaths attributed to Boko Haram fell. Boko Haram has split into various factions, some of which are affiliated to Daesh. It also operates more broadly across the Lake Chad Basin and northern Nigeria. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR) are the countries most affected by terrorism, although all but Mali improved from 2017 to 2018.³

The situation in the Sahel is volatile and affected by spill-over from other conflict prone areas, such as Libya and Nigeria. Inter alia, the facilitation of illicit migration across the Sahara has empowered violent militia groups. Terrorism in Mali reached a five year high in 2018 with 124 recorded attacks.⁴

In South and South East Asia, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and the Philippines all feature in the top ten countries most affected by terrorism. In Yemen, high (although declining) rates of terrorism are closely linked to the ongoing civil war. While the above countries are seriously (but not exclusively) affected by jihadist groups, the report notes that other areas (including Western Europe, Oceania, and North America) have been affected by far-right groups.⁵

¹ UN Office of Counter Terrorism (2016) Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Report of the Secretary-General.

² Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney, November 2019. Available from: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports>

³ ibid

⁴ ibid

⁵ ibid

The Global Terrorism Index report notes, however, that while the intensity of terrorism has reduced, its global reach and impact has not, and 103 countries recorded at least one attack in 2018. The data shows a very high correlation between countries in states of conflict and incidences of terrorism (95%), especially where insecurity and poor levels of governance, human rights and justice are prevalent. Terrorism in countries already affected by conflict also appear three times as lethal as incidents in other countries. Aside from its direct human costs, terrorism also has various economic impacts. Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), for example, is estimated to be constrained by around 20% due to the direct and indirect effects of terrorism.⁶ These factors are also reflected in the UN Secretary General’s report, which urges member states to do more to address the political, socio-economic and other conditions that are conducive to extremism and terrorism as well as factors that contribute to facilitating it.⁷

3 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

3.1 CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING

For the purposes of this review, we have chosen to use the understanding of terrorism used by the European Council that it concerns “acts committed with the aim of 'seriously intimidating a population', 'unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act', or 'seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization'”.⁸

Recent EU guidance on counter terrorism (and counter violent extremism) programming highlights also the relevance of distinguishing between CT-specific and CT-relevant programming where the former refers to explicit measures to fill counter terrorism capacity gaps and counter terrorist actors and methods and the latter concerns broader actions that will contribute to the overall response to terrorism but are not specifically designed to do so.⁹ Examples of CT-specific programming include measures to stop the financing of terrorism and protection of critical infrastructure whereas examples of CT-relevant programming include security sector reform. It follows that, to be included in this literature review, the documentation has needed to refer specifically to counter terrorism capacity building in relation to the six CTCBP thematic areas.

In relation to capacity building, we have used the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development / Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC)’s definition of ‘capacity development’, which is “a process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time.”¹⁰ OECD/DAC’s preference for capacity development over capacity building reflects the non-linear nature of development based upon local ownership rather than the application of a “pre-conceived design”.¹¹ Nonetheless, in deference to the Statement of Work, we will use the two terms inter-changeably in this report.

3.2 OVERALL APPROACH

⁶ ibid

⁷ Activities of the United Nations system in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, Report of the Secretary General. 12 April 2016

⁸ European Council (2001/931/CFSP) 27 December 2001

⁹ Operational Guidelines on the preparation and implementation of EU financed actions specific to countering terrorism and violent extremism in third countries, European Commission, 2017

¹⁰ OECD (2006) *The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working towards good practice*. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series.

¹¹ ibid

Our approach has been guided by the understanding of counter terrorism described above and the six thematic areas and the six review questions outlined in Chapter 1. The review has been desk based and has drawn exclusively upon open source documentation without direct interaction with representatives of any of the countries or agencies involved.

The Review Team (RT) has undertaken an extensive google-based search for relevant documentation in English using (a) the six CTCBP thematic areas as key words; (b) a broader google search using counter terrorism capacity building and related key words designed to identify sources possibly missed by the initial search; (c) a targeted search of national and multilateral agencies' homepages (e.g. United Kingdom Home Office, European Commission CT Morse, Dutch intelligence service (AVID)); and (d) a targeted search of think tanks and other knowledge banks (e.g. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT) etc.). In addition, we have followed up on references and other links included in reports to the extent possible.

The RT has not reviewed evaluations or other material relating to preventing or countering violent extremism (P/CVE) as this area is excluded from the Statement of Work.

It should also be noted that the RT has focused on counter terrorism capacity building undertaken (largely) by the EU and the six OECD countries highlighted in the Statement of Work for the benefit of third parties (non-OECD countries). As a result, experience and lessons arising from domestic counter terrorism activity in the six thematic areas has not been included. Likewise, CT cooperation between the focus countries in Europe (such as through the EU's Counter Terrorism Group and other internal cooperation fora) has not been included.

The study has therefore encompassed:

- Evaluations and reviews – open source only with a focus on the six countries identified in the Statement of Work, but with the addition of the EU, UN Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and certain United States agencies (the latter is the focus of Annex A).
- Academic and applied research literature, such as academic journals and outputs from think tanks, such as RUSI.
- Grey literature, such as academic databases.

For a comprehensive list of sources consulted, please see Annexes B and C.

3.3 LIMITATIONS

The study has encountered a number of limitations, the most prominent of which is the very limited open source literature available. In the six CT-specific areas addressed by this study, the documentation found was often both general in nature (i.e. without significant depth on the six thematic areas being studied) and not very geographically defined (i.e. either global in nature or focused at a strategic level). There was, for example, relatively little open source documentation related to counter terrorism capacity building in the Sahel, which is an area of special interest for GAC.

How we define and understand counter terrorism is also relevant to the ease of data collection on counter terrorism capacity building. As noted in section 2.1, we have distinguished between counter terrorism-specific (CT-specific) and counter terrorism-relevant (CT-relevant) and have focused on the former. As a result, we have not included in our search terms items such as 'security and justice', 'security sector reform', 'police reform' etc.

as this would have incurred blurred lines with counter terrorism, unless increasing counter terrorism capacity was a distinct outcome or impact area. From the perspective of this literature review, the evaluations and reviews have therefore needed to be CT-specific for them to be included. In practice, this means that they have needed a counter terrorism “marker” that identifies them as having been designed with counter terrorism explicitly in mind. So, we have searched for ‘counter terrorism legislative assistance’, ‘counter terrorism related border security’ etc. We have also included the key words ‘counter terrorism capacity building’ or ‘counter terrorism capacity development’ within the search.

In order to test the validity of the above approach, we examined the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI)’s 2015 review of UK development assistance for security and justice. This review did not have an explicit CT-specific focus, despite assessing a number of security and justice capacity building engagements supported by the UK (DFID) in developing contexts with a terrorism threat. The 48 page report included only one reference to terrorism, this being to the UK’s PREVENT strategy.¹²

In the CT-specific area, the amount of documentation available was found to vary according to the thematic area concerned. For example, reviews of Countering Financing of Terrorism (CFT) and counter terrorism legislative assistance are more available than reviews of support to Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) and Critical Infrastructure Protection, where there is very little material concerning capacity building initiatives available.

It also appears that counter terrorism is much less well documented than preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Illustrating this, a recent literature review undertaken by RAND Europe of counter terrorism evaluations found that of the 50 evaluations examined, only 5 of them were CT-specific and only 1 of these was at program level (while an additional 17 had some CT-relevance). The majority of evaluations related to P/CVE.¹³

We also encountered significant difficulties in identifying relevant documentation concerning counter terrorism capacity building from the six European countries prioritized in the Statement of Work. This may simply be because counter terrorism capacity building work in third countries is poorly documented or it may be because the results and lessons from it are not in the public domain. Counter terrorism and P/CVE knowledge banks (such as the GCTF) often have both a public and a membership only portal, with the latter requiring some form of accreditation.¹⁴ This obviously limits access. In order to mitigate the impact of this limitation, the RT took up the option of examining lessons arising from the work of multilateral bodies, such as the EU and UNODC which are more accessible.

As noted above, we have focused on capacity building delivered to third parties, as per the Statement of Work. The effect of this has been to exclude evaluations or reviews of domestic counter terrorism activities unless these include external capacity building as one of their outcome areas. Our documentation search revealed considerably fewer evaluations or research on counter terrorism capacity building to third parties compared to domestic counter terrorism interventions. This mirrors the findings of the 2018 Rand Europe study mentioned above.¹⁵

¹² Review of UK development assistance for security and justice. ICAI. 2015.

