



UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMS IN MOGADISHU CITY

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Executive summary

This paper provides a synthesis of ten social and material systems functional within Mogadishu city. It looks into how the systems have been shaped by historical events and political systems that determine how they are managed, perform and accessed. In this research, the paper sought to provide a catalogue of information for these service sectors, that can form a foundation to other researchers. A combination of literature review and key informant interviews was employed for data collection.

The systems of Mogadishu city are managed through a hybrid governance setup with weak government oversight and the involvement of an extensive number of non-state actors supplying services across the city. The level of engagement by the Federal Government and the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) varies across systems; however, in none of the systems are the state or the BRA the sole provider of services, and within some systems, such as sanitation and sewage, the state and the BRA is not present at all.

For most systems, there is some policy framework in place. As an example, in the education sector, there is a national curriculum, that schools are encouraged to follow. There is however no law or regulation dividing the responsibility between the Federal and state level and between the state and the BRA. Similarly, there are no regulations governing sanitation in the city. There has nevertheless been progress in terms of legislation in areas such as the energy sector, where new policies and regulations were drafted and approved in the last three years as well as a new PPP policy, which in principle opens up the facilitation of private sector involvement in service delivery and regulation of the same.

Despite improved legislation covering some systems of the city, the technical capacity and financial resources to monitor compliance and ensure quality are limited in the BRA as well as in the Federal agencies. For most systems, service provision process, cost, and quality are not subject to oversight by the authorities. The

exception to this is in areas where there is a high tax revenue potential. This is in particular the case in the transport sector where taxes are levied on vehicle imports, license plate registration, duties on imports via ports, and registration of public transport operators (all operated by private companies). Also, the food provision sector is heavily taxed by the BRA making food distribution costly for humanitarian actors. The only sector where there is significant public financial support is the health sector, where the Ministry of Health oversees the services provided through 61 (donor-funded) public health facilities. The largest provider of health services however is the private sector which controls 105 health facilities and 49 clinics in the city.

With the exception of the rule of law system, and in part the health system, the private sector and the humanitarian actors are the sole providers of services across systems in Mogadishu. In the education sector, a mere 1% of children attend publicly funded schools, while 90% of the energy for public consumption is provided by 70 independent power providers.

The service provision across systems is governed by a complex interplay of actors, some systems are - on paper - regulated and taxed by the BRA, while other systems remain unregulated. Entrepreneurs and humanitarian actors are the main providers, with humanitarian actors mostly active in the outskirts of the city, while the private sector operators are more concentrated in the centre. In several systems there are middlemen and brokers engaged in facilitating service agreements between BRA and those delivering services. These brokers operate in a complex pattern negotiating contracts, road access, and land provision for each system. The brokerage includes the fiercely competitive large food contracts, public-private transport, and energy provision.

All systems are intrinsically linked to the political settlement in the city. The most important factor governing service delivery is the ability to provide financial facilitation for contracts and investments. When it comes to rule of law, clans and elders play an important role as formal

justice system is viewed as slow and its integrity questioned by the citizens in Mogadishu. Consequently, 90% of cases are settled outside the court system. The political settlement also means that key government positions in the BRA, courts, and police are distributed among clan lines. The same accounts for leadership positions in ministries and line agencies including health officials.

Service providers will also have to navigate the omnipresence of al-Shabaab in the city. All private operators are expected to pay taxes to al-Shabaab and in some cases, they will need to seek approval for operations in the city outskirts. Unregulated taxation is applied at roadblocks where local militia, as well as al-Shabaab and the government, require payments to pass, increasing the cost of services. In addition, human rights abuses including gender-based violence (GBV) are a regular feature at the roadblocks.

Access to services across systems is a challenge for the poorer and more vulnerable segments in Mogadishu. In addition to the concerns related to the roadblocks, access is restrained by the high cost of transportation which is required to reach many service stations. The number of service facilities in the outskirts of the city, where IDPs reside, is significantly less than in the centre. Most services also bear a cost which makes them unaffordable for IDPs and informal settlers.

All systems are gendered and access to services across systems is impacted by gender inequalities. As an example, latrines are few in informal settlements and often not existing in schools, which means that girls are less likely to attend school. Similarly, public-private transport arrangements and roadblocks pose a GBV threat to women travelling on their own. Overall, money and clan affiliation as well as distance are the main obstacles to accessing services, and as a result, the city systems in Mogadishu are only enjoyed by an exclusive group of citizens.

Introduction

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Mogadishu forms a significant part of Somalia due to its administrative functions as a capital of Somalia, and a direct Federal territory. It is home to the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) and under it, 17 district governments. Its political status is contested, due to many interests.

Table 1 State structure in Somalia

Nation-State	Federal Republic of Somalia
Sphere of government	Federal
Government	FGS (Federal Government of Somalia) Led by an elected President
Regional administrations	Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) Led by a Governor/Mayor of Mogadishu, appointed by the President of the FGS
Local governments	17 district governments Led by a District Commissioner, appointed by the President of the FGS

Source: World Bank (2020). Somalia Urbanization Review; Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Washington DC.

The following sections provide an overview of noteworthy features characterizing each of the city's systems.

Education

At large, the Banadir region is served by a combination of formal and informal education systems. Within the formal, there are two education systems which determine the type of education delivered; the 8-4 system¹, which is formalised and used in public schools², and the 9-3 system³ mainly used by Islamic religious institutions and communities (such as the Quranic schools) and provides religious education for children focused on the study of the Quran and related subjects. As of 2020, the most attended education facilities in Mogadishu included, primary mixed school for boys and girls, Quranic school for boys, Quranic school for girls, and secondary mixed school for boys and girls.⁴

State governance in the formal education is served by the two layers of government; Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education (MoECHE) at Federal level that oversees national management, administration and policy development; and at state level, where the BRA education directorate is housed within the Office of the Deputy Mayor-Social Services Division to oversee development of policies and programmes, institutional registration and provision of school and adult educational programmes within the Mogadishu.⁵ MoECHE has the most influence in the sector. Overall, there are very few public schools. In Mogadishu, only 1 per cent of schools are ran by the government.⁶ MoECHE manages 24 public primary and secondary schools within Mogadishu.⁷

Aside from the state, the education sector is fragmented, and proliferated with various actors offering education-related services. These include private providers, local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations, community

¹ 8-4 system: 8 years in primary, 4 years in secondary, 2-4 years post-secondary

² MOECHE (2015). Federal Government of Somalia National Policy of Education. 2015-2030.

³ 9-3 system: 9 years in primary, 3 years in secondary, 2-4 years post-secondary

⁴ Joint Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment Banadir, Somalia
[SOM REACH JMCNA Regional Factsheet Banadir February-2021.pdf \(impact-repository.org\)](#)

⁵ [EDUCATION – Maamulka Gobolka Banaadir iyo D/Hoose Ee Xamar \(bra.gov.so\)](#)

⁶ [EDUCATION – Maamulka Gobolka Banaadir iyo D/Hoose Ee Xamar \(bra.gov.so\)](#)

⁷ Key informant interview with education official

education committees, private operators, religious groups, among others.⁸ Following state collapse in 1991 and destruction of academic institutions, the capacity and role of non-state actors expanded to fill in the state's absence in the sector. The concept of 'private schools' or 'private sector' in education has its origins in this era. Over the past 20 years, the nature of private schools has evolved into a hybrid of education or administrative umbrellas⁹ (initially formed by the educated Somali elites), community-run schools, and those established by external non-state actors such as international NGOs, diaspora elites and the philanthropic interests from the Gulf particularly on Quranic schools.¹⁰ Private schools are predominant at all the three levels of education; primary and secondary (80 per cent) and higher education (96 per cent).¹¹ In the Benadir region, 79 per cent of schools are run under private umbrellas, in addition to 12 per cent managed by NGOs and 8 per cent by the community.¹² Fourteen administrative umbrellas manage some 399 schools throughout Mogadishu.¹³ Almost 88 per cent of NGO-managed schools are located in Mogadishu, possibly because the city is easily accessible to international actors as well as a hub for international aid.

Generally, the nature of private schools is understood to mean 'for profit', privately owned and managed. In the context of the South-Central region, even though a majority of academic institutions are owned and administered by private actors, a small fraction have been structured to be non-profit-oriented ie they charge little to no fees. The role of private actors is not only instrumental in collating resources but are also keen to expand reach and coverage where the government has had little access, to maintain basic levels of education. For instance, the community-run schools are more present in areas with higher security risks.

The quality of education in privately-run institutions is considered fragmented with no clear regulatory oversight from the State. There is presently no standardised national curriculum or syllabus from the Ministry. This has resulted in sector-wide variation in how schools interpret implementation of the curricula and administration of the examination. Aside from the to be a Arabic or national curriculum usually followed by the public schools and private 'for profit' schools, other forms of private schools adopt curriculums utilised by their source of funding e.g. the syllabus and examinations spelt out in the textbooks from the funding agency. Some schools are known to follow the curricula system from Kenya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.¹⁴

Access to education is a significant challenge for the country. Nationally, the education deficit is one of the most substantial in the world, hosting an estimate of 3 million children (60 %) out-of-school population. In Mogadishu, out of an estimated 1.6 million residents, combined primary and secondary school enrolments average at only 264,071 students, including those in Internally Displaced Persons, (IDP) schools.¹⁵ Only half of the youth are enrolled in school.¹⁶ Across board, households in both non-IDP and IDP settlements are likely to experience difficulties in meeting education needs.¹⁷ The most excluded groups consist of IDPs, nomadic/pastoralists, minority clans, rural communities and the urban poor. Youth, women and girls experience an added layer of marginality within these groups. These groups also experience the lowest literacy rates. Only 24.2 per cent of IDP children under the age of 6 are enrolled in school, 12 per cent below the national average.¹⁸ Additionally, only 3.1 per cent of nomads/pastoralists attend primary school, and far fewer in secondary.¹⁹

⁸ Hassan, A.H. and Wekesa, M. (2017)

⁹ Umbrella-managed schools involve a private association whereby each umbrella school gets into a sharing arrangement of administration, funding, and some degree of management.

¹⁰ MOECHE and UNICEF (2017). p.277

¹¹ Hassan, A.H. and Wekesa, M. (2017). p.44

¹² Hassan, A.H. and Wekesa, M. (2017)

¹³ Bennouna, C., Richard, K., Roberts, L. and Boothby, N. (2015).

¹⁴ MOECHE and UNICEF (2017); key informant interview with education official

¹⁵ Somalia Education Sector Covid-19 Response Plan (2020)

¹⁶ World Bank (2020)

¹⁷ [SOM REACH JMCNA Regional Factsheet Banadir February-2021.pdf \(impact-repository.org\)](#)

¹⁸ Hagmann, T. (2019). p.21

¹⁹ Ibid.

Inequities in the education sector are multifaceted and are driven primarily by issues of equitable access and participation, particularly for marginalised and vulnerable populations who experience the lowest levels of education. The financial cost of education is a key barrier, which can be prohibitively high particularly when dynamics such as hidden school costs come into play such as uniforms, textbooks, examination fees etc.²⁰ The private education system reinforces this disparity where a majority of private schools charge school fees which can range an average of \$10-\$15 per month for primary school and \$20-30 for secondary school for each child,²¹ Notably, only 1.2 per cent of children are enrolled in government-managed or community-run schools, despite being likely to charge lesser to no school fees. Moreover, rural areas experience lower school enrolments and literacy rates, compared to urban areas. Cities such as Mogadishu appeal to migrants fleeing from insecurity incidences, al-Shabaab-controlled areas or in search of better livelihoods, due to a higher provision of services such as education. In this regard, the school enrolment rate in the urban areas has been increasing. This brings about inequities of resource distribution where rural areas are prioritized less in funding or overcrowding of facilities becomes a common feature in the urban schools. Additionally, the distance to school impacts attendance mostly for learners living in the rural areas and for the physically disabled translating into a primary contributor for those who are out-of-school.²² Where children travel less than 3km to school (such as in the urban areas), enrolment is higher, with a majority going to school on foot due to either lack of transport services or inability to afford the additional transport fees charged on school fees. Urban IDPs are disadvantaged as they live in areas located far from schools.²³

The relationship between the government and the political settlement is complex. There is presently no law that defines clear division of

roles, responsibilities and mandates between the Federal and state levels, and thus, they rely on a Memorandum of Understanding to guide this process. This has not been an easy process and is often fraught with confusion over governance mandates such as coverage of running costs for schools and provision of teachers' salaries.²⁴ Additionally, at times there are clashes in modalities of resource mobilization, where sub-national government units see education as a source of revenue and an international aid source. Administrations at state level are known to seek bilateral engagement with donors, bypassing the Federal ministry almost entirely. As a result, Ministry-led efforts to reform or develop the education system are hampered by complex challenges and constraints.²⁵

Rent capture in the education system manifests itself in areas where diverse actors, such as the Federal government, BRA, local government leaders, businesspeople, elders, and members of the diaspora, benefit or attempt to profit from the sector. This is done through seizure of education infrastructure and properties such as constructing immovable private properties on public lands owned by the Ministry or through courts or directives. Others include redirecting of scholarships and aid and imposing of illegal school fees. In some instances, there is proliferation of government officials in the management of private schools, driven by business interests. It is also argued that schools that do not follow the national curriculum make more profit than those that follow.²⁶

The system faces risks from conflict legacies which perpetuate vulnerabilities especially for regions in that have been most affected by the insecurity and prolonged al-Shabaab control. The threat of safety and security tends to have a profound impact on how learners and teaching staff access school infrastructure such as classes and the conduct of the school curriculum. Security threats and attacks on schools by a variety of actors pose a severe risk for students.