¹³ Counter terrorism evaluation: taking stock and looking ahead. Rand Europe. 2018.

¹⁴ Examples include the European Expert Network Group on Terrorism Issues (EENeT) and GCTF.

¹⁵ Rand Europe. 2018

4 OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' COUNTER TERRORISM CAPACITY BUILDING EFFORTS

This chapter presents a brief mapping of counter terrorism capacity building initiatives from the six countries (and the EU). The mapping demonstrates that the definition of counter terrorism capacity building is not uniform between countries and that the information on them available also varies in depth and quality. There are a number of common efforts noted between the countries of interest – namely being a part of larger multilateral efforts (such as the G5 Sahel or the Global Coalition against ISIS/Daesh) or working groups and fora relating to counter terrorism capacity building (such as the GCTF).

Figure 1. provides an overview of the six countries' (and the EU) participation in key international CT initiatives and the degree of open source documentation available.

Figure 1. Overview of CT Engagement

European Union	United Kingdom	Germany	France	Netherlands	Denmark	Sweden

GCTF Global Coalition Against ISIS/Daesh Sahel Alliance Documentation of external CT capacity building strategy available

4.1 EUROPEAN UNION

Counter terrorism capacity building is a core element of the EU international engagement. The EU's Counter Terrorism Strategy focuses on four overarching priorities, these being Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond, and although most of the strategy focuses on domestic counter terrorism priorities, it is also important to note the international reach and collaboration of the EU through international capacity building efforts.¹⁶ Amongst these, the thematic areas of the most relevance and interest for this literature review are: (a) rule of law, justice and governance; (b) law enforcement and internal security; and (c) land and sea border management. EU capacity building in these areas targets improving the coordination of law enforcement agencies, providing training and technical assistance to law enforcement and judicial offices, enhancing the ability and capacity of law enforcement to disrupt terrorist activities reinforce the rule of law and maximizing the effectiveness of security actors in their ability to control borders and territory.¹⁷ Other focus areas (outside the scope of this review)

¹⁶ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/>

¹⁷ The main EU funding channels used are the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) as well as the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, the European Union emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), and European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

include P/CVE, as well as funding through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) which is currently around €18 million (app. 26,4 million CAD) per year.¹⁸

The EU’s counter terrorism capacity building cooperation is global in scope, and includes programs in the Western Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.¹⁹ In the Sahel, for example, the EU is also member of the Sahel Alliance, supporting the G5 Sahel countries through security and stability support – which is inclusive of improving regional capacity to fight terrorism.²⁰ This has been pursued through programs such as “CT Sahel” and more recently “EUCAP Sahel Niger” and “EUCAP Sahel Mali”. In East and South East Asia, the EU has supported capacity building for counter terrorism legal frameworks, rule of law-based counter terrorism implementation, inter-disciplinary and transnational cooperation. In the Balkans, the EU supports capacity building of counter terrorist financing, law enforcement, witness protection, and inter-agency cooperation.²¹

The EU is relatively transparent regarding its counter terrorism capacity building activities and its documentation, such as the 2018 Global Evaluation of its counter terrorism engagement, provides a key source for this review in the absence of documentation from other sources. The CT Morse website (<http://www.ct-morse.eu/>) provides a useful resource for knowledge sharing and learning.

4.2 UNITED KINGDOM

Within the UK’s Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), the Counter Terrorism Programme Fund (CTPF) supports capacity building in countries where the risk to the UK and its security interests is considered high.²² The CPTF has four strands – each with their own objective – as shown in box 1 below.

Box 1. UK Counter Terrorism Programme Fund

Counter Terrorism Programme Fund		
Key areas for investment: CT investigations and prosecutions, protective security around key sites, and quick and effective response to terrorist incidents.		
<p>Strand 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weaken drivers of radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism • Degrade terrorist structures • Create environments that decrease the ease with which terrorists are currently able to operate. 	<p>Strand 2 +3</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build the capacity of international partners to disrupt, prosecute and detain terrorists and violent extremists. 	<p>Strand 4</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build capacity of international partners in strengthening their protective security • Respond quickly and effectively to a terrorist incident.

¹⁸ CT Morse homepage, accessed 12 December 2019

¹⁹ European Commission Counter Terrorism (2019): https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/counter-terrorism_en

²⁰ EU External Action Serve (2018) *The European Union’s Partnership with the G5 Sahel countries*. Brussels.

²¹ EU efforts on counter terrorism – capacity building in third countries, European Parliament, December 2017. This is a mapping of EU action rather than lessons learned and experience.

²² Her Majesty’s Government (2018) *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism*.

The key geographic areas of interest for counter terrorism capacity building for the UK are the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Strategies for overseas counter-terrorism work are developed by the Joint International Counter Terrorism Unit (JICTU) (Home Office/Foreign & Commonwealth Office). In addition, the UK works on counter terrorism as a part of the UN, EU, G7, Sahel alliance, the Global Coalition to defeat ISIS (which has included instruction on countering improvised explosive devices), and is a founding member of the GCTF.

While the UK's overseas counter terrorism capacity building support appears to be broad in scope, it is described only in very general terms (as above) and programmatic evaluations and reviews relevant to this literature review have not been identified on open sources.

4.3 GERMANY

Germany engages in global collaborative counter terrorism activities through a number of channels, including the UN counter terrorism strategy, the EU counter terrorism strategy, the Council of Europe, in the GCTF, and the Sahel alliance. Germany is also an active member of the Global coalition to defeat ISIS.²³ In 2019 Germany pledged USD 1.14 million to boost Iraq's local police forces and criminal investigation services.²⁴ They provide training support to security forces: including tactical and command and control processes, administration of medical aid, maintenance, handling chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence equipment, explosive ordinance disposal and international humanitarian law. The availability of open source documentation concerning German counter terrorism capacity building activities appears very limited.

4.4 FRANCE

France is reported to engage in counter terrorism and counter terrorism capacity building activities in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Mali, the Sahel region, and the Lake Chad region and has been particularly active in Mali and the Sahel region bilaterally as well as through larger EU and UN conventions and engagements.²⁵ France's engagement has largely been through the G5 Sahel joint force and Operation Barkhane to support the actions of the Sahel G5 to ensure collective and coordinated security and to enable partner States to acquire the capacity to ensure their security autonomously²⁶ France is also an active participant in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and in the GCTF. Documentation on France's counter terrorism capacity building activities is very limited and although there are a number of documents which cite the engagement, details on the programs or their results are scarce.

4.5 NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands has reportedly financed a variety of external counter terrorism capacity building projects.²⁷ They are an active member of the GCTF, which they co-chaired from 2015-2019 alongside Morocco - and of the EU's Counter Terrorism Group, which aims to improve cooperation and information exchange between European counterterrorism services. The Netherlands is also a part of the Sahel Alliance, and the Global Coalition to defeat ISIS since its formation in 2014.²⁸ This has included training Iraqi Special Forces in Baghdad, providing Iraqi and Kurdish forces with training and strengthening the security sector in Iraq. The Dutch MFA has appointed regional

²³ The Global Coalition Against Daesh (2017) *Germany's Military Contribution Against Daesh In Iraq*. News. <https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/germanys-military-contribution-against-daesh-in-iraq/>

²⁴ Global Coalition Against Daesh (2019) *Germany Support For Policing in Iraq*. News. <https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/germanys-support-for-policing-in-iraq/>

²⁵ United States Department of State Publication (2019) *Country Reports on Terrorism 2018*. Released October 2019 by the Bureau of Counterterrorism

²⁶ <https://onu.delegfrance.org/France-a-strategic-partner-of-the-Lake-Chad-basin-countries>; <https://onu.delegfrance.org/G5-Sahel-Joint-Force-10433>

²⁷ United States Department of State Publication (2019) *Country Reports on Terrorism 2018*. Released October 2019 by the Bureau of Counterterrorism

²⁸ The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (2019) *Netherlands' Contribution Towards the Global Coalition Against Daesh*. News. <https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/netherlands-contribution-daesh/>

security coordinators at six embassies who work on capacity building, although details of the latter are unclear.²⁹ Sources indicate that the Netherlands has also entered into cooperation agreements with Kenyan and Indonesian CT counterparts but there is no documentation available on the details of this.³⁰ The Netherlands has also supported financially the Global Center's program on rule of law and criminal justice capacity and cooperation in North Africa.³¹ While the Netherlands is host to a number of think tanks dealing with the security sector (including Clingendael and the International Centre on Counter Terrorism (ICCT)) there is very little open source documentation relating to capacity building programs or their results. An evaluation of the Dutch counter terrorism strategy was undertaken (and published) in 2016 but this concerns domestic responses only.³² The Netherlands also financed Rand Europe's 2018 study on counter terrorism evaluations, although this was primarily a methodological analysis rather than an evaluation of distinct interventions' relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact.³³

4.6 DENMARK

Denmark cooperates with the US, UN and EU on a number of global counterterrorism capacity building initiatives – including the GCTF and G5 Sahel.³⁴ Denmark is also an active member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS – contributing to both military and civilian efforts, including reducing illicit financial flows.³⁵ Denmark has also been a forerunner in supporting counter violent extremism (and to a lesser extent counter terrorism) initiatives, notably in the Horn of Africa, Sahel, and MENA using a mix of ODA and non-ODA funding via its Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF). This builds upon a significant (and well publicized) domestic counter violent extremism program drawing from multi-actor cooperation at national and local level (the so-called Aarhus or Danish model).³⁶ Aside from countering violent extremism, this has included support to capacity building within rule of law/justice and counter terrorist financing. In relation to the latter, Denmark has been undertaking AML/CFT capacity building and technical assistance for the Ethiopian financial and legal authorities since 2014. Denmark has also financed regional mapping studies on AML/CFT; for example, on the wider Horn of Africa.³⁷

As part of its international security cooperation - Denmark, together with France, contributed DKK 7.5 million to the G5 Sahel in 2018, which was mainly targeted towards countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices in the Sahel.³⁸ The Danish Government states that it engages actively and extensively in enhancing military and security capacities - but this is classified as peace and stabilization engagements rather than counter terrorism.³⁹ While evaluations of Denmark's PSF and country programs are undertaken and are usually published, these have not gone into detail on CT-related results and experience. This is in contrast to Denmark's domestic counter violent extremism activities, which are regularly evaluated and the results published.⁴⁰ A 2015 study commissioned and published by the Danish MFA concluded that there was scope to include CVE -relevant aspects

²⁹ United States Department of State Publication (2019) *Country Reports on Terrorism 2018*. Released October 2019 by the Bureau of Counterterrorism

³⁰ *ibid*

³¹ United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - The Netherlands*, 19 July 2017, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e41011.html> [accessed 9 December 2019]

³² Government of the Netherlands. (2016) *Evaluation of the Dutch counterterrorism strategy between 2011-2015*, Dutch Ministry of Security & Justice.

³³ Counter terrorism evaluation: taking stock and looking ahead. Rand Europe. 2018.

³⁴ United States Department of State Publication (2019) *Country Reports on Terrorism 2018*. Released October 2019 by the Bureau of Counterterrorism

³⁵ Government of Denmark (2016) *Preventing and Countering Extremism and Radicalisation: National Action Plan*.

³⁶ *Ibid*

³⁷ Shetret, L., Durner, T., Cotter, D., and Tobin, P. (2015) *Tracking Progress: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in East Africa and the Greater Horn of Africa*. Global Centre on Cooperative Security

³⁸ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018) *The Peace and Stabilisation Fund: Annual Report 2018*.

³⁹ Danish Ministry of Defence (2017) *A Strong defence of Denmark: Proposal for new defence agreement 2018-2023*.

⁴⁰ <https://stopekstremisme.dk/nyheder/10-initiativer-fra-satspuljeaftalerne-fra-2015-og-2017-er-evaluert>

within development assistance and to draw from domestic CVE experiences provided that programming is carefully tailored to the local environment.⁴¹

4.7 SWEDEN

Sweden focuses its CT capacity building support on measures which enhance the capacities of judicial authorities, institutions, and the rule of law in cases concerning terrorist crimes. According to the Swedish Government, this takes place in the form of both bilateral and multilateral efforts.⁴² Sweden's engagements are carried out both through the development assistance work of the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), as well as through larger multilateral efforts, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Sweden has also supported the work of the EU on counter terrorism capacity building activities in Pakistan, Yemen, Horn of Africa, the Maghreb and Sahel.⁴³ In addition they have provided trainers to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.⁴⁴ Sweden has emphasized the importance of supporting to "provide support for community building, strengthening the rule of law and thus also tackling the root causes of terrorism".⁴⁵ Sweden is also a member of the EU Counter-Terrorism Group and the Global Coalition to defeat ISIS/Daesh.

5 REVIEW FINDINGS

The sections below provide a summary of the key findings from the review and are organized around the six questions highlighted in the Statement of Work. To the degree possible, this highlights experiences relating to the six thematic areas and the six European countries taking into account the limitations mentioned above, the effect of which is that the Review Team's ability to provide a consistent level of coverage varies significantly due to the quality and extent of documentation available. To augment our findings, we have therefore also included more general CT-specific lessons and experience. Additionally, a summary of key points from the review of certain U.S. counter terrorism agencies' evaluations that are in the public domain is included at Annex A. These tend to reinforce the findings from the European evaluations.

5.1 RESPONSES TO NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPACITY BUILDING

Question 1 asks *to what extent has similar programming by other countries responded to evolving needs and opportunities for Counter-Terrorism capacity building, especially in the Sahel?*

Key messages: *All of the literature examined by the Review Team has found a high degree of relevance, with an essential pre-condition for this being a robust context analysis and participatory design process. These should take a "whole of system" approach so that the capacities, interests and needs of different actors and connectivity between them are highlighted. Adopting a political economy lens and theory of change process during design would be useful in these respects, irrespective of the thematic area concerned. Other factors aiding relevance include flexibility and adaptability so that longer term initiatives have the opportunity to flex and meet emerging*

⁴¹ http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/evaluation_study_2015_03/Pdf/evaluation_study_2015_03.pdf

⁴² Government Offices of Sweden (2011) *Sweden's national counter-terrorism strategy*. Government Communication 2011/12:73.

⁴³ United States Department of State Publication (2019) *Country Reports on Terrorism 2018*. Released October 2019 by the Bureau of Counterterrorism

⁴⁴ United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 - Sweden*, 19 September 2018, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f7ea.html> [accessed 2 December 2019]

⁴⁵ Government Offices of Sweden (2014) *Prevent, Preempt, Protect: The Swedish counter-terrorism strategy*. Government Communication 2014/15:146.

needs. In relation to the Sahel, evaluations highlighted the need for flexibility to respond to the evolving context (increasingly unstable). They also noted the increasing donor interest that requires harmonisation of counter terrorism programming to promote overall coherence and avoid duplication and/or gaps.

The evaluation of UNODC's capacity building support for **criminal justice responses** to counter terrorism in East and South East Asia (2016) found that the program was relevant when designed and became increasingly so over time.⁴⁶ The program adapted to changes in the counter terrorism landscape, notably in response to the foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) phenomenon. As this became apparent, research was carried out between links between Daesh and countries in the region. The evaluation highlighted a number of good practices. It found that relevance was enhanced through a thorough and participatory design process that generated beneficiary buy-in and identified needs. This enabled the design to reflect the particular needs and capacities of the beneficiaries (i.e. tailoring), not all of whom faced the same level of risk. For example, a relatively higher level of intensity of training was programmed for Indonesia and the Philippines. The evaluation, however, also points to some challenges for **regional programming**, notably that not all countries were ready for project start-up at the same time; a key precursor for this being the identification of counterpart institutions. The evaluation found also that there were comparative advantages in UNODC's role as project anchor due to its UN status, its technical expertise, and its ability to bridge the development and security agendas in a context that has been dominated by security agencies.⁴⁷

The Global Evaluation of the EU's external engagement on counter terrorism (2018) found that the EU's counter terrorism engagement was relevant and had increased in line with emerging security threats. The evaluation recommended, however, that the EU should do more to explain and link its actions to its strategic goals and consider the balance between internal (i.e. intra-EU) and external counter terrorism (and P/CVE) activities. To achieve this, the evaluation recommended developing an external assistance counter terrorism plan anchored in a revamped counter terrorism strategy. These should be guided by a theory of change and include application of Do No Harm principles. The evaluation also noted that the main focus of the EU's engagement was on the PREVENT and PURSUE pillars of the EU's Counter Terrorism Strategy and that further consideration should be given to possible investment in PROTECT and RESPOND capabilities, including in relation to critical infrastructure protection, crowded places and iconic sites, emergency services capacity, and crisis response. Inter alia, it recommended increasing the mandate for certain EU agencies (such as EUROPOL and EUROJUST) in external capacity building assistance, increasing attention to sustainability and uptake of learning.⁴⁸

The Final Project Evaluation (2018) of the EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project strengthening Nigeria's **rule of law-based criminal justice responses** to terrorism and strengthening the **legal regime** against terrorism found that relevance was promoted through intensive and ongoing consultations with the Nigerian partners but was hampered by the short engagement time period (under two years). It also found that the training of staff needs to be complemented with appropriate engagement of senior decision makers to achieve buy-in for project objectives. Bringing together different stakeholders enhanced mutual trust, leading to improved communication and ultimately increased effectiveness.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ The UNODC program was funded by EU, New Zealand, United States and the primary beneficiary countries were Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, and Vietnam.