²⁰ Altai Consulting. (2018) p.58

²¹ KII Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education representative, 13 February 2022

²² MOECHE and UNICEF (2017) p.116

²³ World Bank (2020)

²⁴ KII Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education representative 13 February 2022

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Key informant interview with education officials

From July 2013 and January 2015, there were 52 attacks on educational facilities in Mogadishu.²⁷ These take the form of explosions near education facilities or indiscriminate firing of bullets by security forces to clear traffic congestion or stop vehicles that cross checkpoints near education facilities, putting children and teachers at risk.²⁸

Energy

State ownership of energy generation and supply is limited. There is no national modern grid in Mogadishu.²⁹ Privately-owned electricity service providers (ESPs) dominate the city's power supply. More than 90% of the energy system in Somalia is supplied by private sector actors³⁰, who operate both diesel powered and hybrid mini grids drawing from a combination of wind and solar energy sources.³¹ Benadir Electric Company (BECO) is the leading large-scale provider in Mogadishu with a generation capacity of 25MW, covering 80% of Mogadishu electricity needs.³² Formed in 2014, BECO has become the largest electricity utility in Somalia, created out of 70 independent power producers (IPPs). These IPP's are mostly entrepreneur-owned or NGO-owned diesel-powered mini-grids, with a growing focus on renewable energy sources. They operate their mini-grids in a zone, whereby each mini-grid will control the generation, transmission, distribution, tariff collection and maintenance in its own operation.³³ Other dominant private companies include Blue Sky Energy and Mogadishu Power Supply Company. UN mandated and the international peace support operations offices also play an important role in Somalia's energy sector since they are the largest consumers of energy in the country and generate half of the energy in Somalia. As such, the countries energy requirements including that of Mogadishu are

complemented by the UN-operated electricity infrastructure that operates in parallel to those of the commercial providers.

At Federal level, Ministry of Energy and Water Resources (MoEWR) oversees the maintenance and regulation of the energy sector. The sector at large, however, grapples with challenges of a largely unregulated environment where service, quality and safety standards are not enforced by effective state policies. The Ministry struggles with capacity issues which, along with a limited budget, serve as limitations to the system. Supply largely became fragmented since the state collapse in 1991 which consequently allowed for an introduction of private companies to have control over electricity pricing and infrastructure. Additionally, weak regulation and oversight by Federal and state authorities, makes the energy sector in Somalia to be extremely competitive among the commercial service providers. Recently, efforts have been made to improve the regulatory environment through the introduction of national policies such as the Energy Policy (2019) and an Electricity Bill (2020), and an Energy Act, to establish the guidelines to administer regulation, tariff structuring, permit licensing and consumer protection.³⁴

The relationship with the political settlement follows the perceived importance of ministries measured against each minister's clan identity. As such, allocation and control is pegged on the 4.5 power sharing system. The MoEWR leadership positions have over the years been allocated to lesser politically dominant clans, such as the Digil and Mirifle, from the Rahanweyn clan. To generate revenue, the MoEWR collects rent or tax from small and localized ESPs who evolved in the absence of a functioning government or government structures. On the other hand, ESPs are also required to pay tax to non-state armed actors,

²⁷ Bennouna, C., Richard, K., Roberts, L. and Boothby, N. (2015). p.13

²⁸ KII with Ministry of Education, Culture and Higher Education representative, 13 February 2022

²⁹ African Development Bank Group. (2015). *Energy Sector Needs Assessment and Investment Programme*.

³⁰ Energy Catalyst (2020) *Country Guide Somalia* June 2020, pp 7

³¹ 'Energy Sector Needs Assessment', FGS and AfDB, Aug 2015, p.11

³² Hagmann, T., Sarkar, A., Aboker, A., Mohamed, J., Wasuge, M., Ibrahim, M.H., Mohamed, Y. and Bradbury, M. (2018). *Drivers, Governance and Political Economy of Urbanization in Somalia: Review and Research Gaps*. Rift Valley Institute.

³³ Energy Catalyst (2020) *Country Guide Somalia* June 2020, pp 7

³⁴ Abdullahi, M., Githinji, M., Sosis, K. and Kahinga, E. (2021). *Stand Alone Solar (SAS): Market Update* (2021). Tetra Tech International Development. Pp 10

such as the al-Shabaab, resulting in double-taxation which drives high electricity production costs. Al-Shabab controls significant parts of supply routes in Somalia, and through checkpoints, they generate revenue from levying taxes on the movement of diesel across the country.³⁵

Accessibility is unequal nationally, particularly between rural and urban residents, with the latter accessing up to 33% access rate.³⁶ In Mogadishu, the disparity is similar, where the rate of access to electricity in urban and peri-urban households is estimated to be between 68%³⁷ to 96%.³⁸ Data differs on the actual estimate based on the different study methodologies. However, it all concludes that the average Mogadishu resident has 20 hours of electricity per day,³⁹ where two of three urban households are said to source electricity through micro-grids.⁴⁰ Urban resident dwellers benefit the most from electricity access, due to their proximity to the grid and service providers. Peri-urban and rural areas are the most underserved. Settlements such as those hosting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and urban poor are not sufficiently supplied and most of these residents' access only 14 hours of electricity per day in comparison to their urban counterparts.⁴¹ Moreover, affordability becomes a key area of concern as they have limited purchasing power to afford the high costs of electricity. According to UN Habitat, all consumed energy forms in Mogadishu continue to be expensive with the average household expenditure ranging between USD 19-60 every month.⁴² Connection charges can go up to USD 150-300 in some cases. Even though prices appear to have fallen in the past years due to upgrade of the grid by large-scale providers, affordability challenges have

contributed widely to consumption of alternative sources of energy. To cope, these populations rely on biomass fuels, wood and charcoal for cooking. The annual energy consumption of Somalia is estimated to be 4 million tons of locally sourced firewood which meets up to 90% of energy needs.⁴³ About 60% of IDP rural households also use torches for lighting and some use solar lamps at night in informal settlements.⁴⁴ The traditional resources are not readily accessible, and the charcoal supplies are not always stable, as the supply must be brought in from long distances. When faced with these challenges, low-income populations resort to burning wastepaper and plastic for cooking, posing serious environmental and safety hazards.⁴⁶

Due to challenges related to public sector oversight, limited electricity infrastructure systems, and depletion of biomass, quality of energy sources has not been consistent. Destruction and looting tampered what little infrastructure there was before the state collapse of 1991. Following this period, the sector underwent under tremendous strain including dwindling of investments, and disappearance of public resources and public sector oversight. The potential to cultivate electricity and expand electricity infrastructure systems and markets has been hampered over the past two decades by protracted security incidents. The result has been a huge regression and substantial delay and backlog in providing affordable modern sources of energy, even when compared to other similar small, poor economies.⁴⁷ The electricity system in Somalia loses approximately 25%, and at times up to 40% of its energy. This loss leads to inefficiency and ultimately reliability challenges, long and/or daily blackouts, varying frequency

³⁵ Abdi Aynte, Eugene Chen and David Mozersky (2022:19), Powering Ahead: The United Nations and Somalias Renewable Energy Opportunity. The Powering peace initiative, The Stimson Centre and Energy Peace Partners. Washington, DC.

³⁶ Bryld, E., Kamau, C., Bonnet, C., Mohamoud, M.A. and Farah, F. (2019). *Shelter provision in Mogadishu: Understanding politics for a more inclusive city*. IIED and Tana Copenhagen.p.28

³⁷ Energy Catalyst. (2020). *Country Guide: Somalia*.p.7

³⁸ The World Bank. (2020). *Somalia Urbanization Review*.p.31

³⁹ The World Bank. (2020). *Somalia Urbanization Review*.p.48

⁴⁰ African Development Bank Group. (2015). *Energy Sector Needs Assessment and Investment Programme*.p.31

⁴¹ The World Bank. (2020). *Somalia Urbanization Review*.p.48

⁴² African Development Bank Group. (2015). *Energy Sector Needs Assessment and Investment Programme*

⁴³ Compare 'Energy Sector Needs Assessment', FGS and AfDB, Aug 2015

⁴⁴ UNDP (2018). *Shifting the Energy Paradigm in Somalia (STEPS)*.

⁴⁵ Bryld, E., Kamau, C., Bonnet, C., Mohamoud, M.A. and Farah, F. (2019). *Shelter provision in Mogadishu: Understanding politics for a more inclusive city*. IIED and Tana Copenhagen.p.28

⁴⁶ African Development Bank Group. (2015). *Energy Sector Needs Assessment and Investment Programme*.p.29

⁴⁷ Africa Development Bank Group (2015) Somalia-Energy Sector Needs assessment and Investment Programme. Report. AfDB

and connections delivering at a very low capacity.⁴⁸

There are several risks associated with the energy system including the use of traditional methods of cooking with charcoal and wood which are detrimental to health. Weather and climate extremes and conflicts between IDPs and host communities push women, especially among the displaced population face health, safety, and protection related risks as they are the one tasked with collecting firewood for domestic consumption. Vegetation cover is still utilized as an important source of energy for the preparation of food to ensure optimal nutritional intake which also helps to prevent malnutrition, contamination, and diseases. Also, systemic, displacement of people has enabled a profit-driven charcoal venture to flourish, which has led to extensive exploitation of vegetative cover resulting in further land degradation and energy access problems.

Food distribution

Nationally, food demands of the population are met through a combination of domestic supply, commercial imports, and humanitarian food assistance. Import of food-related items is relatively the second largest sub-sector following the construction sector.⁴⁹ In Mogadishu, the system serves an estimated population of 1.54 million residents in the city's 17 districts. Distribution is primarily served by wholesale stores/markets and retail markets, which offer sale of both food and non-food commodities. The main markets in Mogadishu include the Bakara market (one of the largest), the Suq Bacad (Yaaqshid district), the Hamarweyne Market (Hamar Weyne district) and the Madina Market (Madina district). In addition to offering locally produced products, the markets have become redistribution hubs for imported food to all Somali regions such as major urban cities and towns of the five Federal Member States.⁵⁰

Food distribution in the city functions as a complex interplay of actors comprising of local authorities, entrepreneurs, and humanitarian actors. The private sector is large and dynamic and involves a combination of actors such as importers, wholesalers, transporters, brokers, and small-scale retailers, such as shopkeepers, open-air traders, and food-vendors. Importers and wholesalers are generally on the higher end of the distribution chain, with larger leverage on capital as they often own or have access to a fleet of large-capacity transport (motor cars, trucks, and ships), and storage facilities (warehouses).⁵¹ Large-scale importers sell their goods to medium-scale traders and distributors who then organise trade and transportation to smaller towns within and outside of Mogadishu. Often, small traders (shopkeepers), open-air retailers and those engaged in petty trade are predominantly women. They are mostly located in towns and urban settlements and sell a minimal range of goods at a fraction of the profit that larger traders make. Brokers or middlemen hold considerable power within the system as they are recruited to organise transportation of goods in-between rural, urban and export markets. A network of brokers decides on the price of produce as well as who to sell to (or not to sell to), acting as gatekeepers in the absence of a formalised system.