⁴⁷ UNODC, Final independent project evaluation of the Sub-programme on Counter Terrorism: East and Southeast Asia Partnership on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism. June 2016

⁴⁸ Global Evaluation of the European Union Engagement on Counter Terrorism, CT Morse, June 2018

⁴⁹ Final Project Evaluation of the EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project, 2018

The EU's CT Sahel project (2011-2015) sought to strengthen the capacity of **law enforcement and judicial institutions** in Mali, Mauretania and Niger and subsequently Burkina Faso and Chad and enhance their regional cooperation. The latter was through an innovative "virtual" Collège Sahélien de Sécurité (CSS) with a rotating leadership and technical committees.⁵⁰ CT Sahel was reviewed twice – firstly through an extensive Mid Term Review (MTR) in 2014 and subsequently through a lighter touch Final Review in late 2015. These reviews found that the project was relevant and consistent with the priorities of its beneficiaries. However, the initial uniqueness of its national components had become progressively challenged by the growth in similar CT initiatives from other donors in the wake of the Mali crisis. The **regional** component of the program was relevant to the transborder challenges being faced by the Sahel, including terrorist groups but also trafficking and organized crime.⁵¹

CT Sahel was designed through a lengthy and highly consultative process involving a number of joint missions to the region and dialogue with regional states. The MTR Report notes, however, that this was overly protracted and had raised expectations regarding the ultimate size and shape of the project. Despite the thorough preparation, the review also pointed to a divergence of opinion regarding the scope of the project, with the EU prioritising capacity development and national authorities also desiring an equipment element.⁵²

In 2015, CT Sahel was replaced by the EUCAP Mali and EUCAP Niger missions, which have somewhat broader security sector reform objectives, although nonetheless relevant to the **law enforcement, security and border security** thematic areas with a focus on provision of technical advice and capacity development. A 2018 analysis of EUCAP found that the relevance of the capacity development being provided was affected by the lack of familiarity of external trainers with the local context, which in the worst cases meant that the training courses were seen as irrelevant by the participants. The high rates of turnover for EUCAP staff was seen as contributing to this because it prevented a sufficiently deep understanding of the local context. The report notes that EUCAP is trying to work its way around this by sending mobile training teams beyond the area around Bamako, attempting to further analyze local conflicts. The length of training (e.g. of training the trainers) was also seen as overly short. A further limitation was caused by weak oversight of beneficiaries, with the result that similar training (from other providers) can be provided to the same people. Equipment provided was sometimes too technical.⁵³

5.2 EXTENT OF ACHIEVEMENT OF INTENDED RESULTS

Question 2 asks *to what extent has similar programming by other countries delivered desired results?* This is essentially an issue of effectiveness – have the programs been effective in achieving their goals?

Key messages: The documentation presents a picture of mixed levels of effectiveness. It is generally vague in terms of impacts and outcomes and somewhat less so in relation to outputs, thereby echoing the widespread observation that identifying the results of counter terrorism (as with preventing / countering violence extremism) is difficult. The documentation, however, also points to weaknesses in the approach to monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) as being partly to blame for this; projects did not necessarily have measurable baselines and indicators against which to measure and monitor change. This points to the need to strengthen MEL frameworks, especially at output and outcome level. In doing so, the Review Team suggest that lessons from development

⁵⁰ <https://www.g5css.com/>

⁵¹ Mid Term Review of CT Sahel. CT Morse. 2014

⁵² Ibid

⁵³ Bøås, M. et al. (2018) Working paper on implementation of EU crisis response in Mali, EUNPACK, 2018

assistance could be drawn upon, such as ensuring clarity of assumptions, i.e. through a theory of change approach that specifically highlights the pre-conditions for change and thereby project effectiveness. The literature suggests a number of other means to promote the latter, including strengthening cross-agency linkages and ensuring that implementing teams (who may be thematic experts drawn from domestic counter terrorism resources) are familiar with the context.

The 2018 Global Evaluation of the EU's counter terrorism engagement points to a number of areas with positive results (that are also measurable). Examples are: **AML/CTF** assistance in MENA, South East Asia, and Western Balkans that have contributed to countries existing Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) grey lists; support to **border security, aviation security** and **judicial capacity** in Lebanon; and connectivity between security agencies and international organizations (such as Europol). Further examples are evident in the P/CVE. However, the evaluation also highlighted that measuring effectiveness and impact is difficult. Finally, a number of obstacles to effectiveness were also identified, including political sensitivities, poor human rights standards, security conditions, and lack of a diverse field of implementing agencies. Meanwhile, a significant gap identified was the internal capacity of the European Commission itself, this being partly due to the relative scarcity of counter terrorism professionals and partly due to the resources and mandates of EU agencies.⁵⁴

The 2014 and 2015 reviews of the EU's CT Sahel found that the program had been effective in delivering multi-actor capacity building of **law enforcement** in intelligence gathering, investigation, justice (criminal proceedings), and crisis management. At output level, and by the time of the 2014 review, it is credited with having trained 600 officials through 26 courses.⁵⁵ At outcome level, CT Sahel contributed to enhancing regional cooperation through its multi-agency courses and equally through the Collège Sahélien de Sécurité (CSS) which is described as "an incubator for the G5 Sahel"). The CSS is credited with facilitating operational linkages to be established between strategic counterparts in national administrations.⁵⁶ Although it also appears to have had some difficulty gaining traction initially as the virtual nature of the College proved difficult to grasp and momentum relied upon the buy-in and commitment from a few individuals.⁵⁷ The project also appears to have been adaptive; for example, by expanding to include engagement with penal authorities (an area of particular need from a counter radicalisation perspective).

A 2018 evaluation by the European Court of Auditors of the EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger found that the two missions contributed to strengthening capacity, but each encountered difficulties which reduced the efficiency and sustainability of their operations. These challenges included lack of access to adequate operational guidance and training and each mission needed to spend considerable time and resources on setting up its own systems and procedures, which were often not adapted to the local conditions. The evaluators further found that the European Commission did not provide enough support and, in some cases, applied procedures that were unsuited to the working conditions on the ground. In addition, the monitoring and evaluation of the missions' activities was found to be inadequate and not focused on outcomes or impact.⁵⁸

The evaluation of UNODC's support to **criminal justice responses** in East and South East Asia (2016) found that UNODC's regional program delivery had been effective due to its nuanced and reflective approach, which

⁵⁴ Global Evaluation of the European Union Engagement on Counter Terrorism, June 2018

⁵⁵ Mid Term Review of CT Sahel. CT Morse. 2014

⁵⁶ Final Review of EU CT Sahel, CT Morse. December 2015

⁵⁷ Mid Term Review of CT Sahel. CT Morse. 2014

⁵⁸ Strengthening the capacity of the internal security forces in Niger and Mali. European Court of Auditors, 2018

enabled it to respond to the differing needs and capacities of the beneficiary countries. Examples included development of regulations on asset freezing in Indonesia; new anti-terrorism legislation in the Philippines, Cambodia and Lao PDR; mutual legal assistance legislation in Laos and the Philippines; and various capacity development results, notably strengthening inter-agency collaboration and implementation mechanisms (e.g. regulations concerning freezing of assets in Indonesia and technical support on extradition and inter-agency collaboration on intelligence, investigation and prosecution). This underlines the earlier point about the need to move beyond legislation to the technical aspects of its implementation. However, the evaluation also notes that the program was weak in assessing the effects (or impact) of these outputs and outcomes. For example, progress was made in relation to FATF compliance, but the impact (attribution) of this is less clear in terms of reductions in terrorist financing, improved prosecution rates etc.⁵⁹ This suggests a need for programs to focus more systematically on the theory of change underlying the engagement and the results expected (and corresponding assumptions/pre-conditions, baselines and indicators).

The 2015 Evaluation of the UNODC's Global Program on Strengthening the **Legal Regime** against Terrorism found that it is important to adapt to specific needs and not present generic trainings, to couple assisting ratification with increasing technical assistance to implement legal instruments in order to increase effectiveness in the long term, and it is critical to partner with national counterparts and empower them to deliver technical assistance.⁶⁰

The need to ensure a rigorous understanding of causality is also highlighted in the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI)'s 2018 Performance Review of the UK's Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) which found that "at a minimum, a theory of change must specify plausible links between desired end results (the what) and the means for achieving them (the how). It should also include key assumptions that must hold in order for the pathway from means to end to be realisable. These assumptions should include the identification of risks that could undermine progress. To retain relevance, particularly in volatile settings, theories of change should be revised regularly."⁶¹

5.3 APPLICATION OF A GENDER ANALYSIS LENS TO PROGRAM DESIGN

Question 3 asks *does similar programming by other countries apply a gender analysis lens to program design and the achievement of desired results?*

Key messages: In general, the Review Team finds that gender is poorly addressed in the literature, which is either gender blind or adopts a simplistic approach. Good practice from development assistance suggests that gender requires women's participation and empowerment and also that gender perspectives (including the impact of counter terrorism on women and girls) is addressed through the project approach which ensures that these perspectives are incorporated throughout the project/program management cycle.

The evaluation of UNODC support to **criminal justice responses** in East and South East Asia (2016) found that gender equality was referenced very little in program documentation and that, in relation to human rights as a whole, a more nuanced approach is needed that moves away from stating principles of human rights and focus instead on how they can be applied to programmes involving different stakeholder groups within the context of counter terrorism.⁶²

⁵⁹ Sub-programme on Counter Terrorism: East and South East Asia Partnership on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism: Final evaluation, June 2016, UNODC

⁶⁰ Evaluation of UNODC's Global Programme on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism. 2015

⁶¹ The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund's aid spending: A performance review. Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI), March 2018.p19

⁶² Sub-programme on Counter Terrorism: East and South East Asia Partnership on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism: Final evaluation, June 2016, UNODC

The Global Evaluation of the EU's counter terrorism engagement notes that strengthening gender equality and human rights adherence is one of the EU's comparative advantages and it is an important criterion in DG DEVCO's operational guidelines for counter terrorism programming. This extends beyond promoting equal participation in courses to the inclusion of gender perspectives in activities.⁶³ In line with EU policy, CT Sahel mainstreamed human rights aligned approaches into the strengthening of operational skills; although the 2015 project review also highlighted that these aspects will require continual attention to generate wider impact.⁶⁴

The approach taken in the EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project strengthening **rule of law-based criminal justice responses** in Nigeria was to systematically seek the participation of women in training sessions and raise awareness about the gender dimensions of the criminal justice response to terrorism. The final evaluation found that the project had been effective in mainstreaming gender issues (although still only 24% of participants in training activities were women) and that the approach enhanced the understanding of the impact that terrorism has specifically on women.⁶⁵

5.4 LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICES FOR IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS

Question 4 asks *what are the lessons learned and good practices for improving the effectiveness and the achievement of longer-term outcomes for this kind of programming?*

Key messages: The literature review points to a large number of good practices and lessons from counter terrorism (and P/CVE) work which, at a generic level, mirror findings from similar studies of development practice. These include robust context analysis (including conflict sensitivity), tailoring of designs imported from elsewhere, the importance of generating ownership amongst beneficiaries through participatory processes, sufficient and informed project management, a focus on coherence and breaking down silo thinking through inter-disciplinary processes, practical and applicable approaches and techniques etc.

The EU Council's Conclusions on Counter Terrorism (2015 and 2017) note, for example that EU external efforts must be tailor made and, where necessary, developed in an incremental way, taking into account the needs and capacity of its partners. Complementarity with other international and regional partners and bilateral efforts of EU Member States is essential. Counter terrorism (and P/CVE) should be embedded in the EU's strategies and policies, thereby allowing the EU to address the root causes of radicalization, to support social and economic development, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights (including gender aspects). It notes, for example, that counter terrorism should be mainstreamed into justice programs while ensuring also the protection of rights of victims of terrorist crimes.⁶⁶

In 2017, the European Parliament published an assessment of the EU's counter terrorism cooperation with its southern neighbourhood (Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries). It noted that capacity building encounters a number of challenges: (a) their success is difficult to measure (how to measure a negative?), clear and defined objectives are not always used, and obtaining data from trustworthy sources can be problematic, (b) they are limited by the political will of the partner country, and (c) they are often undermined by violence recreating the conditions conducive to terrorism. With regard to (a) the report highlighted the criticism that

⁶³ Global Evaluation of the European Union Engagement on Counter Terrorism, June 2018

⁶⁴ Final Review of EU CT Sahel, CT Morse. December 2015

⁶⁵ Final Project Evaluation of the EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project, 2018

⁶⁶ Council of Europe (2017) Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Counter-terrorism (19 June 2017). EU.

quantitative data rarely provides a comprehensive or accurate picture of counter terrorism success or otherwise and that there are demands for a system for monitoring and evaluating longer term impact of counter terrorism measures that also include qualitative data methods more commonly used in development work and incorporating human security perspectives. The report noted that the EU's dedicated counter terrorism monitoring and research unit (CT-MORSE) is a step in the right direction.⁶⁷

In 2017, the EU published operational guidelines for the preparation and implementation of EU support to counter terrorism (and P/CVE). The guidelines apply a counter terrorism (and a P/CVE) lens to processes that more frequently feature in program cycle management. A key point made is that a deep contextual understanding (political economy or similar) is required so that needs, interests, perceptions, capacities, risks and opportunities are identified and can influence programming and implementation modalities.⁶⁸ Despite the complexity of undertaking effective counter terrorism programming, the existence of such practical and accessible guidelines (bridging the security and development areas, which do not necessarily sit comfortably together) can be considered a good practice.

The reviews of the EU's CT Sahel (2011-2015) found that **law enforcement** stakeholders appreciated the focus on promoting and enhancing cross-agency operational level working relationships and practical skills of front line officers rather than theory based training. For example, trainings brought together officers from the police, gendarmerie, national guard and prosecutors in order to promote operational working relations. The trainers were specialists provided by EU member states and coordinated by resident coordinators in each country. The 2014 review found that the latter were an "exemplary asset" to the project due to their seniority, commitment and experience and thereby provided credibility. However, this also meant that the project became dependent upon them.⁶⁹

The reviews of CT Sahel were useful in highlighting a number of systemic and institutional issues that CT capacity building needs to overcome for it to have impact. On the one hand, participants welcomed the practical nature of the training which provided necessary and applicable skills. Instructors, however, commented that the level of many of the officials was quite basic which meant that training tended to focus on foundational skills in crisis management, investigation and response with only limited scope to introduce specialized skills. Therefore, the results and expectations need to be realistic. The reviews also note that the countries lack the infrastructure to put the training to good use. A further institutional issue was the high level of turnover amongst staff. CT Sahel lacked a means to track whether officials trained actually use the skills developed (outcome mapping).⁷⁰

The evaluation of UNODC support to **criminal justice responses** in East and South East Asia (2016) emphasized that counter terrorism programming needs to be thoroughly attuned to the situation on the ground; offer flexibility and responsiveness to partner governments; go beyond ratification of instruments to support implementation (inter alia, the focus on strengthening inter-agency collaboration and use of case studies in training where highlighted as useful lessons); and include a logical and consistent approach to results based management and monitoring and evaluation (the program in question was considered somewhat weak in the latter regard). The evaluation also pointed to a number of enabling factors contributing to its results; including

⁶⁷ European Parliament. Counter terrorism cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood. 2017

⁶⁸ Operational Guidelines on the preparation and implementation of EU financed actions specific to countering terrorism and violent extremism in third countries. CT Morse. 2017

⁶⁹ Mid Term Review of CT Sahel. CT Morse. 2014

⁷⁰ Mid Term Review of CT Sahel. CT Morse. 2014

- Ensuring an adequate program duration relating to expected results
- Linking activities to external systems of enforcement (e.g. FATF regulations)
- A consultative design process that was responsive to national needs and priorities
- Apply an integrated approach that links headquarters with field work
- National ownership, including co-organizing and co-funding.
- Use of train the trainer methodologies helped promote institutionalisation and thereby sustainability. Use of case studies during training to demonstrate experience.
- Institutional credibility of the implementing partner (convening power) and the choice of reliable and appropriate institutional partners at national level
- The need to be aware of the sensitivities, dangers, threats and competency issues of counter terrorism work.⁷¹