Over time, food markets have expanded as new settlements emerge. Displacement population levels in the city have grown as people flee from al-Shabaab-controlled territories as well as climate change-induced conflicts spurred by the frequent cycles of droughts and floods in the Lower and Middle Shabelle, Bay, and Bakool areas. The expanded presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees in Mogadishu has become an important component for the system due to an increased demand for food. This group represents an emergent consumer group which has expanded or introduced new markets such as in Dharkenleey, Kaxda, Deynile, the Livestock

⁴⁸ The World Bank. (2020). *Somalia Urbanization Review*.p.48

⁴⁹ Somali National Infrastructure Strategy (2019-2063)

⁵⁰ KII source (12 February 2022)

⁵¹ WFP (2011). p.8-10.

Market in Heliwaa, and Eelasha (which now has a large market called Bakara 2).⁵²

Further, the food assistance market industry plays quite a dominant role in the city's food supply and distribution, accounting for one of the largest forms of humanitarian assistance. Food assistance, as a recent model has contributed to shifts in food supply from the traditional model of providing in-kind rations to supplementing households with income through food vouchers, and cash transfers, where families can exchange these with food items, listed with a trader.⁵³ Since January 2022, over 2.4 million people had received monthly food assistance, in response to the current multi-season rainfall failure.⁵⁴ Food assistance is important for the functioning of the city as it performs several roles. Humanitarian food assistance is particularly significant as it is able to contribute to a wider reach in numbers, accessibility and resources.⁵⁵ The number of people accessing food assistance has grown over the past five years, where for instance, less than 5% of the population were reached during the 2016/17 drought, to, 10-15% of the population receiving cash transfers in 2020/21. In Banadir region, social protection programs from the government and the WFP was able to deliver 35 USD/month/household to about 125,000 Somalis since July 2018.⁵⁶ Notably it is also used as a strategy to regulate food prices during periods of food shortages for instance, when there is low local cereal supply or to boost the household's purchasing power.⁵⁷ Additionally, food assistance is used where the demand is high for the private sector to manage on their own.⁵⁸ This creates a close linkage between humanitarian sector and the private sector, since food assistance requires a fully operational market where consumers are able to buy and sell supplies from local markets, and actors such as wholesalers, retailers and transporters can collaborate with humanitarian agencies in bulk

purchase and distribution of food. These allows a transfer of risk from the aid agencies to traders to leverage on their wide logistical capacity and connections. Currently, private businesses dominate the trade and transport sector in Somalia, alongside agriculture and livestock.⁵⁹

There are structures within the BRA that encourage a more formalised governance oversight on the system, including a department within the BRA responsible for development and management of 21 markets within the city's 17 districts, and officials responsible for overseeing markets, distribution of vendors and management of collection of daily or monthly tax from private businesses such as stalls, shops, and vendors that sell small fruits and vegetables. Food distribution, however, is governed in a highly informal and unstructured manner, and particularly in tax collection. Due to weaker capacity, the BRA relies on district mayors and local tax collectors to collect revenue.⁶⁰ Recently there have also been efforts to establish a centralized electronic tax revenue database but it is still far from making gains of a functioning solid taxation system. Limited government regulation in revenue management has allowed infiltration of insurgent groups in revenue collection. Private businesses are required to pay taxes to both the government and the al-Shabaab. Local armed groups and clan militia not only controls production of food in fertile areas but also have significant influence in how food moves in and out of production or market areas to other parts of Somalia. In Mogadishu, the groups impose various modalities of tax payments including taxation on food imports, extortion of payments along roadblocks and checkpoints situated along the major transport routes, protection levies, demands ad-hoc *zakat* and *sadaqa* (Muslim-based donations to charity) from companies.⁶¹ In standard cases, al-Shabaab

⁵² KII source (12 February 2022)

⁵³ Grunewald, F., (2012)

⁵⁴ FSNAU and FEWS NET (2022) Somalia Food Security Alert – May 31, 2022

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ FEWS NET and FSNAU (2022) Somalia Food Security Outlook – February to September 2022

<https://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/SO-FSO-202202-final.pdf>

⁵⁷ Grunewald, F., (2012)

⁵⁸ Jaspars, S., Adan, G. and Majid, N. (2020)

⁵⁹ Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy et.al (2017) p.16

⁶⁰ KII source

⁶¹ Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy et.al (2017) p.18

will require both the owner of the goods and the owner of the transport vehicle to pay tax.⁶²

When it comes to access, the situation on food security is dire. Nationally, 43% of Somalia's population was considered severely food insecure as of 2020. When you include those who are moderately affected, the number increases up to 79.1%.⁶³ At the subnational level, the South-Eastern and Central regions were classified as the most food-insecure by the end of 2020, with the Banadir region being acutely affected.⁶⁴ A high number of the population in Mogadishu is also considered to experience high food consumption poverty incidence, where one in every two are unable to afford food-related purchases due to lack of financial resource. Rural areas are disproportionately affected compared to the urban centers, with rural agro-pastoralist and IDP settlements emerging most affected.⁶⁵ Current trends indicate increased displacement movements from the South into Mogadishu, placing the city at a precarious position, where its IDP settlements are at most risk of famine. Acute malnutrition among IDPs is also considered at critical levels.⁶⁶

Food distribution practices within Mogadishu's humanitarian context underserve certain population groups, such as minority clans, urban poor and IDPs. They reinforce marginalisation when these practices fail to ensure representation in policies, resources, and local administration. In IDP settlements, the level of wealth and personal connections will determine the type of aid received, such as food aid or cash. In some instances, those with minimal income will largely receive non-food items and will be dependent on daily labour to buy food. It has also been argued that these vulnerable groups are used by those in power to attract aid but are denied access to it once it arrives.⁶⁷ Displaced people in Mogadishu have to part with a certain percentage of the aid they receive (estimates are

at least 30%), to pay to continue staying in the settlements. The landowners and informal settlement managers (also known as 'gatekeepers') in turn benefit largely from collecting these sums.

The extent to which residents of Mogadishu have access to nutritious and varied foods is very low, especially among vulnerable groups including IDPs, low-income, and unskilled people. There is also little awareness about nutritious diets among the public, which is exposed to the advertisement and promotion of low-nutrition food. The consumption of fruits and vegetables that provide critical nutrition is low among Mogadishu residents; imported foods such as rice and pasta dominate the supply, while traditional foods like corn and sorghum mash (locally called Soor) are neglected. Nutritious legumes like cowpea, red kidney pea, and mung bean are widely available but are expensive. On the other hand, Somalia has a large population of livestock that supplies substantive amounts of milk that can be processed, yet the country imports enormous amounts of powdered milk without any quality control.⁶⁸

Complex power dynamics exist in how the actors relate in the system. Critics argue that Federal and State level policies on matters of food distribution tend to adopt the Western governments, donor, and UN' priorities, to an extent where the full ownership and implementation of national strategic plans and policies remains secondary. In the same light, specific UN organisations appear to take on the government's main role in service delivery to the level where the aligning UN organisation becomes synonymously associated with the corresponding government ministry, for instance, the WFP functioning as the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and the Food Agriculture Organisation (FAO) as the Ministry of Agriculture.

⁶² Ibid. experiences of an interviewee.

⁶³ Boero, V., Cafiero, C., Gheri, F., Kepple, A.W., Rosero Moncayo, J. & Viviani, S. 2021. *Access to food in 2020. Results of twenty national surveys using the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES)*.

⁶⁴ FAO (2021) Humanitarian Response Plan 2021

⁶⁵ Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024

⁶⁶ <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/SO-FSO-202202-final.pdf>

⁶⁷ Jaspars, S., Adan, G.M and Majid, N.2020. *Food and Power in Somalia: Business as Usual?*, London: LSE Conflict Research Program

⁶⁸ Ibid.

Moreover, large food aid contracts are fiercely competitive and the jostling for the control for these contracts is considered a central part of the 'political marketplace'.⁶⁹ These food contracts are worth hundreds of millions in dollars in value, and managing these contracts becomes a highly competitive political process. Often, there is a multiplicity of roles such that the importers holding larger food aid contracts also own other businesses along the distribution chain. Transporters are also known to own trading businesses such as retail shops. Through dominating different trade opportunities, companies gain political status and influence and enables them to negotiate political roles as well.⁷⁰ Controlling food assistance in some districts has enabled some District Commissioners and some Mayors to become very powerful, as they control the terms under which organisations and local authorities target beneficiaries and entry into the locality.⁷¹ Political loyalty is also rewarded through preferential selection of aid beneficiaries and businessmen from one's own clan. The clan system guiding operations in the private sector means that businessmen will often hire kin or clansmen that share similar allegiance or connections. This locks out minority clans from the food distribution roles such as in transportation.

It is argued that a variety of actors benefit from the protracted displacement situation and have vested interests in maintaining Mogadishu's geo-position as host to internally displaced. The presence of IDPs in towns politically 'feeds' several actors ranging from informal settlement 'gatekeepers', landowners who collect rent from IDPs, businesses that economically benefit from providing humanitarian services such as security, meeting venues, etc., aid agencies, and businesses that leverage on the available cheap labour. Gatekeepers at IDP camps and informal settlements within the city control the influx of food aid to residents and tax a percentage of the direct cash transfers distributed by aid organisations. These gatekeepers are tolerated

by the BRA to some extent, though attempts have been made to make their roles more accountable and transparent (for instance, through the BRA's IDP Policy) to avoid exploitation of the IDPs' food aid, among others. However, gatekeepers still operate in a largely unregulated manner and provide some housing and security in exchange for food aid, cash transfers, or vouchers.⁷²

As it may now be clear, the transport system is key to food distribution, based on the required movement of food items for trade and food aid. The system currently faces challenges from the poor transport infrastructure which has an implication on food prices. Conflict also plays an influential role especially when it affects major supply routes. Al-Shabaab's relations with aid agencies and private businesses has been hostile, such that suspected aid-actors have in the past been victims of reprisals, targeted attacks, and loss of lives. The armed group played a dominant role in the 2011 famine, by obstructing movement of agencies distributing food, and propagated the food crises even further. The next section provides a more in-depth look into this system.

Road Transportation

Road transport a vital function of the city, is characterized by public transportation as the main method of mobility. Intra-city travel is comprised of mainly minibuses, three-wheelers, taxis, among others.⁷³ The common preferred type is the 14-seater minibuses (locally known as BL) that mostly operate on fixed routes. These minibuses are popularly considered a convenient, affordable, and accessible option. Also preferred are the Bajaj intracity three-wheelers which are available on customer demand and have a wider coverage than the minibuses as they can navigate neighbourhoods with bad road infrastructure. Occasionally, taxis, though more expensive, are used, but mostly

⁶⁹ Grunewald, F., (2012) p.51

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Jaspars, S., Adan, G.M and Majid, N.2020. *Food and Power in Somalia: Business as Usual?*, London: LSE Conflict Research Program

⁷² Bryld et al. (2019),

⁷³ The World Bank. (2020:170).

preferred by government officials and business elites. A more affordable option for taxis is the Dhaweeye's. These have been described by the World Bank as the 'Somali version of Uber,' and have been operating in Mogadishu, Bossaso, and Hargeisa since 2018. It is estimated that Dhaweeye has 500 registered vehicles in Mogadishu. Like Uber, these drivers are screened by the contracting company and use a taxi meter to regulate prices. These two aspects provide a sense of security to customers who can afford them.⁷⁴

Public transport is dominated by the private sector, in both formal and informal measure. It is essentially self-regulated as private transport associations, cooperatives, and companies, oversee provision and management of the service. There is no government-run or government-subsidised public transportation system. The Federal government's priority is directed towards aspects such as investments and maintenance, where investment is predominantly directed towards development and rehabilitation of road infrastructure. Over 90 % of Somalia's 21,933 km of road network is in poor to very poor condition.⁷⁵ Budgetary gaps are supplemented by foreign investment who engage their financing instruments towards reconstruction or resurfacing of existing roads, and development of absent state regulatory policy. Nearly half of the Federal Government's transport expenditure, which is financed through bilateral and multilateral donors, such as Norway, Turkey and Qatar, is directed towards development and rehabilitation of the poor road infrastructure to enable connectivity, expansion of economic opportunities, facilitation of social services and meeting political needs. Turkey presently enjoys majority ownership of the airport and ports in Mogadishu.⁷⁶ These actors have an important say in how the transport sector is run and governed.