Although now somewhat dated, the 2011 evaluation of the UN Global Program against **Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Financing Terrorism** highlighted a number of good practices which were key for the success of the program. The development of a mentorship program was emphasized as an effective method for assisting countries to establish AML legal regimes and improve law enforcement by being flexible in its response to local needs. The evaluation also stressed need for more cooperation between and within law enforcement agencies as a good practice to incorporate going forward. An additional good practice noted was the prosecutor placement program. This capacity building program was highly relevant for sustainability as it supported cross border cooperation and networks to exchange best practices, a unique form of technical assistance. Finally, the establishment of regional asset recovery networks to harmonize legislation across the region, and the presence of a framework for legal cooperation were important for the creation of a favorable atmosphere for investigation, detection, asset recovery and prosecution of money laundering case were key for taking legal action against money laundering.⁷²

5.5 UNANTICIPATED IMPACTS FROM THIS KIND OF PROGRAMMING

Question 5 asked *What have been some of the unanticipated impacts from this kind of programming?*

Key messages: Very little of the documentation reviewed took a systematic approach to addressing unanticipated impacts, although some were identified (such as the growth in inter-agency cooperation as a consequence of the EU's Sahel engagements). This diverges from Rand Europe's study of counter terrorism evaluations (2018), which found that half of the evaluations had sought to capture potential unintended effects of initiatives. Of these, it was found that evaluations of counter terrorism initiatives placed greater emphasis on investigating unintended effects than those looking at P/CVE specific initiatives.⁷³ Our findings reinforce the EU Global Evaluation's recommendation that counter terrorism (and P/CVE) evaluations should examine unintended consequences as a matter of course and the application of Do No Harm in particular.

With regard to good practice, the 2018 Global Evaluation of the EU's counter terrorism engagement highlighted the need to work "do no harm" principles into CT (and CVE) planning and implementation, through including them into counter terrorism theories of change. The need to include a Do No Harm perspective reflects the risks that counter terrorism (and counter violent extremism) measures can have for human rights; for example,

⁷¹ Sub-programme on Counter Terrorism: East and South East Asia Partnership on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism: Final evaluation, June 2016, UNODC

⁷² in-depth evaluation of the UN Global Programme against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Financing Terrorism, 2011

⁷³ Rand Europe. 2018

through empowering law enforcement for PREVENT, RESPOND and PURSUE objectives without corresponding provisions for human rights protection.⁷⁴ The EU Global Evaluation did not, however, actually assess the degree to which this had actually been done or whether unanticipated impacts had arisen from EU interventions.

Taking steps to ensure adequate coherence of engagements was also identified as important, both to avoid unnecessary duplication but also to ensure potential synergies are obtained. The former appears to be a particular issue in countries receiving relatively greater assistance (Jordan and Lebanon are examples, but also the Sahel, see below).⁷⁵

A positive effect of delays in UNODC's capacity building on counter terrorism **criminal justice** in South and South East Asia was the opportunity to include additional, unanticipated activities (such as AML/CFT standard operating procedures for the Laos counterpart). It also meant that the program was able to respond to new developments, such as the rise of Daesh/ISIS and the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon. Adaptability appears to be a relevant issue for counter terrorism programming. The 2016 UNODC evaluation also notes that, whereas UNODC had previously focused on **legislative drafting**, the increased degree of ratification of global counter terrorism instruments means that attention needs to be placed on capacity building for implementation.⁷⁶

These decidedly mixed findings on unanticipated outcomes derived from the literature studied for this study contrast with Rand Europe's study of counter terrorism evaluations (2018), which found that half of the evaluations had sought to capture potential unintended effects of initiatives. Of these, it was found that evaluations of counter terrorism initiatives placed greater emphasis on investigating unintended effects than those looking at P/CVE specific initiatives.⁷⁷ Our findings are even more surprising given that the Rand study was looking primarily at domestic Dutch and European counter terrorism and counter violent extremism evaluations while the current review is examining evaluations of initiatives in third countries, many of which experience human rights constraints. Our findings thus reinforce the EU Global Evaluation's recommendation that counter terrorism and counter violent extremism evaluations should examine unintended consequences as a matter of course and the application of Do No Harm in particular.

5.6 SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES

Question 6 asked *Does similar programming by other countries include sustainability considerations? Where possible, what factors have contributed to the sustainability of results especially after funding ended?*

Key messages: The evaluations studied tended not to assess the degree to which results have been sustained after project exit. Nonetheless, they did come with a number of useful observations for how sustainability can be optimised. Most of the literature emphasized the importance of embedding knowledge and skills within beneficiary institutions, for example through Training of Trainers (ToT) approaches, which can ameliorate the common problem of trained personnel being rotated away from the jobs for which they have been trained. Sustainability can also be enhanced through investing in local ownership; for example, by involving beneficiaries in project design, strengthening coordination units, and through improving cross-agency cooperation. Predictable funding and the longevity and cohesion of support (not one-off activities) also appear relevant.

⁷⁴ EU Guidelines. 2017

⁷⁵ The Global Evaluation of the EU's Engagement on Counter Terrorism, 2018.

⁷⁶ UNODC, Final independent project evaluation of the Sub-programme on Counter Terrorism: East and Southeast Asia Partnership on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism. June 2016

⁷⁷ Rand Europe. 2018

The 2018 Global Evaluation of the EU's counter terrorism engagement found that investing in institutions is likely to be more sustainable than finite projects. However, this will only be the case if the support is appropriately targeted. Capacity building projects should ensure sustainability and uptake of learning by including preparation and follow-up activities before and after training workshops. It was also observed that there can be a trade-off between innovation and sustainability. While piloting should be encouraged, especially in fields like P/CVE which have a weak evidence base, it is not risk and cost-free, and sustainability risks should be explicitly addressed in the design phase. Piloting in counter terrorism could be considered challenging due to the legal, operational and security risks involved. The evaluation also identified investment in knowledge institutions (such as GCTF) as a sustainable approach, with the contribution increasing where the support is core funding. Meanwhile, challenges to sustainability include the rapid turn-over of individuals who have been trained and "hoarding" of training opportunities by a few well-placed individuals. This points to the need to ensure sufficient targeting of the support.⁷⁸

The Final Review of the EU's CT Sahel found there should have been a greater emphasis on training of trainers and further cooperation with **law enforcement** and judicial training institutions (such as police or judicial training schools) where specialized training could have been included with curricula. The review also noted a potential threat to sustainability in the over-reliance upon a limited number of key individuals, notably the resident coordinators who were counter terrorism specialists.⁷⁹ Other reviews have noted that more guidance was needed on operational procedures to improve efficiency, local ownership over programming should be enhanced, and there should be focus on sustainability and following up after exit on if the training given and equipment provided has been useful.⁸⁰

The 2018 evaluation of EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Assisting Nigeria to strengthen rule of law-based **criminal justice responses** found that the sustainability of the project was hampered by the short engagement of under two years and a lack of an explicit commitment from senior management in the institutions to follow up on the results of capacity building also contributed to undermining sustainability. Additionally, a good practice noted for sustainability was the achievement of what was referred to as a *critical mass* of participants working on counter terrorism. Ensuring that training and other engagements (workshops, conferences) reached a variety of different stakeholders which included investigators, prosecutors and judges.⁸¹

The evaluation of UNODC's support to **criminal justice responses** in East and South East Asia (2016) found that sustainability is supported through approaches such as training of trainers that help embed capacity within institutions, but there was also limited evidence that capacities will be maintained without further assistance. It noted that training of trainers requires robust planning and monitoring; for example, by producing user friendly materials and manuals that national trainers can use, more use of on-line training packages that can be updated and easily delivered. A positive feature of the program noted by the evaluation was the acceptance by some of the partner authorities to take on responsibilities for delivery (e.g. of training packages). These efforts appear entirely state-led as the evaluation did not find any evidence of involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). On the other hand, factors undermining sustainability include lack of budgets, confidence, structured

⁷⁸ Global Evaluation of the European Union Engagement on Counter Terrorism, 2018.