At State level, significant support from external agencies, such as the World Bank is instrumental for the road infrastructure sector. The BRA is responsible for generation of domestic revenue through taxation, licenses and custom duties. This is generated through vehicle and number plate registration fees, annual vehicle tolls and road taxes, as well as custom duties on imported vehicles.^{77,78} However, the sector struggles to meet revenue deficits, because tax collection is often poorly enforced, and infiltrated by informal actors.^{79,80}

Access to road transportation in Mogadishu is limited to those who can afford it, locking out low-income households, IDPs and urban poor, particularly in the absence of government subsidies.⁸¹ These groups are the disproportionately affected by transportation prices and access, often on a frequent basis.⁸² IDPs and the urban poor that live outside the city will resort to walking, at times over very long distances which poses several safety, health, and security risks.⁸³ Mobility barriers imposed to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 have had particularly challenging effects on urban poor and displaced people, impeding their ability to secure a livelihood.⁸⁴ Socio-economic factors such as income, have an influence in mobility patterns, where for instance, highly secured escorts are reserved for government officials and aid workers, Bajaj tricycles for the middle-class residents and urban poor moving on foot or in buses.

The city residents' mobility is significantly affected by insecurity since the threat of a volatile security situation not only hinders how people and goods move around, but also affects the movement of workers, materials, and relief aid. The potent threat of al-Shabaab not only impedes movement of the public but also of government officials, who are forced to operate within the large urban centres limiting movement outside the city.⁸⁵ In 2021, an average

⁷⁴ Hagmann, T. (2019:44).

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Abdulle, O.M. (2018); Hagmann, T. (2019:39).

⁷⁷ The World Bank. (2020) p-88,102

⁷⁸ Hagmann, T. (2019:43).

⁷⁹ The World Bank. (2020:14).

⁸⁰ Hagmann, T. (2019:43).

⁸¹ Hagmann, T., et. Al, M. (2018 :44).

⁸² Bryld, E., et. al (2019:31).

⁸³ Ibid

⁸⁴ BTI (2022) Country Report, Somalia

⁸⁵ Heritage Institute (2020)

of 265 incidents were recorded monthly across Somalia, with Banadir region among the most affected by al-Shabaab activities. These targeted attacks were aimed at private vehicles or security convoys transporting members of the private sector, government, and security officials.⁸⁶ The operation of roadblocks contributes to a far larger risk to the transportation system risk beyond traffic accidents. Users endure human rights abuses ranging from low-level harassment, through intimidation, and threats; to extreme violence including gender-based violence and killings.⁸⁷ These crimes are largely attributed to clan militia-run roadblocks rather than State or al-Shabaab-run roadblocks, which are considered by users as better organized and relatively safer.⁸⁸ Drivers will usually seek to minimize risk by adapting the itinerary or postponing the trip entirely where the likelihood of encountering a checkpoint can still be high. For most Somalis, the primary risk at such checkpoints is to be suspected of belonging to the enemy, a suspicion which may cause serious reactions to the travellers. Travelers thus try to avoid arousing suspicion by keeping a low profile and blending in with fellow travelers. Unresolved clan conflicts limit urban mobility, where poor relationships between people and clans prevent entry to communities, highlighting the importance of clan relations within the political settlement regarding transportation system.⁸⁹ Dominant clans in Mogadishu would generally be content with control over the city's businesses including transportation.⁹⁰

One of the main challenges the system is subjected to relates to the poor conditions of the road network where conditions exist in varied states of paved, gravel and earth. Majority have been in this state as a result of destruction due to protracted civil war periods and poor maintenance by the government. The inadequate road infrastructure is also a major constraint on the population's access to social

services, such as education and health care, as well as a significant obstacle to the political integration of the country's territories. There is often a backlog of maintenance and repair works at both Federal and regional administrations, due to budgetary constraints and institutional capacity gaps. In some contexts, Mogadishu communities have engaged in repair of the roads themselves.⁹¹ Traffic is also a considerable issue, particularly in Mogadishu, due to the poor road infrastructure, the security checks, and the roadblocks.⁹² This prolongs travel times in between locations within the city.

The system presents unique opportunities for political settlements. Roadblocks and/or checkpoints are a common feature within inter and intercity travel. They are predominantly controlled by various power groups, such as the government, police forces, clan militia and al-Shabaab, often in favour of the elites. Checkpoints are often classified into regular and irregular checkpoints, depending on whether the post is sanctioned by the authorities. Checkpoints/roadblocks can be categorized into four including category 1 referring to the roadblocks that are created for the purpose of robbing travellers regardless of clan conflict and power struggles; category 2 referring to checkpoints that are established in connection with armed clan conflicts - clan militias erect roadblocks under the pretext of providing security to their clansmen but sometimes violently seize possessions, money, or goods, especially from rival clan members.⁹³ Categories 3 and 4 relate to conflict between al-Shabaab and government forces. Such a dichotomy makes little sense in a context where the Somali boundaries are contentious and various actors have varying degrees of loyalty to the government in Mogadishu. Due to the limiting nature of free movement across these checkpoints, brokers locally known as 'maqalas' facilitate a safe passage of overland road users

⁸⁶ UN Security Council Reports (8 February 2022): An improvised explosive device attack on 16 January 2021 in Mogadishu was directed towards the vehicle of the Spokesperson of the Federal Government of Somalia, Mohamed Ibrahim Moalimu.

⁸⁷ Transparency Solutions (2017:5), Beyond isbaaro-Reclaiming Somalia haunted roads. Somalia Accountability Programme, DFID and IAAAP.

⁸⁸ *ibid*

⁸⁹ The World Bank. (2020). *Somalia Urbanization Review*:p85-86

⁹⁰ Ahmad, Aisha. (2014). The Security Bazaar: Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia. *International Security*, 39(3), 89–117. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24480762>

⁹¹ Inter-Ministerial Public Works Coordination Mechanism. (2018:8).

⁹² Hagmann, T. (2019:44).

⁹³ Lucas Mahlasela Makhubela (2016), Understanding Civil Militia Groups in Somalia. ACCORD see <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/understanding-civil-militia-groups-somalia/>

for a price, facilitating safe passage with those manning roadblocks.⁹⁴ They act as referees for road users to enable affordable passage. Long-distance transport companies especially truck drivers are the primary beneficiaries of the ‘maqala’ services. This is due to the risks they face including clan profiling, extortion, hijacking and killing. The use of the term checkpoint or roadblock is political and largely has to do with economic motives rather than checks and controls.⁹⁵ Checkpoints and roadblocks generate a lot of interest for purposes of control and revenue collection, as money is a greater motivator for operating roadblocks than security. It is estimated that al-Shabaab collects up to USD 3 million annually from roadblocks.⁹⁶ The roadblocks are a vital source of funding for the insurgent group, and these may explain why they are keen on offering seamless services to road users.

Table 2 Taxes paid by vehicle operators

Route	Taxing agent and amount (USD)
Beledweyne–Mogadishu	Beledweyne road block: 400 Galjael road block: 150 Al-Shabaab: 1,025 Banadir (Mogadishu) Administration: 480 Total: 2,055
Beledweyne to Bosaso (Puntland)	Hiran Administration: 400 Matabaan (Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa): 180 Galmudug Administration: 400 Puntland: 80 Total: 1,060
Bosaso (Puntland) to Beledweyne	Bosaso: 300 Galmudug: 400 Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa: 280 Beledweyne: 400 Total: 1,380

Note: The table shows taxes paid to state and non-state actors by 35-ton vehicle operators from Beledweyne (based on an interview with the Hiran Transport Association).

Such risks as highlighted above limit mobility and have knock-on effects on businesses, aid

delivery, trade and contribute to increased inequalities for marginalised communities.

Law and order

Access to justice

Somalia’s justice sector is pluralistic in nature and encompasses a combination of legal systems that form the basis of legislation, institutions, and justice provision for city residents. For most member states, the judicial system engages a combination of state-based law and institutions (what may also be referred to as statutory), customary and religious laws, which are enforced in different measures.

Statutory law, as the face of post-independence justice system, has its origins in pre-colonial era when Britain and Italy ruled the Northern (current Somaliland) and Southern parts of Somalia respectively. This led to the introduction of British common law and Italian continental law, and the adoption of secular and westernized codes and norms. Mogadishu adopted more of the Italian legal conduct due to its historical connection to the Italian colony. From independence, the judicial system underwent various reforms as it transitioned through different government and military regimes, where predecessor institutions were abolished. It was not until 2009 that the justice system began to rebuild itself to what it is today.⁹⁷

The Constitution as a guiding instrument for enactment of legislation regarding the judicial mandates remains ambiguous eight years since drafting. In this absence, member states and Benadir have adopted their own constitutions, Ministry of Justice, legislations and court mandates. Commonly, a three-tiered court structure⁹⁸ from the Siad Barre regime is used in all member states including Benadir, whereby:

⁹⁴ Transparency Solutions (2017:19)

⁹⁵ Landinfo (2017:1-15) Somalia: Practical issues and security challenges associated with travels in Southern-Somalia

⁹⁶ Transparency Solutions (2017:5)

⁹⁷ Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) (2021). *Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System: Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures*.p9-

⁹⁸ Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS)(2021). *Rebuilding Somalia’s Broken Justice System: Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures*.p15-6

- Court of First Instance (CFI) sits at the lowest level (District level) and handles civil and minor cases.
- Appeals Court, sits at the capital of the province/region and receives cases escalated from CFI when they are too complex or large to manage.
- State Supreme Court (SSC), highest court within member states, and handles predominantly constitutional disputes between government institutions and criminal matters such as SGBV cases.

Decades of state collapse, civil war, and insurgency had for a long time contributed to the breakdown of statutory institutions and practice, which ushered in clan elders and religious scholars who stepped in to fill the void left by the state. Although Western secular laws were imposed, larger parts of the *Xeer* (Customary) and Shari'a (Islamic) systems were left intact and are still practised by local clans. During post-civil war (1991-2000), no formal justice system existed, aside from *Xeer* and Shari'a at the local level.⁹⁹

Shari'ah¹⁰⁰ law refers to Islamic law that has been practiced in Somalia from pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence periods. In early colonial rule, while the British tried to suppress implementation of Islamic law, Italian rulers on the other hand promoted it, by advocating on selection of shari'ah judges within communities.¹⁰¹ This later changed as a new movement expanded in the region. In post-independence era, Shari'a was identified as a supreme source of law in the new Somalia. However, this mandate remained arbitrary as different regimes adopted varied political ideologies (from parliamentary democracy to socialism and back to democracy). Nonetheless, statutory reforms aimed to complement Islamic law even where discrepancies existed in beliefs and norms. Islamic law gained dominance in

post-civil war Somalia, where NGOs and Islamic organisations stepped in to fill in the service delivery void left by the Somali government. Mogadishu began to witness the first sights of Shari'ah courts (1993), where they maintained their own militia to enforce justice. Implementation of Shari'ah law got firmer with the establishment of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which encompassed ten Mogadishu Islamic courts. Upon curtailing of the ICU which relied solely on approximately 400-strong militia to enforce laws, fight warlords and clans, this paved way for the rise of Al Shabaab, the ICU's armed youth wing. This militant group imposes a more extreme and stricter model of Shari'ah. They currently have a heavier presence in the rural than urban areas in South-Central Somalia and they ran a parallel justice system with Al Shabaab courts.

Shari'ah was formally adopted as Somalia's official judicial system in 2009, through cabinet and parliamentary action.

Customary law, also known as *Xeer*, is an important feature in the city's justice system. It is based on mutually agreeable contracts (usually historically pre-existing relations) among clan groups that place importance on collective responsibility rather than individual punishment.¹⁰² Aggrieved clan groups or persons depend on these agreements to pursue compensation which is pre-determined based on type and degree of crime, and who the perpetrator or victim was. Negotiations can be done either bilaterally or multilaterally among clans. Elders are the primary justice providers in this system, selected by male clan members.

In Mogadishu, security actors are also considered as justice actors. Institutions such as the police, the army, international actors, private security providers, and neighbourhood policing committees are also seen as justice providers.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) (2021). *Rebuilding Somalia's Broken Justice System: Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures*.p8-9

¹⁰⁰ Loosely translates as the path or the road leading to the water or the correct path.

¹⁰¹ Expanding Access to Justice Program. 2020. The Shari'ah in Somalia. Nairobi, Kenya: Pact and the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative.

¹⁰² Danish Demining Group (2019) The clan system and customary justice in Somalia

¹⁰³ Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS)(2021). *Rebuilding Somalia's Broken Justice System: Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures*.p29

The active presence of formal security actors and their functionality varies across the different zones of the city. They are scattered across different locations. Private security providers are mostly in Mogadishu and are locally owned contracted by humanitarian workers, politicians, or businesspeople. Where police presence and surveillance is minimal, neighbourhood watch committees in Mogadishu patrol and inform the police of suspicious activities. They have direct ties to the police, though such ties are often weak and inefficient, resulting in residents primarily relying on themselves and their communities for safety.¹⁰⁴

Access to justice is dependent primarily on three factors: kinship ties (clan affiliation), gender, and population group.

Depending on kinship ties, access and right to safety can vary largely across social structures in Somalia. Residents of urban neighbourhoods belonging to a dominant clan lineage tend to be more secure than marginalised groups and communities such as IDPs, who do not have access to solid social structures, thus subjected to more safety risks.¹⁰⁵ Additionally, the *Xeer* and clan elder systems, rely heavily on clan affiliation.

The *Xeer* has non-negotiable elements when it comes to women, children, the sick, poor and elderly, where they are to be protected from violence.¹⁰⁶ However, in practice, women rarely receive proper protection or justice following incidences of violence, leaving Somali women strongly disadvantaged in their access to law and order.¹⁰⁷ Women are excluded from customary decision-making, are prohibited from hearings without a male companion, and are made to pay higher bribes and fees.¹⁰⁸ Customary systems also do little to safeguard the rights of women

women in cases of SGBV. For this reason, perpetrators that are militarily or politically affiliated, often favour customary proceedings, whilst victims tend to ask for rights-based statutory proceedings.

Access is very limited for IDPs and other marginalised groups, with the main barrier being cost and representation. IDP communities do not have these resources nor the influence needed for decisions to be made in their favour. Often, IDP cases are ignored by the courts, pushing them to approach clan leaders and try to gain assistance in this way.¹⁰⁹ Other marginalised communities such as the Bantus, descendants of people who were enslaved, also have very little representation in the judiciary. Bantus are very vulnerable as they often live in poverty, have low socioeconomic status, and lack education.¹¹⁰

Use of either of the three justice systems is fluid and complementary, where one or more systems can be used at different periods of time. Justice seekers 'shop' for the option that suits them at the time. For instance, customary and Sharia'ah law is used to appeal decisions made in government court. *Xeer*, is increasingly used to settle disputes between clan communities.¹¹¹ The factors driving judicial options are driven by gaps and quality deficiencies in the systems which makes the other system a preferable option. The statutory court system is perceived as inefficient, expensive, and complicated. Courts charge a fee as well as take a commission of the value of the dispute.¹¹² Additionally, justice practitioners in Somalia are not trained according to a standardized curriculum and few courts apply statutory law. They are also unable to act and respond to cases involving informal settlements.

¹⁰⁴ Hagmann, T. (2019). *Not so public goods: the political economy of urbanization in selected Somali cities*. Rift Valley Institute.p.36

¹⁰⁵ Hagmann, T. (2019). *Not so public goods: the political economy of urbanization in selected Somali cities*. Rift Valley Institute.p.40

¹⁰⁶ Danish Demining Group (2019) The clan system and customary justice in Somalia

¹⁰⁷ Saferworld (2020). *The missing link: Access to justice and community security in Somalia*.p3

¹⁰⁸ United States Agency for International Development (USAID). (2020b). *The Expanding Access to Justice Programme Somalia (EAJ): Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu*.p25-6

¹⁰⁹ United States Agency for International Development (USAID). (2020b). *The Expanding Access to Justice Programme Somalia (EAJ): Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu*.p27

¹¹⁰ United States Agency for International Development (USAID). (2020b). *The Expanding Access to Justice Programme Somalia (EAJ): Pathways and Institutions for Resolving Land Disputes in Mogadishu*.p28

¹¹¹ Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS)(2021). *Rebuilding Somalia's Broken Justice System: Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures*.p27

¹¹² Hagmann, T. (2019). *Not so public goods: the political economy of urbanization in selected Somali cities*. Rift Valley Institute.p.39

Therefore, many people resort to the customary and Sharia'h systems that cover wider geographical areas throughout the city, increasing access, and assisting in legal issues and disputes. Many elements of customary practice shape legal proceedings underscoring underscores the importance of well-trained, affordable, and locally available legal aid services.¹¹³ Alternative dispute settlement arrangements¹¹⁴ are preferred, as it is quicker, and perceived less corrupt. It has been estimated that these justice systems cover between 80-90% of all legal cases in Somalia.¹¹⁵ Other non-state actors such as the al-Shabaab have become increasingly engaged in land conflict disputes in both urban and rural Mogadishu area based on clan affiliation. The al-Shabaab jurisdiction extends to areas into the city, mainly on land-related matters.¹¹⁶

Political and military interference, corruption, and lack of professionalism shapes general access to justice in Somalia, imposing cost barriers in all aspects, including enforcement, and renders treatments and outcomes unpredictable. This applies particularly to displaced and rural communities and is magnified for land disputes.

The political settlement within which this sector operates is such that the distribution of power across the judicial institutions is based on clan affiliations, as top positions are distributed along clan lines, and the 4.5 power sharing arrangements at national and regional levels where officials from only four of the most powerful Hawiye sub-clans have held these positions since the establishment of the Federal Government.¹¹⁷ For close to 20 years, the Dir have held top positions at the Supreme court including the Chief Justice, and Attorney General; Rahanweyn on Speaker of Parliament

and Hawiye and Daarood alternating between presidency and premiership.

The justice system is linked to all the other city systems earlier discussed. Order is needed to safely access services such as education, water, sanitation facilities, and transportation. The justice system impacts how much access groups and individuals have to different city systems; e.g., losing a land dispute can mean that a family must relocate to an informal settlement where access to other basic city systems is restricted and of lower quality. There are substantial knock-on effects of the limitations to the law-and-order system on all the other systems and domains, and most importantly people's quality of lives, safety, and livelihoods.

Several factors pose risk for the justice system: 1) informal groups such as al-Shabaab, who control areas just outside of Mogadishu, pose threats to security and human rights¹¹⁸; 2) lack of rehabilitation for criminal offenders with mental health or addiction challenges, hinders effectiveness of the criminal justice system (repeats offenders could be minimised with a more robust, comprehensive rehabilitation for the people that need it)¹¹⁹; 3) SGBV is a constant and consistent threat to women and girls. Particularly IDP women and girls, living in informal settlements with little access to clan or other community leaders, are subject to this vice.¹²⁰

Water

The water sector in Mogadishu operates under a complex environment generated by pre-existing collapsed water infrastructure, low sector governance, minimal availability of skilled technical capacity, privatisation, and budget cuts, which, when combined, have adverse

¹¹³ United States Agency for International Development (USAID). (2020a). *The Expanding Access to Justice Programme Somalia (EAJ)- Access to Justice Assessment Tool: 2020: Somalia Baseline Study Brief*.p.2

¹¹⁴ Alternative Dispute Resolution as an approach comprises of settling disputes out of court, often through customary alternatives, in the context of Mogadishu.

¹¹⁵ Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS). (2021). *Rebuilding Somalia's Broken Justice System: Fixing the Politics, Policies and Procedures*.p.28

¹¹⁶ Saferworld (2020). *The missing link: Access to justice and community security in Somalia*.

¹¹⁷ KII with Director of the Institute of Federalism and Security Analysis, 13 February 2022

¹¹⁸ Hagmann, T. (2019). *Not so public goods: the political economy of urbanization in selected Somali cities*. Rift Valley Institute.p.32

¹¹⁹ Hagmann, T. (2019). *Not so public goods: the political economy of urbanization in selected Somali cities*. Rift Valley Institute.p.33

¹²⁰ Saferworld (2020). *The missing link: Access to justice and community security in Somalia*.p.4

effects on water quality. Water supply in the city depends primarily on groundwater sources, which are generally unevenly distributed and scanty.¹²¹ Due to the depth of the groundwater, supplies often rely on diesel-powered pumping systems to bring water to the surface, after which it can be accessed through wells and boreholes. Mogadishu residents rely on groundwater for domestic water supply, agriculture and livestock, small-scale irrigation and minute quantities directed towards drinking and hygiene.

The water sector is largely driven by the private sector, which has occupied a strong position since the 1980s. In current Mogadishu, the sector is primarily an oligopoly where water production and distribution are largely privatised and dominated by large-scale actors such as the Banadir Water Development Company, Xamar Water Distribution Company, and Somali Water Development Union Company. The three companies form the Water Development Cooperative of Banadir (DAHAB); they dominate the coordination, control, and management of piped water and about 350 wells in Mogadishu's 17 districts and are, in theory, equipped to cover the water needs of the expanding city.

There is no encompassing Federal control or oversight of supplies, quality or maintenance; the role of the government has remained administrative, i.e., policy development (the MoEWR provides oversight in developing policy, planning and development of infrastructure¹²²). The extent of control is limited due to capacity and resource challenges. With a severe lack of involvement, the government relies heavily on private sector financing and (I)NGOs to meet the gap in service provision.¹²³ Private sector supports the government in much of the infrastructure construction and expansion of water networks

through self-financed avenues such as diasporic investments, and aid from donors.

Dominant clans and some religious institutions own and control private boreholes and dominate the water business in different sections of the city.¹²⁴ Though, there is still competition between borehole/well owners and private water companies, which can result in price increases; by allowing water companies to court customers directly, the clans attribute to a minimised level of competition amongst water providers. In the absence of centralised coordination and regulation, clans step into fill the gap. In addition, private water supply actors often enter into informal agreements with the municipal government to manage license and fee payments on their behalf. In most cases, private providers are left to manage disinfection of water supplies, which often is not reliable enough to control contamination.

Access to water in Mogadishu is starkly segregated between urban and rural populations. Urban households enjoy significantly higher access to water than rural households due to their proximity to existing water service provision facilities.¹²⁵ Many of the urban and peri-urban poor, including IDPs and minority clans, who live outside of the main water pipeline grids, are heavily dependent on small-scale vendors for provision of non-piped water. The water, often provided in jerrycans, is sold at water kiosks or distributed by donkey carts.¹²⁶ Access is also dependent on clan lineage in Mogadishu as water distribution companies in parts of the city are owned by clan and sub-clan groups. This practice reinforces the risk of perpetuating existing inequalities along clan lines.¹²⁷

IDPs and low-income households are more disadvantaged than the rest of the population due to their limited purchasing capacity to buy water from these private providers. To mitigate this, humanitarian/development organisations

¹²¹ Van der Plas et al (2013), *In a state of uncertainty? Mogadishu water supply*. In Delivering water, sanitation, and Hygiene services in an uncertain environment.

¹²² AfDB (2015), Somalia water and sanitation sector needs assessment and investment programme report.

¹²³ Interview notes, (14.02.2022)

¹²⁴ World Bank, Somalia Urbanization Review (2021:100)

¹²⁵ World Bank, Somalia Urbanization Review (2021:88)

¹²⁶ Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), *National Development Plan 2017-2019*, December 2016

¹²⁷ World Bank, Somalia Urbanization Review, (2021:101)

focus on providing relief from the cost implications of buying water, and as such water is provided free of cost in IDP settlements. NGOs also take lead in building communal water taps for the settlements that struggle with consistent water supply. In some cases, water companies (DAHAB) provide water-payment subsidies or donate profits to marginalised groups, under a cross-clan profit-sharing arrangement.¹²⁸ DAHAB is known to provide free water to all mosques in the city and to IDPs and urban poor living in the abandoned government and municipal buildings.

The quality of the water transported by donkeys is most likely very low, as a result of the poor state of cleanliness of the barrels and containers used to transfer the water to a water storage facility. This untreated/non-piped water is the root of chronic diarrhoea outbreaks in Mogadishu.

Although the bulk of groundwater resources is thought to be enough to sustainably meet current and mid-term-future demands, the city's raw water quality does not meet WHO's guidelines for potable supply; in fact, the groundwater quality is most likely deteriorating.¹²⁹ Water supply systems are known to malfunction frequently due to weak water management models, high operational and maintenance costs, lack of supply chain of spare parts and technical limitations of service providers.