⁷⁹ Final Review of EU CT Sahel, CT Morse. December 2015

⁸⁰ Strengthening the capacity of the internal security forces in Niger and Mali - EU Sahel, 2018

⁸¹ Final Project Evaluation of the EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project, 2018

materials that relate to the national context (the evaluation suggests using a standard module that can then be adapted), and one-off events without clear linkage to outcomes.⁸²

Sustainability of donor funds was found to be an important factor contributing to the effectiveness of UNODC's Global Programme on **Strengthening the Legal Regime** against Terrorism. The 2015 evaluation of this program found that sustainability was contingent on a number of factors, including: i) member states recognition and acceptance of the importance and relevance of the Global Project, ii) the extent to which national capacity has been strengthened to implement the universal legal instruments, iii) member states ability to apply the new counter-terrorism legislation, iv) the extent of and willingness by stakeholders to harmonize their efforts; and v) the extent to which the knowledge gained is managed and exchanged but sustainability was weakened in cases of weak institutional foundations.⁸³ Similarly, the earlier Evaluation of the UN Global Programme against **Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Financing Terrorism** noted that sustainability was constrained due to the unpredictability of funding; without long term secure funds, there is an inability to base the program on a long term strategy.⁸⁴

5.7 GOOD PRACTICE FROM OTHER SOURCES

As noted above, we have examined a number of additional sources, including grey and research literature. While the latter does cover some of the thematic areas in which GAC is interested, it mainly concerns domestic counter terrorism measures and is therefore not relevant to this study. Of the other sources focusing on CT capacity building, think tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT), and the Global Center on Cooperative Security (Global Center) provide sources of good practice. Examples include recent Global Center reports on criminal justice and AML/CFT.⁸⁵

A further source of good practice, is the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF). As described in Box 2 below, the GCTF is an international collaborative venture gathering and discussing good practice on counter terrorism (and P/CVE) and includes Canada as one of its members.

Box 2. Overview of GCTF documentation

The Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) is a counter terrorism platform which brings together 29 countries and the European Union to develop tools, strategies and frameworks with the goal of promoting a long-term approach to countering terrorism. GCTF has produced a number of documents and good practice guides which include recommendations and action plans covering a variety of counter terrorism topics in order to reduce the threat of terrorism and enhance capabilities to address it. For Further information reference can be made to the following documents.

A general guide to inform and assist border practitioners in developing policies, programs and guidelines for counter terrorism, GCTF developed *Good Practices in the Area of Border Security and Management in the Context of Counterterrorism and Stemming the Flow of "Foreign Terrorist Fighters"* which focuses on:

⁸² Sub-programme on Counter Terrorism: East and South East Asia Partnership on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism: Final evaluation, June 2016, UNODC

⁸³ Evaluation of UNODC's Global Programme on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism. 2015

⁸⁴ In-depth evaluation of the UN Global Programme against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and Financing Terrorism, 2011

⁸⁵ For example, Lefas, M., and Nozawa, J. (2016) *Delivering Justice: Views from Supreme Courts in the Euro-Med Region on Countering Terrorism*. Global Centre on Cooperative Security.

- Intra- and Inter- Agency Cooperation
- Involvement of border communities – exchanging information, contributing to security, cooperating,
- Enhance preparedness: risk analysis and strategies and action plans and defining parameters.

The Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector outlines the development of good practices for an effective **and rule of law based criminal justice sector response to terrorism** and the importance of the development of legislative assistance, focusing on:

- Criminalizing terrorism offenses
- Developing legal frameworks and procedures to properly address terrorist threats
- Cooperation between international and domestic agencies
- Skills development among law enforcement, enhancing coordination, institutional development.

Reference can also be made to the extensive guide for a training of trainers curriculum to Support the Development of Training Courses that address *Good Practices in the area of Border Security and management to Counter Terrorism and Stem the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters*.

For a complete list of framework documents see: <https://www.thegctf.org/About-us/GCTF-framework-documents>

More generally, we would also highlight sources such as the UK’s Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) – to which we have referred in our review above – as providing useful insights for programming and evaluation within the justice and security area that is shared with counter terrorism capacity building. For instance, ICAI’s 2018 review of the UK’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) includes very relevant observations regarding the use of research and analysis, a political economy analysis (PEA) approach, theory of change, conflict sensitivity etc. And perhaps above all, the relevance of regular review and evaluation.⁸⁶

6 CONCLUSIONS

This literature review of European evaluations of external counter terrorism capacity building has examined over 70 evaluation reports, reviews and grey literature that are available on open sources. The majority (over 60%) of these are the product of independent assessments of counter terrorism initiatives financed by multilateral agencies (notably the EU). There is very little evidence or results data that is openly available from bilateral agencies concerning their contributions to counter terrorism capacity building. This is despite the findings of the mapping survey undertaken by the review team that points towards a range of counter terrorism capacity building activity commissioned by such agencies. The UK, for example, appears to operate a number of counter terrorism capacity building programs overseas; yet, the Review Team has been unable to find any open source documentation reporting on their results. The Review Team is not able to draw any conclusions as to whether such programs are or are not evaluated as such assessments are not openly available. This would be a valid line of enquiry for Global Affairs Canada to pursue with its European counterparts. While this paucity of information has undoubtedly hampered the current review, it is in line with the findings of other literature reviews (e.g. Rand Europe, 2018). A conclusion therefore is that bilateral agencies as a general rule do not publish the results of their evaluations.

⁸⁶ The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund’s aid spending: A performance review. Independent Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI), March 2018.

Of the evaluations and reviews studied by the Review Team, the majority concerned thematic areas such as law enforcement, criminal justice, AML/CTF, border security, and counter terrorism legislation. It is possible to conclude that these areas were in demand – especially in the case of EU counter terrorism capacity building, where the programs were the product of often extensive and participatory design processes. However, there was only a partial fit with the six thematic areas of Canada’s Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program and some (such as counter improvised explosive devices) were not represented at all.

The literature review finds that few of the evaluations utilised an explicit theory of change approach that unpacked and tested the program or project’s underlying assumptions and change logic. This is perhaps partially explained by the relative absence of this approach in the underlying program documentation. In the light of recent developments in this area (which see theory of change being increasingly used in program design and evaluation), this is a weakness. The Review Team observes that an underlying assumption for many of the program evaluations studied is that counter terrorism capacity building leads to stronger counter terrorism results but, without an explicit theory of change, there is often only an implicit understanding that this linkage is facilitated through political buy-in and ownership, institutionalisation of training, correct selection of trainees, inter-agency cooperation etc.

The literature review shows that the counter terrorism capacity building has been relevant and has produced results (at least in terms of outputs) and there are a range of lessons and good practice that can be drawn from it. In terms of legal assistance, for example, demand has largely moved away from assistance with legislative drafting to support for its implementation; such as through the development of standard operating procedures (SOPs). This will require a relatively deeper understanding of local systems, incentives and practices and the gaps that there may be for the thematic areas concerned. The review also points to the use of local resources (thematic experts and trainers) as ways to tailor such products so that they are relevant. In some areas, AML/CTF for instance, the linkage to external enforcement authorities (such as FATF) appears to have been helpful as an additional motivating factor (and FATF reports also point to technical gaps needing attention).

While the evaluations studies tend not to assess the degree to which outcomes have been sustained over time, they do suggest a number of useful approaches from a sustainability perspective. They highlight, for example, that sustainability of results can be promoted through a training of trainers approach and through ensuring ownership at a senior level which will promote institutionalisation of results. This, however, needs to take into account (and mitigate) the effects of weak systems (such as regular staff rotation), weak targeting of trainees, and poor career planning.

Few of the evaluations studied paid much attention to gender (and human rights in general), although it is noted that these aspects are required for many of the institutions concerned. This is in contrast to the P/CVE area, where gender aspects are more in focus. We note in the report that gender involves more than simply increasing the number of women participants as it also concerns empowerment and integration of gender perspectives into actual practice.

In most cases, the evaluations and reviews were relatively generic and covered similar ground; for example, in relation to design process, ownership, monitoring and evaluation, alignment and harmonization. Good practices here include ensuring a thorough and participatory design process that also relates closely to the specific context, the importance of avoiding “silos” through promoting inter-agency cooperation, ensuring senior level buy-in and ownership, and alignment with national and international norms and legislation. We conclude from this that such

lessons and good practice can be broadly applied and will benefit counter terrorism capacity building programs irrespective of their thematic focus. The good practice highlighted throughout this report is also very much in line with similar experiences and learning from development programs. Inter alia, the EU's 2017 Operational Guidelines and the GCTF resources provide useful compendia of such knowledge.