Families who are unable to pay for water must fetch their supply from open wells.¹³⁰ Open wells are often unsafe, and fraught with water quality challenges because they are unprotected from the elements, making them prone to contamination and salination. When water treatment processes are in place, they are often not reliable enough to control and protect from external contamination. Increasingly, the focus of intervention efforts has been on quantity of

water, rather than quality, and addressing salinization and water treatment has taken secondary priority.¹³¹

Most households pay to have access to water.¹³² However, the price point between piped and non-piped water is stark; thus, poorer households are more likely to be barred from access to safe drinking water than wealthier households due to insufficient funds.¹³³

The sanitary conditions in most water points are considered to pose a high threat to disease transmissions. Most of the shallow wells are less than 20 metres deep, creating health hazards of faecal contamination due to the high-water table. In some urban areas, the risk is multiplied when urban waste is disposed of into open drains. Vendor-managed water presents greater health risks in most cases due to poor user handling and hygiene of the containers.

Sanitation

The sewage system in Mogadishu is old with no recurring funds to ensure maintenance and repair. Consequently, waste is disposed of in or near the sea, posing health hazards to the environment and the people. In addition, people rely on sewage tanks to empty fecal sludge; however, there are no treatment plants or authorized areas assigned to dispose of dangerous fecal waste.

Households and commercial properties have constructed latrines but less than 33 % have access to their own latrine, resulting in latrines being shared among several households, or people defecating in the open. About 57 % of households in Somalia do not have access to improved sanitation facilities.¹³⁴ Most schools, health centres and prison facilities have very poor sanitation-related infrastructure.

¹²⁸ World Bank, Somalia Urbanization Review, (2021:100)

¹²⁹ Abdi-Soojeede, M. and Kullane, M. (2019) Study of Community Perception on Drinking Water Quality in Mogadishu, Somalia. *Open Journal of Applied Sciences*, 9, 361-371. doi: [10.4236/ojapps.2019.95030](https://doi.org/10.4236/ojapps.2019.95030)

¹³⁰ The Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS), *Durable Solutions Framework - Local Integration Focus: Benadir region*, March 2017, p. 27

¹³¹ SWALIM and UNICEF (2007) Rural water supply assessment

¹³² REACH (2019) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Assessment Report

¹³³ REACH (2019) Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Assessment Report

¹³⁴ An improved sanitation facility is one that likely hygienically separates human excreta from human contact. Improved sanitation facilities include: Flush or pour-flush to piped sewer system, septic tank or pit latrine; Ventilated improved pit latrine; Pit latrine with slab and Composting toilet. However, sanitation facilities are not considered improved when shared with other households, or open to public use. (WHO & UNICEF, 2010.)

Banadir region is adjacent to flood-prone areas; floods negatively impact water, sanitation, and hygiene conditions, particularly as the region houses the highest number of IDPs in Somalia (904,000 in 2021).¹³⁵ It is estimated that 70% of the Banadir region is in severe need of sanitation services.¹³⁶

The part of the Mogadishu sanitation systems owned by BRA, to which the government allocates 6.6 % annually, is poorly managed and maintained. The other part is privately owned and managed.¹³⁷ The Federally funded system, is marred with minimally coordinated legal, regulatory and policy frameworks, with huge gaps in human, financial and logistical resources. Harmonizing water governance frameworks at the Federal and local administrative levels seems impossible.¹³⁸ Unfortunately, sanitation in Mogadishu is not viewed as a politically viable venture; thus, the only visible actors are privately owned public toilets in major city markets with no relation to the municipality.¹³⁹

Since 2011, development and humanitarian actors have been offering support to underserved communities through the construction of Community-Led Toilets and Sanitation, (CLTS), where people are supported to design and construct latrines or toilets, using locally available resources.¹⁴⁰ The main target of such a project is settlements with a concentration of displaced persons and the urban poor, where the imbalance between the number of people and the lack of facilities is stark.¹⁴¹

The major challenge for improvement of sanitation systems, seem to be the many layers of management connected to sanitation, of which

neither layer resumes full responsibility. There is no clarity on whether full sanitation responsibility should fall under the Ministry of Health, - of Local Government, or - of water.¹⁴²

As such, the issue lies with the structure of responsibility: from the low level of actual access to facilities, to the higher levels of government, with a lack of legislative and institutional framework surrounding system and infrastructure of sanitation.

About 40% of the sanitation infrastructure in Mogadishu requires rehabilitation.¹⁴³ The World Bank indicates that only 12% of people in Mogadishu have access to an improved sanitation system compared to 14% and 11% of people living in Somaliland and Puntland, respectively.¹⁴⁴ Of those living outside of informal settlements, 42% have access to improved sanitation facilities. The lack of access and a functioning sewer system in urban areas, results in human waste being disposed of directly into open drains, causing high incidences of water and sanitation-related diseases.¹⁴⁵

Gender disparities in access are evident. While women play a key role in household and community activities, they are largely excluded from public sanitation facilities and highly disadvantaged by inadequate services. As main decision-makers, men do not take gender into consideration when it comes to the provision of sanitation services.¹⁴⁶ For school-going girls, the lack of sanitary facilities in schools, negatively affects their school enrollment rates, which

¹³⁵ OCHA, *Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2022*, 2021.

¹³⁶ Estimated according to PiN indicator: the People in Need (PiN) indicator is a WASH framework that measures living conditions against specific indicators that include “access to adequate, appropriate and functional sanitation facilities”, “access to functional handwashing facilities and soap”, “access to an improved water source”, and “access to a sufficient quantity of water”.

¹³⁷ World Bank, *Somalia Urbanization Review*, 2021

¹³⁸ National Water Resource Strategy 2021-2015, Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, Federal Government of Somalia, 2021 and Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH) profile, February 2020 (UNICEF)

¹³⁹ KII with the Banadir Regional Administration representative, 17 February 2022

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ KII with the Banadir Regional Administration representative, 17 February 2022

¹⁴² UNICEF, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene profile. UNICEF Somalia country office

¹⁴³ World Bank (2017:41), *Somali poverty profile 2016: findings from wave 1 of the Somali high frequency survey*, 27 June 2017, p. 41 and African Development Bank (2016). *Improving access to water and sanitation services in Somalia*. Accessed at <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Somalia-AR-Approved-Improving-Access-to-Water-and-Sanitation-Services-in-Somalia.pdf> on June 19, 2022 and OCHA, *Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2022*, 2021.

¹⁴⁴ World Bank (2017:41), *Somali poverty profile 2016: findings from wave 1 of the Somali high frequency survey*, 27 June 2017

¹⁴⁵ FGS (2018), *Somali National Infrastructure Strategy (SNIS) 2019-2063*. Inter-ministerial Public Works Coordination Mechanism

¹⁴⁶ National Water Resource Strategy 2021-2015, Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, Federal Government of Somalia, 2021.

further widens the gender gap.¹⁴⁷ For those living with disabilities, proximity to facilities is a challenge; this is also true women and girls, for whom proximity is a key safety concern.¹⁴⁸

Sanitation remains the number one problem for displaced persons and the urban poor as they are forced to cope with a limited number of latrines against a high number of households.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, lack of affordable waste collection and disposal systems results in overall poor sanitation practices. However, the degree to which access to facilities is experienced, is similar for both displaced and non-displaced population.¹⁵⁰

With the onset of COVID-19, sanitation challenges have become more aggravated. The hygiene requirements were difficult to meet, with most facilities having low provision of soap, washbasins, and water.¹⁵¹ Less than 44% of Somalia's population have a handwashing facility and even fewer have water, soap, and drainage.¹⁵²

Only about 4 % of Mogadishu's latrine facilities have access to water;¹⁵³ moreover, facilities near water points pose a high risk of contamination and disease transmission.¹⁵⁴ Due to the lack of well-functioning drainage and sewerage system, sanitation services are very poor in the city.¹⁵⁵ Lack of latrines, non-functional or full latrines, and unhygienic conditions are common issues.¹⁵⁶ For women and girls, there is the added issue of security, i.e., latrines don't have locks, exposing them to GBV.

Mogadishu's sewage system was created in colonial times, and post-independent civilian and military governments later invested in sewerage/drainage infrastructure. However, since then, there have been no upgrades to reflect the city's growing population. With the

collapse of the country in 1991, the population resorted to using septic tanks in individual residences; these tanks have since deteriorated and are now a source of pollution of underground water, on which the population depends. Prolonged under-prioritization, neglect from leadership, under-investment, and a lack of technical capacity within municipal and Federal government spheres have worsened the state of the system. Despite efforts of NGOs to implement sanitation projects in areas with high concentrations of poor and displaced populations, their services remain fragmented and insufficient to cover the enormous demand side.¹⁵⁷

The system of sanitation is connected to the issue of land rights in Mogadishu; landowners of housing for displaced populations have no political interest or incentive to improve living standards in settlements. Urban displaced people struggle with limited provision of water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste, and as they do not have any formal right to the land on which they reside, are not allowed to build latrines or waste collection points themselves.¹⁵⁸ The political disinterest in sanitation in Mogadishu is linked to clan affiliation and control of certain ministries in the 4.5 governance system; the less influential clans have been given control of the sanitation system, which brings no political or economic leverage, hence, no incentive to allocate funds to its improvement.

Sanitation is evidently interlinked with water and waste management as a concept at the municipal and community level. The safety inadequacies pose increased vulnerability to water borne diseases, especially during the rainy season where surface level water is washed into open water sources used by households. Additionally, the

¹⁴⁷ US Department of State (USDOS) (2017), *Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2016 - Somalia*, 03 March 2017, *Prison and Detention Centre Conditions* and UNICEF (2016:8), *Situation Analysis of Children in Somalia*

¹⁴⁸ Tana and IIED, *Shelter Provision in Mogadishu: Understanding Politics for a More Inclusive City* (2019:32)

¹⁴⁹ Asylum Research Consultancy, *Situation in South and Central Somalia* (including Mogadishu), (2018)

¹⁵⁰ REACH, *Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Assessment*, (2021:26)

¹⁵¹ REACH (2021), *Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Assessment Report*, February 2021

¹⁵² Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), *National Development Plan 2017-2019*, December 2016, p. 117

¹⁵³ Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), *National Development Plan 2017-2019*, December 2016, p. 117

¹⁵⁴ Asylum Research Consultancy, *Situation in South and Central Somalia* (including Mogadishu), (2018:52)

¹⁵⁵ KII with the Director of the Banadir Regional Administration, 17 February 2022

¹⁵⁶ REACH, *Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Assessment*, (2021:14)

¹⁵⁷ KII with the Director of the Banadir Regional Administration, 17 February 2022

¹⁵⁸ OCHA, *Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview, Humanitarian Programme Cycle 2022*, 2021.

lack of gender-segregated sanitation facilities in the available educational systems, exacerbate access inequalities against school-going girls, consequently discouraging parents from enrolling their daughters in school.

The sanitation system is fragile and exposed to climatic shocks. Latrines and other WASH facilities are prone to destruction, which could lead to breakouts of diarrhea, or skin and respiratory illnesses.¹⁵⁹ In 2016, heavy rains in Mogadishu caused reserves to overflow in six districts, leading to flooding near IDP settlements and vulnerable host communities.¹⁶⁰

Women, particularly in informal settlements where sanitation facilities are located outside the settlement, experience a high level of vulnerability to GBV, due to a longer trip and barely lit facilities.¹⁶¹ Likewise, people living with disabilities are faced with challenges in accessing facilities that are not adapted or built to their needs. Furthermore, overcrowding at the facilities coupled with poor sanitation incubates infectious diseases like cholera and measles.¹⁶²

Waste management

In Mogadishu, while some pilot initiatives have explored sustainable approaches towards solid waste management, most are characterized by informal dump sites, dirty streets and the absence of sustainable solid waste collection systems and facilities. The municipality has limited human and technical capacity and skills to carry out sustainable and systematic solid waste collection and management. Private companies are involved in waste collection and disposal but contracts with municipalities are often of short duration, hindering larger investments in technical equipment. Urban

communities are used to disposing of household, business, and hospital waste on informal dump sites and lack an understanding of the importance of sustainable and regular waste collection and management; thus, are reluctant to pay for regular waste collection.