Finally, and to return to our main conclusion, a common limitation observed by the literature is the difficulty of assessing impact, especially as the context develops (the changing nature of terrorism in the Sahel and the corresponding growth of counter terrorism support is a case in point). The Global Evaluation of the EU's counter terrorism engagement (2018), for example, found that greater attention needs to be given to articulating the intended impact at the needs assessment stage of counter terrorism engagements and reflect this in results frameworks while also building in the ability to monitor and learn from activities. Similarly, there is a need to strengthen the inclusion of theories of change at strategic and project levels to explain how interventions are expected to work.⁸⁷ Drawing from our wider work on monitoring, evaluation and learning in fragile contexts, the Review Team suggests that the real benefit of a thorough theory of change approach is its focus on the assumptions and pre-conditions for change, which can contribute to a more robust design, implementation and monitoring. This appears highly relevant for counter terrorism programming which occurs in locations and sectors of higher than normal risk.

⁸⁷ Global Evaluation of the European Union Engagement on Counter Terrorism, June 2018

7 ANNEXES

7.1 ANNEX A – KEY POINTS FROM EVALUATIONS OF U.S. CT CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMS

Executive Summary of the Comprehensive Evaluation of the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program (2016)

The Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program provides antiterrorism training and equipment to 53 nations, working to **build up capacities of partner nations** to investigate, detect and deter terrorist activities. A 2016 evaluation concluded that the program had an overall positive effect. Despite this, a performance management system was not established so an exact level of its contribution could not be measured. Therefore, an important lesson learned is the need for performance monitoring plans for country programs which will allow effectiveness and achievement of program goals and activities to be accurately monitored. The evaluation stressed the need to be explicit in assumptions, timelines, and performance targets and indicators. An additional good practice noted for enhancing effectiveness was participation of partner nation **law enforcement personnel** in the courses. An advantage of this particular program was that the trainings were designed as long term engagements and included intensive tactical training to develop hard skills to be able to respond to a variety of crisis operations. Finally, the evaluation also stressed the need for a clear link to be established link between the regional to country to overall programmatic goals and activities. This creates a better sense of how training courses feed into larger goals.

US Department of State: Evaluation of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program for Countries Under the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs (2012)

The US Department of State Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program for Countries Under the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs was established with the purpose of providing training and equipment for partner countries through enhancing the ability of **law enforcement personnel** to deter terrorists. A 2012 evaluation of this program was critical of the absence of measurable program objectives or a mechanism for program evaluation and therefore the lack of ability to measure effectiveness and the achievement of desired results. For 20 out of 22 countries there were no specific or measurable strategic or performance objectives contained in the country assistance plans. Any performance indicators or targets that were available were ambiguous and lacked meaning. Therefore, with no proper measurable indication if the program was able to meet its objectives the evaluation was unable to determine if desired results were achieved and overall if the program was effective.

Lessons learned for improving the effectiveness and the achievement of longer-term outcomes taken from the 2012 evaluation include the need for the collection of baseline data in order to measure the performance of indicators and the establishment of M&E systems that include goals and objectives which are clearly defined and measurable, as well as performance indicators that can link these goals and objectives. The importance of standardized reporting process can therefore not be overlooked as a good practice for achieving and measuring long term outcomes.

The Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership: Building Partner Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism

The Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership works to build long term **security force counterterrorism** capacity and regional security cooperation. These operations include **military capacity building, law enforcement** anti-terrorism capacity building, **justice sector** counter terrorism capacity building, public diplomacy and information operations, community engagement and vocational training. This program covers ten countries in the Sahel and Maghreb. A 2014 report on the partnership program recommended that going forward there is a need for the enhancement of partner nation capacity building components within public diplomacy, community engagement, and vocational training in order to ensure that civilian government capacity building is able to keep up with security force capacity building. This is important to help to shift ownership of the program over to the partner nation. It is also suggested that it would be good practice to identify more clearly the conditions under which assistance should be adjusted or terminated.

7.2 ANNEX B – SOURCES CONSULTED

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7.3 ANNEX C – LIST OF DATABASES CONSULTED

Academic Journals	
Terrorism and Political Violence	Foreign Fighters, Radicalization, Understanding Terrorism, Domestic Counter Terrorism, Jihadism, Religious terrorism, Combating terrorism, CVE, De-radicalization, Ideologies, Globalization of Terrorism, Analysis of Specific terrorist groups/incidents, Foreign Fighters, Responses to Terrorism, Extremism in the US, Europe, and the Middle East, Evolution of terrorism, Constructing the Terrorist Identity, Effects and Drivers of Terrorism, General terrorism analysis - how why, when, types, classifications and effects, Lone wolf terrorism
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism	CVE, Domestic CT, Jihadism, Foreign Fighters, Lone Wolf Terrorism, Financing Terrorism, Global Trends of Terrorism, ISIS, Maritime Piracy, Terrorism on the Dark Web, War on Terror, Community Based CT, Political Violence, Jihad, Extremism, International Terrorism, Crime Prevention, Foreign Fighter Networks
Journal of Terrorism Research	Art, Culture, Political Violence, Terrorism for resource control. Extremist Narratives, Comparative Analysis of Terror Groups, Funding Terrorism, Book Reviews
CTC Sentinel	Ideological Origins, International Relations. Specific incidents of terror, Terror Threats, Islamic State Analysis, Financing Terror, Profiles of Foreign Fighters
Perspectives on Terrorism	Cyber Terrorism, Deradicalization, Terrorism Case Studies, CVE, al-Qaeda, Foreign Fighter Mobilization, Globalisation and Terrorism, Regional case studies of Terrorism and Radicalization, Terrorism and Media, Domestic CT,
Journal of Deradicalization	CVE, PVE, De-Radicalization, Extremism, Terrorist Threats
Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression	CT Policy, CVE, Domestic Terrorism, Effects of terrorism on victims, de-radicalization, political crime, contemporary terrorism, political violence
Critical Studies on Terrorism	State sponsored terrorism, domestic counter terrorism, Jihad and ISIS, Narratives of terrorism, violent extremism, radicalisation, anthropological perspective on terrorism, discourse on terrorism, defining terrorism, study of knowledge of terrorism

Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict	Human rights violations, Homegrown violent extremism, lone actor terrorism, violent extremism, Terrorism, bombings, ISIS, Radicalization, Torture, Military intervention, power, terror, the state, conflict analysis
Survival	Global Politics and Strategy, Geopolitical relations, New world orders, International orders, Conflict & Strategy, Insecurity, Chemical Weapons, Islamic State, Arms relations, Nuclear Narratives, State Relations, Diplomacy and Violence, Deterrence, Governance
International Security	The causes and prevention of war, U.S.-China relations, Power politics, Ethnic conflict and intra-state war, Terrorism and insurgency, Regional security in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, U.S. foreign and defense policy, International relations theory, Diplomatic and military history, Cybersecurity and defense technology, Political economy, business, and security, Nuclear proliferation

Grey Literature

WODC Publications Database	Search on counterterrorism yields documents on - mostly domestic counter terrorism, a few counter terrorism strategies (only available in Dutch), inventory of counter terrorism (possibly only focusing on domestic), financing counter terrorism measures
Global Counter Terrorism Forum Violent Extremism (Hedayah)	CVE focused
UK Home Office Research Database	Statements on domestic counter terrorism, prevention strategies, statistics
French Ministry of Interior Publications Database	Nothing on counter terrorism capacity building - mainly domestic, little on terrorism at all
Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy	Crime and Justice Policies
German National Center for Crime Prevention	Crime prevention approaches and crime problems such as sexual offender treatment, juvenile repeated offender rehabilitation, right- and left-wing violence, hooliganism and the prevention of violent extremism, focus on CVE/PVE and radicalization

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	Human trafficking reports, A lot on CVE/PVE, Human Rights, the role of Civil Society, Police related activities, Countering Foreign Fighters, Capacity building in police reform*, GBV, Guidelines for addressing threats (domestically)
Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) Tools	Working groups on: CVE, Foreign Fighters, Criminal Justice & Rule of Law *Working Groups: Capacity Building in East and West Africa Regions - no literature detailing work *Border Security Initiative in 2015- Training of Trainers Curriculum available
UK College of Policing - What Works Crime Reduction	Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice, Organized Crime, Policing
US National Criminal Justice Reference Service	Topic: Counter-terrorism Threat assessments, Homegrown terrorism, studies of violent extremism, Domestic Terrorism
Alliance for Peacebuilding – Monitoring and Evaluation of CVE	All CVE/PVE
Design Monitoring and Evaluation for Peacebuilding	Very little on Counter Terrorism - mainly on strengthening community resilience, evaluations on deradicalization, community based programs, and defense sector assessments.