Waste, drainage, and sewage systems in the city are managed by the Mogadishu Municipality through the BRA, while some businesses have made private waste collection agreements with companies at a fee. Public-private partnership approaches often outsource the service to private actors or community groups. PPPs are deployed by the BRA; currently, the waste management company, IFI, is contracted to collect and dispose of waste in Mogadishu. Informal actors are also involved by collecting waste from businesses located far from the collection site.¹⁶³

The government receives substantial support from the World Bank and European Union to manage solid waste, and a significant share of local government operating expenditures are related to solid waste management.¹⁶⁴ Still, waste management remains largely unattended by the government, making institutionalized solid waste management non-existent in Mogadishu.¹⁶⁵

With the lack of attention given to waste management, the system has never been improved. BRA departments of Roads, Sewerage and Sanitation, with support from external agencies, are in theory responsible for the maintenance; however, in praxis, this is not the reality.^{166 167}

The ramifications of a deteriorating waste management system, forces low-income Mogadishu populations to self-organise

¹⁵⁹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), *Somalia: Humanitarian Dashboard, August 2016*, 29 September 2016, p. 3

¹⁶⁰ Global Shelter Cluster, *Effect of The Rain Update in Mogadishu*, 17 June 2016, p. 2 and Asylum Research Consultancy, *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, (2018:52)

¹⁶¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), *Somalia: Drought response, Situation Report No. 10 (as of 31 May 2017)*, 31 May 2017, p. 8

¹⁶² Asylum Research Consultancy-ARC (2018:48), *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, 25th January 2018 (COI up to 17 October 2017)

¹⁶³ World Bank, *Somalia Urbanization Review (2021:88)*

¹⁶⁴ World Bank, *Somalia Urbanization Review (2021:96)*

¹⁶⁵ World Bank, *Somalia Urbanization Review (2021:90)*

¹⁶⁶ The World Bank (2020:88), *Somalia Urbanization Review; Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development*. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington DC

¹⁶⁷ Mahad Mohamed Jama (2018), *Public officials and Waste Management in Mogadishu*, World Bank. Masters Dissertation, University of Kampala (unpublished)

collection and disposal of waste and share potential costs incurred by informal waste collectors.¹⁶⁸ Informal waste collection happens on a volunteer basis and is organised at community level.¹⁶⁹ Urban poor, particularly women and youth, are often incentivised to initiate collection of both household and business waste for a small fee.¹⁷⁰ However, the inappropriate disposal of the waste through unregulated means, i.e., septic tanks and small streams, exposes the community to water contamination and outbreaks of waterborne diseases like cholera.

While the BRA is tasked with collection and disposal of waste from the city, the Ministry of Natural Resources oversees dumping sites. Only two official dumping sites have been identified in Mogadishu: Qashinweyne in Karan and Kaawo in Madina.¹⁷¹

The provision of waste management services in Mogadishu follows the pattern of a stratified organization of the society in Mogadishu, where wealth and social status are key determinants of access to waste disposal. Private companies charge up to USD 7 for collection and disposal of waste – a fee much above the reach of the urban poor and displaced communities, corresponding to roughly a month's rent.¹⁷² Slums are not seen as 'rightful recipients' of the formal systems of solid waste management and are excluded entirely from proper municipal solid waste services.¹⁷³ In this absence, gatekeepers in IDP settlements and community groups, organise alternative access to waste services.

If the responsibility of maintaining waste management systems was distributed amongst all stakeholders, and it became a joint effort, the

system's quality would improve. However, at present, this is not the case; the poor and most vulnerable groups receive fewer benefits and bear the brunt of the social and environmental consequences of low-quality waste management.¹⁷⁴ Poor drainage often results in flooding and open sewerage regularly contaminates water sources, causing disease outbreaks.

Up until the civil war, waste management was well-maintained by the MoH and WHO; the municipal department managed and controlled solid waste and temporary and terminal disposal areas. Waste disposal bins were available in public areas, and vehicles removed and disposed of the waste. However, since the collapse of the military regime in 1991, most urban services have been neglected; residents handle their own waste, and burn or bury it in holes near their homes or simply dump in open areas, transforming public areas into massive rubbish heaps. Local and international NGOs help to dispose of these heaps by shifting them to dumpsites outside the town. But the problem prevails and expands, as the population of the city is increasing.

One important evolution since the collapse is the creation of the PPP policy in delivering services to the city's population, which has the potential to enact sustainable change – if the government prioritizes it.¹⁷⁵

Despite being a necessary public good, solid waste management has not received adequate attention from the public, private nor the non-profit sector.¹⁷⁶ Waste management is considered to have low profit margins, high risks, with a difficulty in collecting fees;¹⁷⁷

¹⁶⁸ Erik Bryld et al (2019) *Shelter provision in Mogadishu Understanding politics for a more inclusive city also see*

¹⁶⁹ Charlotte Bonnet, Erik Bryld, Christine Kamau, Mohamed Mohamud and Fathia Farah (2020:455) *Inclusive shelter provision in Mogadishu* in Environment and Urbanization international Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). Vol 32 (2): 447–462.

¹⁷⁰ Charlotte Bonnet, Erik Bryld, Christine Kamau, Mohamed Mohamud and Fathia Farah (2020:455) *Inclusive shelter provision in Mogadishu* in Environment and Urbanization international Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). Vol 32 (2): 447–462.

¹⁷¹ Abdikadir Ahmed Omar, Md. Sahadat Hossain and Mst. Mahmuda Parvin (2018:22-26) *Study on Knowledge, Attitude and Practices towards the Solid Waste Management in Karan District, Mogadishu Somalia*. Environmental Contaminants Reviews (ECR)

¹⁷² Tana and IIED, *Shelter Provision in Mogadishu: Understanding Politics for a More Inclusive City* (2019:29)

¹⁷³ Tana and IIED, *Shelter Provision in Mogadishu: Understanding Politics for a More Inclusive City* (2019:32)

¹⁷⁴ KII with the Director of the Municipality of Mogadishu, 8 February 2022

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ The World Bank (2020:90), *Somalia Urbanization Review; Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development*. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. Washington DC

¹⁷⁷ The World Bank (2020:137), *Somalia Urbanization Review; Fostering Cities as Anchors of Development*. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. Washington DC

leaving non-state actors reluctant to get into the business.

A successful waste management system/policy with environmental justice at the forefront could contribute to a more equal balance of power within Mogadishu. However, if waste management continues to be a source of income or politically incentivised (during election times), then sustainable change will be challenging.

With the BRA (on paper) managing both water, sanitation, and waste management, these systems are interlinked; however, as is evident, there is no operational coordination of these systems, causing severe gaps in service provision, leading to health risks for the population.

The significant gaps in the collection and disposal of waste generated by the city of Mogadishu pose risks to the environment and to public health. The uncollected waste gets mixed with human and animal excreta and is dumped indiscriminately in the streets and in drains, contributing to the breeding of insect and rodent vectors as well as to the spread of diseases.

Rapid urbanization without affordable, sustainable, and inclusive waste management services overwhelms the capacity of the municipal authority to provide the most basic services and poses risks, especially to the lowest-income residents.¹⁷⁸ Solid waste management is virtually non-existent across all cities, and in Mogadishu, where there is no central wastewater evacuation network, most households dispose of their waste through septic tanks, exposing the aquifer to contamination.

Some steps have been taken to manage the risk, such as the PPP policy adopted by the BRA. If complemented with environmental justice and with the Urban Agenda 2030's specific sections related to sustainable development goals (i.e.,

eradicate poverty and hunger, reduce child mortality, and ensure environmental sustainability), this policy can potentially expand the reach, quality, and sustainability of the waste management system in Mogadishu.

Finance

Relatively excluded from the global banking system, Somalia's formalised financial sector is still nascent. The financial sector in Somalia comprises a combination of formal, private and informal actors. At the helm of the financial sector is the Central Bank of Somalia, which was recently re-established in 2009 following long periods of unstable governance. The commercial banking sector is still young and small in size. As of 2019, there were about nine licensed banking institutions.¹⁷⁹ As a whole, coverage is low for traditional banking services with only 15 % of the Somali population having an account, where 7 % are women, and less than 5 % are active users.¹⁸⁰

Comparably, money transfer and mobile money services have become increasingly popular in Mogadishu, with 73 % of adult users.¹⁸¹ The rise in demand for these services is supported by the presence of private money transfer operators (MTOs). Originally created as informal banking networks to fill in the gaps left by the absence of formalized commercial banks, eleven MTOs have received licensing from the Central Bank since 2019. Institutions such as Dahabshil, Amal and Amaana provide both banking and money transfer services, to facilitate a combination of services such as individual and salary transfers, retail transactions, diaspora remittances, and cash transfers from development organizations.¹⁸² MTOs rely on commercial banks for their typically more robust anti-money laundering technological infrastructure in measures to combat terrorism.¹⁸³ Presently,

¹⁷⁸ The World Bank (2020:74), *Somalia Country Environmental Analysis*, June 2020

¹⁷⁹ UNIDO. (2020). *Somalia Financial Sector: Technical Report*.

¹⁸⁰ UNIDO. (2020). *Somalia Financial Sector: Technical Report*.

¹⁸¹ SPARK and BINA. (2021). *The Somali Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Ecosystem: Challenges and Opportunities*.

¹⁸² Calhoun, N., Cabot Venton, C., Clarey, T., Dalmar, A. and Bashir, F. (2020). *Mapping of Financial Services for SHGs and Barriers for Women to Access Microfinance Services in Somalia*. Concern Worldwide.

¹⁸³ UNIDO. (2020). *Somalia Financial Sector: Technical Report*.

mobile money functions as the main payment instrument by individuals and businesses alike.¹⁸⁴

The Central Bank is the governing and regulatory authority of financial operations, but it faces succinct limitations in its ability to enforce policies, as it has limited legal basis to regulate operations and practices such as microfinance institutions (MFIs), who remain largely unrecognized by the government.¹⁸⁵ The unclear division of fiscal responsibilities between the Federal government and the member states has been a key challenge in governing the sector, resulting in lack of strategic alignment between the two levels of government. An exception to this, however, is Mogadishu: revenue in the city is administered by the MoF as a result of Mogadishu being domiciled within the Federal government's jurisdiction.

Informal channels of tax collection are also very prevalent; e.g., communal channels (*qaaraan*), which are accessed by family and clan members, and contributions to religious channels (*zakaat*), used by the urban poor and marginalized groups to access 'public goods'. Moreover, al-Shabaab have managed to create a parallel administrative system for collecting rent, which entirely evades the government's Anti-Money Laundering (AML-CFT) regulations.¹⁸⁶ Al-Shabaab collects as much revenue as the formal authorities, with more than half the amount coming from Mogadishu¹⁸⁷, and has, according to Hiraal institute, "substantial money reserves running a financial surplus", making it the only Somali polity that has achieved such a status.

Access to credit and the ability to invest are strongly determined by income level, clan affiliation, and location of residence. The major means of raising finance for both individuals and businesses is still through informal sources such as family, friends, and business acquaintances as the in-availability of financial infrastructure, un-favourable terms and conditions of financial institutions as well as

inability to provide large collaterals prohibits the development of effective credit financing tools. This leads to the financial exclusion of certain groups, especially women, young people and minority clans who have potentially viable businesses but weaker social ties. Micro-enterprises in particular struggle to access finance; nine out of ten businesses in Mogadishu's informal sector use informal channels of financing, i.e., mobile money and microfinance institutions, which have improved the inclusiveness of the financial sector as they ease access.

Similar to other city systems, the financial operating environment remains largely unregulated. There is no significant authority in charge of the regulation of trade or transportation. In the absence of state regulation, Somali businesses rely on the social fabric of trust and credit, founded on either clan identity or Islamic ties, to manage transactions and provide credit to each other. Due to the absence of regulatory laws and enforcement, and of ongoing insecurity, there is low confidence in the sector; this in turn limits Somali financial institutions' access to the global network of correspondent banks needed to channel remittances and ODA. While firms access alternative finance through donors, diaspora investments and clan networks, these informal mechanisms often make it challenging to invest at scale or over longer time horizons.

Somalia's financial system became operational again in 2012, following the establishment of a new government based on the Provisional Constitution which was adopted in the same year. During the three decades of a failed state, the system relied on informal mechanisms of financial transactions mostly through the Islamic money-lending system (*Hawalaad*) and communal credit financing systems. Today, the *Hawalaad* remains one of the most important lifelines of Mogadishu as it has gradually grown into a formalised money transfer system. The financial sector in Mogadishu reflects a "limited

¹⁸⁴ UNIDO. (2020). Somalia Financial Sector: Technical Report.

¹⁸⁵ Bryld et al., p.28

¹⁸⁶ Mary Harper (2020), *Somalia conflict: Al-Shabab 'collects more revenue than government'* BBC World Service [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54690561)

[africa-54690561](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54690561) News Published, 26 October 2020 Accessed 20 June 2022

¹⁸⁷ Hiraal Institute (2020) A Losing Game: Countering Al-Shabab's Financial System, Countering Al-Shabab's Financial System

access order,” an elite division of spoils in which rival political cartels control and divert financial flows to and through the rentier state as the elite bargains takes precedence over the terms of sharing the financial spoils.

Contestation over revenue collection occurs within the Federal Government; competing systems of governance (traditional and religious) as well as non-state actors, are simultaneously collecting taxes; consequently, imposing an expanded tax burden on Mogadishu inhabitants.

The finance sector is strongly linked with the diaspora, as it contributes to remittances/investments in road infrastructure, linking up to transportation and energy systems, health, sanitation, and water systems, as well as in education. Political and economic connections to the diaspora allow on the one hand many investments in Mogadishu that might bring progress, such as housing and infrastructure; on the other, they exclude population groups without wealth or connections. There is conflict among the levels of government regarding revenue sharing as there are no formula-based transfers to the states and allocations are based on a discretionary decision by the Federal government.

Financial risks arise from gaps in regulation of certain parts of the financial system; vulnerable populations are not protected if they default from risks. Disputes may also occur when borrowers encounter loss of business due to security incidents. It is challenging to respond to these cases in a context with limited insurance services. Other risks include financial scammers; many people have invested in fake profitable online forex and cryptocurrencies since the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020. The Central Bank is not properly supervising these activities but has instead carried out awareness-raising campaigns on social media platforms, to warn against entrusting these companies.

Healthcare

The healthcare system of Somalia is supported by different sectors, including publicly funded healthcare, private sector institutions, i.e., pharmacies, hospitals, clinics and diagnostic centres, as well as traditional and informal institutions, i.e., practitioners of traditional and complementary medicine (TCMPs).

Public healthcare is composed of four service levels; rural, sub-district, district, and regional capitals. In addition, there are specialist centres on tuberculosis, antiretroviral therapy and mental health.¹⁸⁸ From Figure 1 (below) it is evident that a significant geographic disparity in the country-wide distribution of these facilities exists – with the majority located in the northern half of the country.

As of 2022, there was an estimated 61 public facilities, 105 private institutions and 49 clinics with operating licenses in the Banadir region, as well as nine referral hospitals run by the Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH), of which two are managed by the Banadir Regional Administration (BRA)’s Directorate of Health (DoH).¹⁸⁹ Some hospitals such as the Erdogan Hospital and Zam-Zam are predominantly donor-funded, supported by the Turkish and Egyptian government respectively.¹⁹⁰ 17 of Mogadishu’s health facilities are run by regional non-governmental (NGOs).

Figure 1: An overview of functional public facilities in Somalia (2020)¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ HIPS & City University of Mogadishu (2020)

¹⁸⁹ Interview with the BRA’s Directorate of Health, Mogadishu, 07/02/2022.

¹⁹⁰ The Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS), *Durable Solutions Framework - Local Integration Focus: Banadir region*, March 2017, p. 28

¹⁹¹ WHO, HeRAMS - Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System, *Somalia*, [url](#)



Up until the COVID-19 pandemic, FMOH served as the principal administrator. After that point, regional departments took up most of the responsibilities. However, the BRA does not run the health facilities directly but works in partnership with NGOs to deliver management. The DoH's role includes oversight and supervision of the 11 tuberculosis centres, four nutrition centres, and public health institutions in the area in conjunction with national and international NGOs. To complement, most public health services are run under donor-funded programmes, focusing on Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (RMNCH), malnutrition, and management of disease outbreaks such as measles, cholera/acute water diarrhoea.¹⁹² The Turkish Red Crescent Society and the Red Crescent Society of the UAE are also present in facilitating public health initiatives within the IDP settlements, a considerably more recent development that started around 2005.¹⁹³

Despite being a statutory district-wide duty, most healthcare is delivered through private and non-profit humanitarian sectors.¹⁹⁴ Although there have been signs of growth, the private sector has remained largely uncontrolled and opaque.¹⁹⁵ As such, in an effort to track key health indicators for the area, the DoHs mandated that the 105 private hospitals and the 49 clinics in the region follow a monthly reporting schedule. Within a weak state regulatory environment, NGO-led public health programmes are thus accountable to strict international standards which enables them to maintain compliance with the quality of medicines, staff training, public health communication and available medical equipment.^{196,197}

In the absence of state provisions, especially in the aftermath of the civil war, the private sector filled the gaps related to the provision of healthcare services.¹⁹⁸ The private sector is an important player in the system as it has contributed to the availability of specialised services, such as MRI scans and dialysis machines, that were formerly not available in the country for which citizens used to travel abroad to access at a cheaper rate.

In Mogadishu, returnees invest in public clinics, consequently boosting the number of facilities within the city.¹⁹⁹ However, in the absence of overall state regulations, the number of small pharmacies – run by unqualified or undertrained staff – offering prescription drugs on sale has increased heavily, and traders are increasingly buying prescription drugs (near or beyond expiry) from the Gulf and sell them in the streets.²⁰⁰ In addition, to support people in an unregulated healthcare system, clan members and relatives are playing an important role in organizing fundraising for medical treatment (known as Qaadhaan), or providing support in the form of a place to stay for relatives, family,

¹⁹² *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:60)

¹⁹³ Grunewald, F., (2012) *Aid in a city at war: the case of Mogadishu, Somalia*

¹⁹⁴ World Bank, *Somalia Urbanization Review*, pg 88

¹⁹⁵ *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:54)

¹⁹⁶ *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:54)

¹⁹⁷ UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), *Situation Analysis of Children in Somalia*, 2016, p. 22

¹⁹⁸ International Alert, *Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector: Case Study Somalia*, (2006:497)

¹⁹⁹ *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:58)

²⁰⁰ International Alert, *Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector: Case Study Somalia*, (2006:483)

sub-clan or clan members while receiving treatment.²⁰¹

In Mogadishu, access to healthcare services has grown due to the heavy presence of the international aid community and due to investments in private clinics by returning Somalis.²⁰² However, even as access to healthcare facilities has increased and is available to all, there is great disparity in access amongst different population groups.²⁰³ Disparities are reflected in the ways people prefer, or choose, one facility over another. Among the most critical determining factors to accessing healthcare in the city, is money, distance, status and connections, as well as clan affiliation. A 2018 household poll showed that the most used facilities were public hospitals (39.2%), NGO-led dispensaries (25.4%) and pharmacies (17.7%);²⁰⁴ majority of people in Mogadishu receive health services through pharmacies and clinics, whereas persons in IDP settlements make use of local NGO dispensaries and public hospitals.^{205,206}

Over the last few years, access to healthcare has widened due to both the increase of international aid, and investments into private clinics by returning Somalis. Despite this, having money remains the most crucial determining factor of whether one will receive quality healthcare or not. This disproportionately affects minority groups such as IDPs, orphanages, street children and rehabilitation centres. For these groups, the BRA's DoH administrators have set up mobile clinics offering free healthcare services. Other factors that influence accessibility to healthcare include distance to facilities (especially in rural areas), status and connections as well as clan affiliation. In terms of service. Delivery in health facilities, there exist some challenges to widespread coverage, as evidenced by a lack of emergency plan that would be sufficient to respond to the onslaught of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the

limited capacity of personnel and expertise. Additionally, Benadir has experienced shortages of medical supplies.

To ensure more people gain access, some private hospitals waive doctors' fees once a week or the first month following the opening of new hospitals. Others organise medical tents or mobile clinics offering free health services to orphanages, street children, rehabilitation facilities, and IDPs settlements.

There is a stark difference between the quality of care and availability of services, medication and equipment, between public health facilities managed by the government and those managed by donors and/or under a public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement. Donor or PPP arrangements are ascribed to higher standards of practice and are comparatively more accountable for meeting requirements than Federally-run facilities. Even though there are national treatment guidelines for public facilities, aligned with the Essential Package of Health Services (EPHS), the MoH has failed to fulfil its responsibility of overseeing the implementation of these guidelines in government-run facilities.

There is sharp difference between the quality of health facilities run by donors and those run by the government concerning the quality of healthcare provided and the availability of services. Government-funded facilities are less funded than those run by international donors, and donors are accountable to international standards and procedures.

The private healthcare sector – often of better quality than the public sector – is unregulated, unaffordable, and widely distrusted by many Mogadishu residents. Overcharging for services, unnecessary tests, prescription of inappropriate treatment, preferential treatment schedules and unnecessary follow-up appointments, are among the obstacles for low-income residents to

²⁰¹ Worldbank, Somalia Urbanization Review (2021:100)

²⁰² *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:58)

²⁰³ The Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS), *Durable Solutions Framework - Local Integration Focus: Benadir region*, March 2017, p. 28

²⁰⁴ *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:59)

²⁰⁵ *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:447)

²⁰⁶ *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:59)

access private health facilities^{207, 208}. Despite offering free quality services to certain population groups, low-income populations are unable to reach the facilities due to high transportation costs, as the healthcare facilities often are unevenly distributed across Mogadishu's districts.

During election periods, in an effort to gain legitimacy among the public and present themselves as 'caring', politicians put pressure on the MoH to distribute medications in their constituencies and occasionally sponsor patients with severe/rare health conditions. Unfortunately, outside of election season, there is a general disinterest towards healthcare from politicians, since attempts at regulation are made for political gain.

The distribution of power is unclear because negotiations between the city and national elites happen behind closed doors. However, there is still a clear influence of the elites on personnel recruitment in the healthcare system, since clan affiliations and political favours strongly affect appointments of top managerial and administrative positions in the public healthcare system.

All public hospitals in Mogadishu, except Medina, SOS, Keysaney and Banadir, have been rehabilitated or constructed in the last 15 years.

In 2021, the transfer of primary healthcare responsibilities from the MoH back to the BRA and into the government's control was a controversial matter, as these responsibilities had been administrated by individuals in the wake of the civil war. The key argument for the transfer relied on the fact that, unless BRA was ready to otherwise compensate them, investors were managing the hospitals through private arrangements – causing further disparities in access. Today, BRA collaborates with the Al-Jazeera and Yardimeli hospitals at the technical

level, where ongoing supervision and reporting are similar to other public health facilities.²⁰⁹

The healthcare system is interlinked with and exposed to similar risks as water, waste management, sanitation, food systems, and education to varying degrees. Poor sanitary practices, waste management, and water and food systems lead to public health challenges and an increase in communicable diseases. Combined with Mogadishu's rapid urbanisation, this puts further strain on an already fragile healthcare system.

There are three levels of risks within the healthcare system in Mogadishu; first, there are risks of indirect or direct attacks on health professionals and government-owned vehicles involved in healthcare services. The recent targeting of BRA outreach vehicles for COVID-19 screening in Karan District in March 2021, highlights the major threat of inferior security measures to people's access to health services.^{210,211,212} Second, there are health facility-related risks: old infrastructure, poor maintenance, improper facility waste management, and contamination control risks. Third, poor sanitary conditions and misdiagnosis put patients at risk of contamination within health facilities, mistreatment, and lack of medical usage instructions, among others. Some of the risk mitigation measures taken by BRA's DoH include relocating critical primary healthcare services to more accessible and safe facilities. The directorate rehabilitated five facilities to ensure better infrastructure, as well as implemented a series of trainings to increase the staff's awareness of patient risks. The directorate advocates for better healthcare risk identification mechanisms/regulations to reduce patient risks in the healthcare system of Mogadishu.

²⁰⁷ *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:58)

²⁰⁸ Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, *Beneficiaries of conflict: a qualitative study of people's trust in the private health care system in Mogadishu, Somalia*, 01 August 2017

²⁰⁹ KII with the Director General of the BRA's Directorate of Health, Mogadishu, 7 February 2022

²¹⁰ *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:58)

²¹¹ Landinfo, *Somalia: Medical treatment and medication*, 14 August 2014, p. 12-13

²¹² *Situation in South and Central Somalia (including Mogadishu)*, Asylum Research Consultancy (2018:58)

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